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

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Our cover: HMS *Intrepid* on Exercise Teamwork '88 in Grytangen Fjord, Norway. The ship has landed British and Dutch Marines. The landing craft in the water are Dutch. Photo courtesy Captain Nick Matson, Royal Marines.

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President's Notes

Academic Freedom

The world and the international security environment in which we operate is changing at a pace unthinkable just a few years ago. These changes and those still to come are outdating many of our basic assumptions and the military doctrines, plans and programs based on those assumptions. More than at any other time in our recent history, we in the military need the new ideas and innovative thinking that can come only from an extraordinarily active intellectual exchange among ourselves and those interested in us. The senior service colleges, and the Naval War College in particular, should be in the forefront of this important activity, just as they have been during key periods of the past.

Coping with change requires that new concepts be encouraged, shared, debated, and subjected to professional scrutiny and refinement. We conduct this process mainly by use of the printed word. Inevitably, new ideas will be critical of current policies and will threaten the *status quo*. From its beginning, the Naval War College has been at the center of such helpful controversy, providing a forum for professional debate within the Navy on the issues of the day. This is a critical function, vital to the development of the naval service. It should be protected zealously. To preserve our advantage, naval and otherwise, we must insist that our bureaucratic structure permit itself to be challenged.

Admiral Kurth spent 19 years in and out of the Soviet Union, including tours as Naval Attaché (1975-1977) and Defense Attaché (1985-1987). He is fluent in Russian and holds a Ph.D. in government (Soviet Studies) from Harvard.

Department of Defense (DOD) prepublication review requirements, however, appear to dampen the fires of professional ferment. Papers intended for public release which address certain categories of information and are written by persons drawing a DOD paycheck require prepublication security and policy review in Washington. While there is a review process in position now, there is a new effort underway to reissue review requirements. Much informal information reaching us indicates that the effort has been sponsored by people who would tighten the requirements. Presently, for scholarly papers we rely on the professional judgment of the author and the editorial review process of such professional journals as the *Naval War College Review* (which includes senior officers with many decades of experience behind them). The DOD review process relies on opinions sought from military and technical experts within the Chief of Naval Operations staff, the naval systems commands, program managers and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DOD agencies. This process seeks to ascertain whether security is being compromised or policies misstated. The lengthy bureaucratic process involved in prepublication review can result in a form of censorship and discouragement that we can ill afford. It is ironic that as the Russians are discarding their stifling Soviet system, the DOD is proposing to restate its requirement for prepublication review and perhaps strengthen it, particularly with regard to the more troublesome issue of policy review.

The requirement for prepublication review is understandable. On the one hand, it is an effort to maintain the security of classified information in the midst of an information revolution. On the other hand, it is an effort to maintain necessary policy discipline within government, but that aspect of review carries with it the threat of stifling healthy discussion. While these two aspects of review may not be meant to stifle professional debate, such could be the result.

In my view, the forces supporting renewal of review requirements are focusing on the wrong target. In the minds and intellectual activity of the military officers now attending our senior service colleges are the solutions of the future. Our students and faculty must be allowed and encouraged to express and discuss openly the issues touching their profession. The security review and editorial procedures currently in place in our service colleges are sufficiently effective at meeting the requirements for both security and policy integrity.

There is a test which is sometimes given job-seekers to measure their talent to resolve issues. A simulated "in" box is set before the candidate with papers identifying problems from low-order to high-order of difficulty. The test apparently plays to the human tendency to empty the "in" box of the low-order problems first, perhaps never to get to the crucial issue. I believe it may be this human tendency at work in security and policy review.

Within the curiously titled category of "human intelligence," the most damaging losses have occurred as a result of espionage and treason. Security and policy review is not a cure—it is not even relevant to the prevention of those crimes.

Perhaps our second most serious problem is the divulging of classified information to the news media.

At our media conference in March, Mr. Fred Francis of NBC Television was one of our most valuable and forthcoming panel members. Without a hint of arrogance, Mr. Francis told our students about the way he gets his job done. He told about his sources of information and said the following to the officers of all services who were attending the conference:

"Let me be very blunt. In the real world of reporting, especially in Washington, I don't need you. I really don't. I don't need to talk to your commanders; I don't need to talk to your branch of service. In the course of covering the military on a day-to-day basis, I do not need to talk to your leaders or your decision makers.

"It is just a simple fact of how it all works. Put another way, there is always someone—*always* someone—who is going to give me the information I need for my story."

On another occasion, a print media friend of mine, who is the head of the Washington bureau for his newspaper, recounted to me how a presidential candidate, in return for exclusive coverage by this well-known reporter, had promised, if elected, to leak like a sieve.

Those examples are evidence of the high-order of difficulty in control of classified and policy information. We do not confront such practices with a review policy, apparently because we can't. So, we concentrate on the low-order difficulty, with its low payoff. We do this with a massive and detailed review of the articles and speeches by uniformed officers and scholars who may write for the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* or the *Naval War College Review* to prevent any inadvertent or unintentional revelation of classified information or deviation from policy. This is like the drunk who lost his keys in the dark, but sought them under a streetlight because there he could see better.

The services employ scholars to teach at their educational institutions. Those scholars may be experts on arms control or American government, or on many another subject. Currently, under a disclaimer that the thoughts that such a scholar expresses are his alone and in no way are connected to the federal department which pays his salary, he may present alternative views to policy on a given issue. But, if through renewal of review requirements the outcome would be to make them more restrictive, then this scholar may be prevented from bringing his useful expertise to bear. Perhaps he will become a Preston Tucker, stifled by the Detroit automobile moguls because there are costs to innovation—costs that come with the prominence or

acceptance of new ideas. More likely he will leave federal service and express his views unfettered by thought police.

There are costs to academic freedom. Bad old ideas tend to be overturned. Bad new ones die. Sometimes good ones are endangered and must be defended. While it makes sense that in public concert senior officials sing from the same sheet of music, it makes no sense to prevent individual musicians, properly identified as individual citizens who are not singing in the chorus, from testing variations of the score. We cannot turn falsehood or error into truth by failing to challenge them. They simply remain falsehood or error.

This does not mean that most accepted thought is false or in error. In fact, most is accurate and sensible. But unless challenged openly, the false and erroneous, masquerading as something better than they are, and the formerly but no longer true, gain power to hurt our country, our services and our causes. In contrast, the accurate and true have the strength to stand tall amidst the wreckage of the properly exposed false.

In an increasingly complex world, we need the ideas that can only come from an adherence to academic freedom. At Newport, intellectual growth is our *sine qua non*, and the free expression of this growth, in the form of new ideas and innovative thinking, is the foundation on which our contribution—present and future—will rest.

Now I am going to wave an American flag. As we are about to enter the 21st century, in our minds we should weave these words onto that flag: "Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write." Those words are a gift to us from John Adams, second President of the United States. They are sound guidance to all of us charged with the defense of our country under circumstances that are new, challenging, and immensely important.

I welcome letters of comment.

Ronald J. Kurth

RONALD J. KURTH
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

The Navy's Battle of the Budget: Soviet Style

Norman Cigar

Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to power in March 1985 has spurred a reassessment of Soviet military doctrine and spending, which, among its results, could have a major impact on the Soviet Navy's development. One of Gorbachev's most notable initiatives so far has been to articulate a strategy that simultaneously addresses the Western threat to the U.S.S.R. and the latter's own domestic woes. The more extensive reliance on political means, such as arms control, to deal with security concerns, in effect, can also mesh with his domestic agenda calling for *perestroyka*—restructuring—of the country's economy. In response to these domestic economic imperatives, Soviet leaders appear to be encouraging a rethinking—spearheaded by the civilian think tanks—of the appropriate role and claim to resources of the military in general, including the navy. This could lead to substantial cuts in the Soviet Navy's budget in future years, with an impact on its construction program and mission.

Reconsideration of the navy's role has engendered an intense debate, particularly between the civilian think tanks and the navy. While this debate is far from the structured process familiar to those who follow equivalent discussions in the West, far-reaching financial and doctrinal issues may nevertheless be at stake. Despite the obvious professional interests and personal passions involved, even major differences usually are couched at a level of openness still well short of what one would find in the West. *Glasnost* notwithstanding, participants, particularly those in the military who may feel more vulnerable than civilians, still seem to prefer to argue in the discreet manner of traditional Soviet political discourse. The use in public of such established techniques as historical analogies and oblique allusions continues to be the safest way to present arguments on a sensitive topic.

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Dealing with the West's Naval Capabilities

Among both civilians and the military, there appears to be a broad appreciation of not only the challenge posed to Soviet political and military interests by the naval power of the West, and that of the United States in particular, but also of the key role that naval power plays in the West's defense strategy. If anything, Soviet awareness of the challenge was heightened in the 1980s by the U.S. Navy's enhanced nuclear and conventional capabilities and then amplified by the assertive application of naval power posited by the publicly announced U.S. "Maritime Strategy." Significantly, when Marshal Sergei Akhromeev was Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, he would be briefed first of all on the location of U.S. naval forces when he came to his office each morning.[1]

While the U.S. naval challenge is certainly the key Soviet naval concern, it is not the only one. Moscow must also consider that posed by the other Western navies. Soviet observers have devoted particular attention to the Japanese Navy's "latest military technology," increased area of operations, growing budget, and possible acquisition of aircraft carriers.[2]

Economic Imperatives and Defense

Even if it were possible to match the West's capabilities, it would not only work against the détente on which Gorbachev has set his hopes for the new inflow of aid and technology that is needed to modernize the Soviet system, but it would also be exorbitantly expensive. Gorbachev has emphasized that, in order to facilitate economic restructuring, it is imperative to scale back military spending in general, which he believes has played a major role in obstructing the U.S.S.R.'s economic development. In fact, he has maintained (probably for domestic consumption) that the arms race is a Western strategy designed to exhaust the U.S.S.R. economically and therefore requires a slowing down in both the U.S.S.R. and the West if the U.S.S.R. is to strengthen itself.[3] From Moscow's perspective, the current trend of the competition would prove even more unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. in the future. General of the Army Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, for example, has underlined that "The potential for [Japan's] militarization is enormous. . . . The scientific-technical and industrial potential of many of the countries allied to the U.S. permit the acceleration of any type of arms race."[4] As Gorbachev has acknowledged, "We cannot permit ourselves the luxury of 'imitating' the U.S., Nato, and Japan in all their military-technological innovations."[5] His "spin doctors" have railed against Soviet military spending in even more explicit terms. *Izvestiya*'s political observer, Stanislav Kondrashov, for example, bluntly called defense "a holy matter . . . not holy in the sense of religious worship, [but] a fetish,

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blind faith." In fact, he claimed that a lowering of military spending is unavoidable if Gorbachev's *perestroyka* is going to succeed, presenting the choice starkly as: "Guns or butter."[6]

Measuring the West's Threat

Soviet leaders view the overall threat, and in particular the likelihood of an attack by Nato, as having diminished considerably. They believe that there is scope for accommodation. In a speech to Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze maintained that no one can argue that the threat has not been reduced and "This is a reality of which every Soviet individual is aware."[7] In part, this may stem not only from a more realistic assessment of the situation, but also from a need to show success as a result of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives and as a rationale to justify cuts in Soviet defense spending. In that sense, Gorbachev's promotion of a defensive doctrine (reasonable sufficiency); political means (especially arms control); and the resolution of regional conflicts, which would result in lower international tensions and, therefore, a decreased need for military spending, are closely interrelated.[8]

The civilian think tanks have furnished expert support for the political leadership's reassessment of the threat, with reassurances that even unilateral cuts in military spending are both practical and safe. For example, Oleg N. Bykov, Deputy Director of the Institute for Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), has noted that: "Our military machine is so enormous that even a whole series of unilateral cutbacks will not turn us into a second-rate military power. . . . We do not always have to look at the West. The time has come to act, based above all on our own internal political and economic interests. . . . I must say this bluntly: in my opinion there is no need at this time to frighten ourselves. The situation in Europe is radically different from what it was at the beginning of the 1940s or the mid-1950s. The world has changed."[9]

The Age of the Think Tank

Under Gorbachev, the civilian think tanks have gained unprecedented prominence in Soviet military affairs. They have often articulated the issues on defense and have provided the political leaders with an alternative source of military expertise and policy options. In general, they have been closer to Gorbachev's thinking than has been the military.[10]

The relationship between the civilian experts and the military, not surprisingly, has often been adversarial. Civilian experts are resentful that, until recently, the military has excluded them from any role in military matters in general. The withholding of information from civilians has been

a particularly sore point. One analyst aired this complaint openly in *Izvestiya*: "Alas, only yesterday there were as many military secrets kept from our own people as from 'the foreign military'. . . . Society should monitor more widely and effectively the decisions of the military, because these decisions have a significant impact on much that concerns us all."[11]

Military spending has also become a salient issue of debate now that civilian experts are able to express their views publicly. Typically, Bykov speaks of "the enormous harm to our economy [caused by] the need to maintain parity even at a constant level," and claims that "unproductive military expenditures shackle *perestroyka*." He accuses the military of being "a gigantic uncontrollable enclave" within the economy, "functioning according to its own logic and devouring colossal resources."[12] As Georgii Arbatov, Director of the influential Institute for the USA and Canada, has remarked, "the time when defense issues were above criticism is ending."[13] The role of the Congress of the People's Deputies in military issues is also expanding, further increasing civilian involvement.

As one could expect, there seems to be resentment within the Soviet military in general against the civilian encroachment on what was once a tightly guarded preserve. The commander of the navy, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, for example, has quipped that "Unfortunately, recently many incompetent publications on this topic [i.e., military] by ignorant individuals are creating confusion and chaos and are leading to an attempt to decide on the extremely important issue of the country's defense from positions which are emotional rather than reasonable. On the issue of the country's defense this is not only harmful but dangerous."[14]

A work published by the military, in fact, stresses that in order to strengthen the country's defenses against aggression, "reliance on the experience and knowledge of the military leadership, and on their participation in working out the most effective solutions" is essential even for "the political leadership."[15] Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets, the First Deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, was critical of the fact that the navy leadership had had no input on decisions affecting naval development under Stalin and Khrushchev.[16] One can assume that, although addressing the safer past, the navy's desire for meaningful input in such matters also applies to the present.

Targeting the Navy's Mission

The think tanks and other civilians have taken the lead in public criticism of the Soviet Navy, voicing openly what they see as the navy's most appropriate role in the changing environment. For example, a front-page article in *Pravda*, on the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to the Northern Fleet's headquarters at Murmansk in October 1987, apparently set the tone for the

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new civilian perception of what the navy's reduced, defensive role should be within the context of *perestroyka*. The article praised the navy's role in World War II and, significantly, highlighted its "strenuous safeguarding of the Red Army's flanks, [and] its carrying out jointly with the ground forces of a protracted defense of naval bases, islands, and the littoral."[17] In his work on the military thinker M. V. Frunze, Colonel-General Makhmut A. Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, quotes Frunze as saying that "the fate of a future war will be determined on the continental theaters of military operations and the main mission of the Navy is to support the operations of land groupings on the maritime sectors"—a statement that appears to reflect a similar perception among the current military leadership.[18]

Others have more explicitly drawn implications as to the navy's more appropriate defensive role. As Aleksei Arbatov, Director of the Disarmament and Security Department of IMEMO, notes, the Soviet Navy should have only enough means necessary to defend its ballistic missile submarines in coastal waters. He rejected explicitly such missions as attacking Western sea lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific as "hardly consonant with defensive strategy." In fact, he concludes bluntly: " . . . it would be useful to reassess the plans for constructing a large surface fleet, including aircraft-carrying ships, nuclear cruisers, and landing ships. The existing forces, it seems, are already fully sufficient to defend the Soviet coast and to defend our sea-based long-range missile strategic forces in coastal waters. Clearly, it would be more convenient to concentrate further efforts [instead] on constructing a smaller number and fewer types of higher quality multi-purpose submarines armed with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes and, if needed, with long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs (Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles)."[19]

In fact, another departmental director at IMEMO, G. Kunadze, discussing the navy and the Western threat to the U.S.S.R., concludes that the only sea lines of communication that the U.S.S.R. has to worry about might be on the northern route—and that is qualified as only "perhaps." Suggesting that the development of the navy is tied more to copying the United States rather than to real defense needs, he asks rhetorically even about the Pacific: "Is there a direct threat to our security from that area? Or, does the Soviet naval presence there in general reflect the logic [only] of a symmetrical response to the actions of the U.S.? Is such a response in the Asia-Pacific region really necessary from the point of view of the security of our eastern frontiers?"[20] Calling for a clear distinction between security interests and mere competition with the United States, Kunadze concludes that the Pacific Fleet not only already has enough forces, but that "one cannot exclude, probably, that some portions of the Pacific Fleet's forces or of its current missions are even unnecessary."[21] Moreover, and perhaps reflecting Gorbachev's decreased focus on military involvement in the Third World,

another departmental director at IMEMO, S. Blagovolin, also claims that "[we] have not found such overseas political and economic interests which would require us to spread our military presence around the globe and to create a navy to safeguard the latter (all the more so that this, evidently, is also the most expensive area of military preparations)."[22]

Targeting the Soviet Navy's Cost

Criticism focusing on the cost of the Soviet Navy has been equally forthright. An article in *SShA*, the journal of the Institute for the USA and Canada, for example, equated the earlier decision to expand the Soviet Navy to falling into a U.S. trap. According to the authors, the United States has tried "to push the USSR into the water" since the 1960s and provoke it into building "large surface warships, including aircraft carriers." The United States has allegedly sought to engage Moscow in a race which would play to U.S. strengths in "existing shipbuilding capabilities and scientific-technological potential," as well as to its advantages of geography, basing network, and alliances.[23] In fact, the article claims that a "symmetric response" would be "exhausting," while, on the contrary, a "refusal to 'play by American rules' up to now has been viewed negatively in Washington." In particular, this could be understood as an allusion to the U.S.S.R.'s decision to build conventional aircraft carriers for the first time.[24]

Aleksei Arbatov concludes that "the Navy merits special attention because of its vast cost, complexity, and the long time needed to build modern surface ships and submarines" and that to try to compete with the United States at sea "diverts resources from important tasks to goals that are unachievable."[25] It appears that Colonel-General Gareev echos similar concerns on the General Staff about the navy's costs: " . . . the specialist sailors, naturally, in being involved in their job, will inflate any figure, while with the enormous expenditure which we have assigned to aviation we should be doubly and triply cautious in terms of expenditures on the fleet."[26] There are indications that such doubts may be fairly widespread in the U.S.S.R. and that they are being voiced more openly, even by laymen. For example, readers of *Voennye znaniya*, the journal of the DOSAAF—the volunteer auxiliary organization, whose main mission is to prepare youth for the military—reportedly have asked, "Does our country at this time need a Navy that is so expensive, with the three-year length of service for sailors?"[27]

Land Power versus Sea Power

What may be of particular concern for the Soviet Navy is the apparent reopening of an even more basic debate between land power and sea power. In the Russian context, particularly during times of difficulty, the choice has

most often been made to the disadvantage of sea power, as Bruce Watson has pointed out recently in an insightful article.[28] In this vein, Aleksei Arbatov also notes that, unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R. already has a heavy continental defense burden and asks "Why get involved in competition on someone else's turf when all the conditions are more favorable for us on our own [i.e., continental turf]?"[29] As Blagovolin, in making a case that downplays the need for a strong navy, concludes: "Is it really in vain that our greatest military figures—A. A. Svechin, M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskii—stressed that we need a navy that is defensively oriented, given our country's specific geographic position and economic situation? One can retort that more than a half century has passed and that much has changed during that time. That is true, but there is one enduring factor that has not changed, that is that we have remained primarily a continental state."[30]

Protecting Institutional Interests

The Soviet Navy, as well as the rest of the military, has found itself in a particularly uncomfortable position in relation to the new security thinking, which could affect its mission and claims to funding. The navy's leaders are keenly aware that others in the U.S.S.R., including high-level military and civilian leaders, have a perspective of the navy's future which differs significantly from their own. Although the navy has usually presented its case in muted tones, it has nevertheless put up a spirited defense of its interests. While the significance of such institutional viewpoints in the U.S.S.R. may be a point of debate, their existence is undeniable. Despite the Communist Party's role as the ultimate locus of decision making (at least until very recently) and its intrusive activity to prevent the rise of autonomous centers of power, more parochial institutional interests nevertheless are present and can contribute to the shaping of policy, especially with the expansion of *glasnost*, if only by articulating the available options.

The Soviet Navy has sought to protect, in particular, its shipbuilding programs and as much of its blue-water mission as possible by stressing the navy's importance to the U.S.S.R. Limitations on operations or a restrictive defensive strategy, of course, would be considerably easier to reverse than cutbacks in long-term construction programs. While operating areas can be changed with relative ease, reviving shipbuilding would be a much more complicated endeavor; there is no feasible quick "break-out" option in the latter should the international situation deteriorate.

The Soviet Navy's Anxiety

The implications of these trends have engendered considerable anxiety and doubts about the long-term future of the navy. Naval officers being retired

early, as part of personnel cuts, have complained about their fate, and there must be some concern for their future among those currently in service.[31] Vice-Admiral Georgii Kostev noted in a letter to *Krasnaya zvezda* on his last visit to the Northern Fleet that "without fail discussion would crop up about cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces" and he stressed that "such massive cuts concern and distress sailors."[32] Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, likewise, has continued to voice lingering misgivings about any extensive budget cuts, noting that "a reduction in appropriations for defense must be within reasonable limits."[33]

These expressions of chagrin and unease appear genuine enough—not part of a massive disinformation campaign. Given the precarious nature of traditional Russian and Soviet naval development, where a strong fleet has been the exception rather than the rule, such attitudes are not surprising. The reaction within the navy when Khrushchev's cutback of surface ships seemed to portend a break in the service's development provides an insight into what many may be feeling today. In his memoirs, Admiral V. M. Grishanov recalls that in 1960 "the fate of surface ships worried us all, and we felt bitterness in our hearts."[34] The long-term commitment which the navy requires was an area of particular concern at the time. As Admiral Vladimir A. Kasatonov had confided to his colleagues: "I'll say it openly. It's one thing to cut back the infantry, tanks, and aircraft, but the Navy is something entirely different. . . . Not everyone, probably, knows how many years it takes to build a cruiser and how much of the people's money goes into it. The situation can change, but you cannot bring back these ships quickly."[35]

Rebutting Domestic Critics

The navy has retaliated against unfriendly views with veiled but mordant criticism. Admiral K. V. Makarov, the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, lashed out at those "in the West . . . who seriously claim that the Soviet Union does not need a powerful Navy." His statement, which was accompanied by arguments on the utility of the Soviet Navy which were not likely to matter to foreigners, suggests that domestic critics were probably as much, if not more, a target of his barb as were foreign ones.[36] Vice-Admiral (Ret.) G. I. Shchedrin, reviving the Gorshkovian view, labeled the claim that the U.S.S.R. is a continental power and that it therefore did not need a navy as "inventions of Western propaganda," which have to be opposed.[37] More basically, the navy has argued for the significance of sea power to the country's fundamental development. In 1989, the lead article in *Morskoi sbornik* for July, the issue dedicated to Navy Day, carried an impassioned plea for support of the country's "historic" naval mission, noting that "Only oceanic thinking will help us to fulfill completely the sacred frontiers of the motherland and the capabilities of our [national] character [*dukhovnyi tip*]."[38] It also included

a pointed warning that, had Peter the Great not made the necessary commitment to sea power, "The inertia of Muscovy Russia would again have dragged [Russia] into the depths of the continent. That same inertia also exists today."[39]

One can view the posthumous rehabilitation campaign of the controversial naval figure Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, begun in 1987, as part of the navy's case in favor of the need for a powerful oceangoing fleet. Kuznetsov had been one of its leading proponents, and naval spokesmen today portray this as the key reason why Khrushchev had relieved him of duty as commander of the navy in 1956.

The navy now accuses Khrushchev of having been shortsighted and of having had only a shallow understanding of military matters, and those who propose similar views today can be tarred with the same brush. Using this criticism-by-analogy, Vice-Admiral Kostev, for example, noted that in the Northern Fleet the question that is asked most frequently is: "Was it not a mistake to reduce the Army and Navy by 1,200,000 individuals in N. S. Khrushchev's time?"[40] Admiral Kapitanets, the First Deputy Commander in Chief, has also spoken out against Khrushchev's cuts, including specific references to the latter's blocking of the projected aircraft carriers, labeling the policy "voluntarism," which in Marxist parlance is the error of not paying sufficient attention to "the objective laws of history."[41] One can read in such observations a not too heavily veiled criticism of any similar naval restrictions under Gorbachev.

The Navy View of the Threat

Perhaps key to the Soviet Navy's case has been its presentation of the overall threat because of the close likely relationship among threat, mission, and claim on resources. One can argue that anything less than rousing support for Gorbachev's view of the threat, and how to deal with it, is worth noting. In fact, the navy view, if not outright contradictory, has been at least different in nuance. At times, naval spokesmen and other military sources have portrayed the threat in starker terms than has Gorbachev, or at a minimum have lagged behind Gorbachev in adopting positions more conciliatory to the West. In particular, Soviet naval sources have stressed the aggressive nature of the U.S. Navy's "Maritime Strategy."[42] Vice-Admiral Kostev was particularly visible for his hardline view of the general threat from the West during the first few years after Gorbachev came to power. He argued that the West is aggressive and dangerous, that the U.S.S.R. has always had a defensive orientation, that a war might not necessarily escalate to a nuclear level, and that "the maintenance of military-strategic parity by means of strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces is exceptionally important," with

ominous warnings that a situation similar to that in 1941 must be avoided—all positions more reflective of the old thinking than the new.[43]

Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank I. Kondyrev, although nodding to Gorbachev's claims that the U.S.S.R.'s main goal now is to prevent war and that it will use political means to a greater extent to ensure security, nevertheless stress that the country still needs a strong defense. They also maintain that the West is still planning for a conventional global war and that, while there can be no victory in a nuclear war, victory in a "local" or conventional war is still possible. They even claim that the United States still retains as its ultimate goal "the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system."[44] Admiral Chernavin has also noted that "The nature of imperialism is such that it is not capable of renouncing its hopes of changing the course of historical development through the use of military force" and that the Soviet Navy's role and importance in "repelling aggression," if anything, are increasing.[45] His interpretation of Gorbachev's "reasonable sufficiency," as is true among the military in general, seems to put emphasis on the need to ensure a sufficiently high ceiling. As Chernavin has stressed: "I am convinced that one can talk of reasonable sufficiency in the military establishment only from a position of sufficient reason, specially on questions of allotting resources for defense. . . . Only such an approach toward defense will not damage it."[46]

To be sure, recently, the positions of at least some naval officers appear to include a less ominous overall view. Admiral of the Fleet Aleksei Sorokin, for example, has voiced views of the threat and even of unilateral military cuts in a vein identified with Gorbachev.[47] However, as First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, he is no longer in the Soviet Navy's hierarchy and need not be viewed, strictly speaking, as a spokesman for the navy. Moreover, an article that appeared in *Morskoi sbornik* at about the same time still spoke of "the openly anti-Soviet direction of its [i.e., the U.S.] foreign policy and propaganda," and concluded that "no substantive changes whatsoever confirmed by practical steps by the U.S. have been observed yet."[48]

Waving the American Flag

Predictably, the Soviet Navy has highlighted the capabilities of the U.S. Navy. Admiral Kapitanets claims that the United States and Nato have no intention of reducing their naval power or of responding to calls for naval arms control. According to him, "the threat from the U.S. and Nato naval forces is increasing," due to a planned U.S. Navy upgrade and a greater emphasis on putting nuclear arms at sea.[49] In fact, he has accused the West of allegedly seeking the Soviet Navy's "unilateral disarmament, to which, of course, we will never agree."[50] As a retired rear admiral put it, the U.S.

submarines still target Soviet cities with missiles and "That is why it is still essential for the Soviet Union to have a powerful navy. One cannot get away from reality."[51]

Soviet Navy sources in general often refer to the substantial funding that the U.S. Navy is said to receive, both in absolute terms and in relation to the other services.[52] Typically, Vice-Admiral Vasilii I. Panin, while Chief of the navy's Political Directorate, even used a discussion of the Soviet escort operations in the Persian Gulf as a springboard for a thinly disguised pitch for continued funding for his service. As he saw it, the Soviet Navy has to be able to keep up with the U.S. Navy, which he stressed receives one-third of "the Pentagon's colossal budget."[53]

In order to strengthen their case, Soviet naval leaders have also highlighted elements of the international naval balance apart from the United States and Nato—in particular, Japan. Admiral Chernavin, for example, has argued that "We cannot fail to take into consideration the program for the future buildup of Japan's naval power because of the construction and inclusion of aircraft carriers in its naval order of battle."[54]

Dealing with the Threat

To be sure, insofar as the Soviet Navy portrays the U.S. Navy's capabilities as a significant threat to the U.S.S.R., it is in agreement with the Soviet political establishment. However, where the navy differs is in its strategy for dealing with this threat, with its lesser emphasis on political means, which, on the contrary, assumes a central role in Gorbachev's new thinking. In an earlier day, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who was in command of the navy from 1956 to 1985, had openly favored an assertive Soviet naval response as the most effective counter, a perspective shared with the political leadership before the Gorbachev era. According to Gorshkov, the only way to deal with this threat was to present the West with the same problem, that is, for Soviet forces to operate in ocean areas previously used by the United States as a buffer. In fact, as he saw it, under such circumstances, the need for the Soviet Navy "increases sharply."[55]

The navy has since not been so outspoken. Still, while recognizing the changing parameters of Gorbachev's new outlook, it has continued to make arguments similar to Gorshkov's, albeit with reduced intentions and in more muted tones. The general thrust of the navy is that the best approach to meeting the threat is still a strong, active navy. One aspect of this is the promotion of "out-of-area deployments" [*dal'nye pokhody*]. Admiral Chernavin, for example, noted in an interview that the Soviet Navy's out-of-area deployments serve to deter Western aggression against other countries and contribute to defending the U.S.S.R. from surprise attacks.[56] An authoritative study on the navy, published in 1988, also echoes this perspective,

favoring the prepositioning of submarines and surface ships in forward positions so that they will be ready "to use their weapons quickly when war starts."[57] Admiral K. V. Makarov, the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, has also highlighted the continuing need for readiness "during the initial period of war, under conditions of surprise attack," and asked rhetorically about the new defensive doctrine: "Does this mean giving up the initiative to the other side and waging combat actions at sea passively? Of course not."[58] On the question of restricting operations on a unilateral basis, Admiral Chernavin has remarked that "It is completely understandable that the further reduction in the operations of the Soviet Navy in ocean areas on a unilateral basis would decrease the security of the country, and could prompt aggressive forces to launch a sudden attack. We cannot give up our security."[59]

Supporting Soviet Foreign Policy

Navy spokesmen in the U.S.S.R. have emphasized the important role the U.S. Navy plays in implementing foreign policy and the implicit need for a strong Soviet Navy in order to play a similar role. In discussing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, for example, one Soviet naval officer claimed that the United States was able to project "great force" to an area thousands of miles from its shores, thanks to its navy. He stressed that "on the other side of the ocean they do not hide the fact that if one has a powerful navy, one can find one's self 'the neighbor' of any coastal state," and concludes that in the Persian Gulf "we are justified in calling it 'aircraft carrier diplomacy.'"[60]

Soviet Navy spokesmen have sought to use such arguments to promote the use of the Soviet Navy as a key tool of Moscow's foreign policy. Speaking of the Mediterranean Flotilla, for example, one naval source noted that "in the final analysis . . . [it consists of] deployed, and far from negligible, military might which exerts real influence on the political-military situation of the entire region."[61]

The Persian Gulf operations, in particular, probably came as a windfall for the Soviet Navy. Not surprisingly, the navy has showcased, at every opportunity, the role that it played there and has stressed its significance to the nation. For example, Rear Admiral Vitalii Sergeev, who commanded the task force in the Gulf, equated his mission there to "defense of the homeland," even noting that: "Peter the First had already said: 'The purpose of the Russian Navy is to defend the homeland.' The ships of our Soviet Navy are also defending the interests of their state—[that is] our [merchant] ships, our people, and ultimately our economy."[62]

Deploying to Train

In addition, navy spokesmen have repeatedly opposed cutting funds for out-of-area deployments for training. According to Fleet Admiral N. Smirnov, such operations continue to be necessary, since "it is on the open ocean . . . that the development of skills and the training of commanders and crews take place." In fact, he stresses that "Only then will the Navy be able to not only sail and carry out some everyday tasks but also to build up its power in practical terms."[63] An editorial in *Morskoi sbornik* categorically stated that "one cannot fully agree" with the view that there are any viable substitutes, including technical simulators, for such training.[64] While some navy spokesmen, such as Admiral Smirnov, acknowledge the high costs involved, the latter is also quick to give assurances that the navy is already doing everything it can to make such deployment as efficient as possible.[65]

The Soviet Navy and Arms Control

Moscow's push for naval arms control as a "political means" to neutralize the U.S. Navy is likely to continue. This will entail the use of the Soviet Navy as a bargaining chip to the greatest extent possible. While any success in this area would be of overall benefit to the U.S.S.R., given the asymmetric role of naval power in Western defense, this would not necessarily be the best outcome for the Soviet Navy's narrow institutional interests, and could have a significant impact on its future development.

As one might expect, the Soviet Navy has been somewhat reticent about naval arms control. Admiral Chernavin has expressed his doubts about the likelihood of the West's agreeing to arms control, noting that Soviet naval arms control initiatives "are not meeting with the appropriate support from the Western imperialist states." He has used this as a rationale for calling for continued support for the Soviet Navy, claiming that "therefore, the Party and the Soviet people are compelled to show constant care to guarantee the security of the homeland's ocean and sea frontiers."[66]

Also significant has been the navy's apparent skepticism about verification in general—a key element in arms control—and particularly of SSBNs. When asked about submarine verification, Admiral Kapitanets did not reject its feasibility outright, but sought to downplay it by maintaining that "The modern-day submarine is a very complex engineering system, in which the latest achievements of science and technology are embodied. It is obvious that it is extremely difficult to detect, and even more so to track constantly."[67] A lack of enthusiasm for the reduction of SSBNs is perhaps not surprising, since this is the bread-and-butter mission of the Soviet Navy, and, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates, a START agreement could lead to a reduction in Soviet SSBNs from the present 62 to 15-30.[68] As a corollary,

the need for other naval assets to protect the latter would diminish accordingly.

Overall, the navy claims that it is already a defensive force and, implicitly, in no need of arms control. Admiral Chernavin has stressed, for example, that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is "above all for the defense of the Soviet Far East coast."[69] He has even contrasted Soviet and U.S. aircraft carriers, calling the former defensive and the latter offensive because they have a land-strike capability.[70] Moreover, Soviet naval spokesmen portray the U.S.S.R.'s naval effort as only a reluctant response to provocative Western threats. Typically, Vice-Admiral Dmitrii Komarov, the First Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, in a written reply to Australian and New Zealand journalists, claimed that there was little reason for Soviet warships to operate in the South Pacific, and that their activities there were only "a forced countermeasure" to U.S. operations there.[71]

Arguing in Economic Terms

Recognizing the financial imperatives which loom on the military agenda, the navy has been anxious to put itself in as favorable a light as possible in economic terms and to reassure Soviet audiences that it is not being wasteful. Vice-Admiral V. Petrov, for example, assured readers that waste and inefficiency are being eliminated and promised that "Every ruble and every gram of fuel and raw materials must work actively to guarantee the navy's combat readiness."[72] The navy also has pointed out that "many elements" of the expensive new technology and capacity of the defense industry that the navy uses also benefit the other services.[73] Moreover, navy spokesmen have stressed that their plants also produce goods for the civilian sector.[74]

However, at least one admiral has called for part of the savings from any financial reductions to be returned to the military to improve the quality of life of its personnel in areas such as housing and social services.[75] At the same time, Admiral Kapitanets has cautioned against funding such improvements at the expense of combat-related construction, and took the opportunity to note that the navy's portion of the total defense budget in any case is already "small."[76]

The navy has tried to shunt some of the blame for its spending onto others. According to one navy source, it is not military spending *per se* that is to blame for the U.S.S.R.'s economic problems. Rather, the culprits are said to be the pre-Gorbachev "administrative-command methods" and "horizontal concept of development"—safe enough targets. However, he also notes that part of the problem is the recent increased cost of inputs—technology, fuel, food, uniforms—that is raising the navy's operational costs.[77] More recently, the navy seems to be trying to shift some of the responsibility for its high operating costs onto the shipbuilding and defense industries, which it alleges provide

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poor-quality systems (particularly electronics) that require expensive repairs and maintenance.[78]

Perhaps it is not coincidental that a navy source has suggested the creation of a new navy expertise in military economics. Ostensibly, this would facilitate the provision of "recommendations on the economy" to the navy leadership.[79] Left unsaid, however, is that this could lead to a group of in-house experts who could prepare and defend a budget case and deal more effectively with civilians seen as hostile to navy interests, something that formerly was not necessary.

Interservice Rivalries?

While one might expect shared concerns to lead the military to formulate a united platform on cuts, it is perhaps likely that interservice competition for a shrinking pie will triumph. It appears that the navy has found the rest of the military, as well as civilian experts, to be unsympathetic to its concerns. Although interservice debate generally has been kept out of the public eye, glimpses of it have been apparent when the navy has vented its frustration.

The top military leadership has been traditionally a sea of green, with an occasional "blue suit." In the overall scheme of things, the Soviet military as a body would probably view naval cuts with little regret. When speaking of the cuts made in the Pacific Fleet, Minister of Defense, General of the Army Dmitrii Yazov noted with relative equanimity that the threat to the U.S.S.R. had diminished and that U.S.-Soviet relations were improving. Therefore, he concluded, "Under these conditions, it becomes possible to decide on large unilateral cuts in our armed forces," adding that the cuts made in the Pacific Fleet were "a thoroughly thought-out step," and that they would be implemented in a way that "there will be no damage to our security."[80] The military leadership would probably be willing to use the navy as a bargaining chip, along with less palatable ground force reductions, to try to reduce the U.S. Navy's capabilities and freedom of action and, in particular, to limit those U.S. Navy systems which concern the Soviets most: ballistic-missile submarines, sea-launched cruise missiles, and aircraft carriers. For example, when asked about the possibility of a mutual U.S.-Soviet elimination of ballistic-missile submarines, General-Colonel Nikolai Chervov, Director of the General Staff's Treaties and Arms Control Directorate, was not negative, noting simply that "The Americans haven't made such a proposal yet. If they do, we'll study it."[81] Indeed, trading off Soviet naval capabilities might seem a small price to pay, from the perspective of the other services, to neutralize the U.S. Navy's potential impact on the outcome of a conflict.

In pressing the argument against the West on the need to trade cuts in naval forces for those in ground forces, non-naval Soviet spokesmen have had

recourse to concepts very much in the vein of such proponents of naval power as Admiral Gorshkov—although applying them only to Western naval power. For example, Marshal Akhromeev, by then retired and a special adviser to Gorbachev, claimed that: "Since when has the Navy ceased to be an indicator of the might of states and of military alliances? There is absolutely no substance to claims that naval forces do not participate in the seizure of territory or land because they operate on the seas and oceans. The only danger, so they say, comes from motorized rifle and armor forces. This assertion is directed to those who are ignorant of military matters or are naive simpletons. Three-fourths of the earth's surface is made up of expanses of oceans and seas. For centuries, we have heard the leaders of the U.S. and Britain, and others, claim: 'Whoever rules the seas and oceans rules the world.' Military history confirms the enormous role of naval forces in overall military power, particularly the employment of the U.S. Navy in World War II, and in the Korean and Viet Nam wars."[82]

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the military sees this as also applicable to the Soviet Navy. Colonel-General Gareev probably expressed the Soviet military consensus about the navy when he noted that Lenin allegedly believed that "a significant fleet with a large number of capital surface ships for the Soviet state was an 'excessive luxury.'"[83] When the military as a whole will have to make sacrifices, the other services will probably offer up the navy to take the relatively deeper, long-term cuts. While some suggestions, such as one by a retired major-general to use SSBNs for ecological and civilian purposes, may appear whimsical, they are probably no less of a concern to the navy because of that.[84]

The navy, of course, has been careful to make the appropriate obeisance to the established joint doctrine. Deeply ingrained in Soviet military thinking, this is a sliding scale which can accommodate different mixes among the individual services and which has varied from one period to another in its specific balance. The navy, apart from a short-lived foray for a more independent role under Gorshkov, has tried to take advantage of joint doctrine to argue its case, when possible. *The Navy*, for example, has maintained that "Helping the ground forces requires significant naval forces for combat against both the naval and land enemy."[85] *The Navy*, in fact, comes back repeatedly to the argument that the Soviet Navy is important as a strategic force, having the ability to play a major role in a war even against targets on land, such as hostile military forces.[86] However, at the same time, Admiral Chernavin, although including among the navy's missions "if need be" also "cooperation with our ground forces in carrying out defensive operations," has also gone out of his way to reiterate that, while cooperating, each service nevertheless should still retain primary responsibility for carrying out its "specialized traditional missions."[87]

The navy's perception of its subordinate position within the Soviet military hierarchy has apparently heightened its unease in the jockeying for position on defense allocations. Some of the most trenchant criticism by the navy on this issue, reflecting concern about seeing its missions subordinated even further to the other services, has appeared under the plausible denial afforded by Admiral Kuznetsov's rehabilitation campaign. One segment of his memoirs, published in *Krasnaya zvezda*, ostensibly at his widow's initiative, centered on his calls for a greater naval role in joint decision making and his accusations that the army had not appreciated the navy's full potential in the past.[88]

The navy has expressed discontent in areas such as the army's neglect of training for the Naval Infantry, prompting the suggestion that responsibility for training plans be transferred from the army to the navy. Admiral Chernavin has also called for the navy to train its own pilots once again, rather than relying on the Air Force.[89]

Recent Reductions—How Significant?

While its policy on naval arms control so far has been largely declaratory, the U.S.S.R. nevertheless has made some unilateral cuts and restrictions in operations, probably intended primarily as an economic measure, as well as a political gesture. For example, since 1986, the Soviet Navy's operational tempo has been reduced, with less time spent at sea and, especially, on out-of-area exercises, with most major exercises carried out in waters close to the U.S.S.R. As such, the focus is even more on the "defensive" bastion concept. Moreover, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov announced that, as part of Gorbachev's one-half-million-man reduction, a projected 20,000 personnel would be cut in the Leningrad Military District and would include personnel from the Northern Fleet. The Baltic Fleet would also be reduced, with a focus on the retirement of its submarines.[90] Likewise, the Minister of Defense made public that sixteen ships of the Pacific Fleet would be eliminated as part of the proposed force reductions in the Soviet Far East.[91] Plans to scrap ships have received considerable publicity in the Soviet media. There have also been calls for the transfer of naval equipment and auxiliary ships to civilian purposes, e.g., for use by the fishing industry.[92] As one might expect, Soviet spokesmen have portrayed to foreign audiences the reductions and changes in operational routine that have already been made as major steps. For example, Admiral Amel'ko, in an interview with a Japanese news agency, claimed that such measures had already transformed the Pacific Fleet into a "defensive force."[93]

The Soviet Navy does not appear to have reacted negatively to these steps, and one can argue that the cuts announced or made so far are not in themselves significant. In fact, the Soviet Navy contains numerous obsolete ships whose

removal from the active inventory would hardly affect capabilities. According to *Krasnaya zvezda*, the Pacific Fleet, for example, includes such obsolete ships as a 1956-vintage destroyer, which is relegated to dockside duty. On the rare occasion when it gets underway, it is only for a few hours during the daytime, for phony exercises. The same article tells of a destroyer that has to be towed out for gunnery practice. The reporter, following an interview with a vice-admiral in the Pacific Fleet, concluded that such ships should be "closed down," noting that "Every day that an obsolete ship stays on means that hundreds and thousands of rubles' worth of resources literally go up in smoke" which, he stresses, could be used instead for other purposes.[94] The Golf-class submarines, which are being eliminated from the Baltic Fleet, are also, as even the Soviets admit, "technically obsolete."[95]

Cuts on the Horizon?

In the short term at least, the navy's funding appears to be embedded in the 1986-91 Five-Year Plan. The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Moiseev, has noted that most of the announced 19.5 percent cut in military spending will come from savings related to the INF Treaty and the 500,000-man reduction; that is, largely from non-navy sources. However, this refers to the current five-year plan.[96] Money has already been invested in those ships being built, and it would be drastic indeed to scrap them in mid-stream. This means that new submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and weapon systems already in the pipeline—including the aircraft carriers being built—will continue to enter the Soviet naval order of battle to replace obsolete ships being eliminated. This will enable the Soviet Navy to maintain, or even enhance, its overall capabilities in the short term.

However, even without a *quid pro quo* of mutual arms control-mandated cuts, domestic economic imperatives in the U.S.S.R. are likely to lead to unilateral cuts for the navy in the 1991-95 Five-Year Plan and beyond. The Soviet economy may be in even more dire straits than the leaders had earlier believed, and speeches by Gorbachev in May 1989 and Prime Minister Ryzhkov the following month reaffirmed the intention to cut military spending in general. Of course, there is no way to forecast the extent to which the ideas of the think tanks, navy, and military leadership will shape Gorbachev's final decisions. However, the Soviet Navy's secondary role in defense and limited bureaucratic influence may well lead it to absorb major, or even disproportionate, cuts for at least a certain period of time—all the more so because of the contribution this could make to the U.S.S.R.'s new positive image, particularly with some of its neighbors in Northern Europe and the Far East. At the same time, the Soviet government may come to feel increasingly that existing U.S. budgetary trends, combined with the pressure generated if Moscow makes unilateral cuts, will also lead the United States

to cut funding for the U.S. Navy, thus making unilateral Soviet cuts less risky.[97] Even if Soviet proponents of such a view do not really believe the U.S. naval budget will be slashed drastically, this can still be used as an argument in the domestic debate in support of Soviet naval cuts.

Big-ticket items such as aircraft carriers and other large surface ships still on the drawing boards may be the most attractive areas in which to make such cuts. Not surprisingly, aircraft carriers and the anticipation of the imminent entry of the first such ship into the force have been of special concern to the navy. This system has generated considerable criticism, particularly on the part of the think tanks, in the areas of cost, vulnerability, and mission, and the navy has felt it prudent to address the critics with counterarguments. Overall, given the long lead-time involved in building ships, the impact of such cuts will be clearer as time goes on, especially since much of the previous naval buildup occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the corollary that an increasing number of Soviet ships will be coming up for retirement in the 1990s.[98]

Options for the Navy

Misgivings and grumbling notwithstanding, the Soviet Navy, apart from articulating its case, can do little to prevent unfavorable decisions at the national political level. Once a decision is made, the navy will have little choice but to put it into effect, although its preponderance of expertise may allow it to advise on how cutbacks or restraints are to be applied. The navy's leaders doubtless are well aware of Gorbachev's willingness and ability to change top military leaders should they prove resistant to his vision of reform. The navy appears particularly vulnerable, with sufficient pretexts likely to be available, given its propensity for spectacular accidents. While the navy might dismiss criticism in such sources as *Komsomol'skaya pravda* or *Ogonek*, which nowadays often express maverick opinions, it is more difficult to overlook criticism which began appearing in the more official fora such as *Pravda* in mid-1989, excoriating the navy for such faults as poor safety and its penchant for secrecy.[99]

Although, thanks to its hierarchical nature, one can expect the navy to speak in public with a fairly united voice, one can assume that, as in any organization, there are some internal fissures along personal, factional, and professional lines, and all the more so in a period of considerable change and uncertainty. Even under a strong leader such as Admiral Gorshkov, for example, we know now that there were internal disagreements on such issues as the building of the *Kiev*-class VTOL aircraft carriers, with some senior officers, such as Admiral Nikolai Amel'ko (formerly Commander of the Pacific Fleet), arguing against them.[100] This no doubt provides Gorbachev with

additional leverage and an implicit club with which to hammer the navy by selecting its new leaders from among those who agree with him.

This is not to say that the navy may not try to slow down or minimize change by dragging its feet on significant decisions. For example, it appears to have been unhappy about Gorbachev's announcement in 1986 to open up Vladivostok to foreigners as a confidence-building measure.[101] Not surprisingly perhaps, the opening of Vladivostok appears to have proceeded very slowly, with the city still largely inaccessible to foreign businessmen. According to Soviet reporters critical of the slow pace, "It is the military who oppose the development of foreign economic links. The location of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's base in Vladivostok is the stumbling block."[102] Political leaders have also expressed some impatience with the military in general for what it perceives as its slow development and implementation of a defensive doctrine.[103]

Coming to Terms with Reality

Increasingly, however, there are indications of the navy's adjustment to the changing situation. Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral F. Gromov, recognizing what may be inevitable, noted that naval training would have to be changed "in light of the substantial forthcoming unilateral reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces."[104] The navy's leaders may now even be trying to leave a way out for themselves by building a case that blames the navy's shortcomings on its past leaders. Admiral Gorshkov himself has been criticized in what may be the beginning of a campaign to "demythologize" this overpowering figure, although this may also be a case of alternate views being aired.[105]

Significantly, an article in *Morskoi sbornik* portrayed the navy's development under the czars and in the Soviet period as a cycle of expansion and contraction, depending on the country's level of economic development. The emphasis, interestingly, is on the periods of stasis and contraction, both as far as the number and types of ships and their missions. With Russia's allegedly backward economy in the late 19th century, the article argues, it would have been unrealistic to seek naval superiority, while a fleet with a strictly defensive character and mission was seen as appropriate at that stage. Again in the 1920s, a big fleet and offensive strategy are said to have been unrealistic, due to the country's difficult economic conditions, making the "Young School" and its defensive orientation more suitable. Stalin's intended buildup of a large fleet is also taxed as having been expensive and inappropriate to the threat faced in World War II. The article's admonition to heed the "historical rule" in developing the navy suggests strongly that another contraction cycle, reflecting the country's economic restructuring, is now on the horizon.[106]

However, another article in *Morskoi sbornik*, rehabilitating a former commander of the navy who was purged in 1937, Admiral Romual'd Muklevich, counters this view, suggesting a continuing internal debate. While approving Muklevich's acceptance of the Party's 1928 decision to have a navy "for the defense of the homeland, not for combat to control the seas," it takes to task at the same time some members of the Revolutionary Military Council who had claimed that "the Navy gets too many resources, [and who] proposed to cut allocations." According to this second article, even Admiral Muklevich—who was well-known as a promoter of the more defensively minded "Young School"—allegedly "showed the error of these ideas," for, supposedly, even in a defensive mode he favored the navy's quantitative and qualitative development.[107]

By mid-1989, however, at least one low-level naval source—perhaps a harbinger of the navy's grudging resignation—had come to echo the think tanks' key position to the effect that an arms race at sea was to the West's advantage, and that "Western strategists" intended to use this means to "weaken the USSR economically once and for all."[108]

Given the navy's limited options, it is perhaps not surprising that however strongly it has made its case it also appears to be hedging its bets for the future. *The Navy*, for example, had already acknowledged the relationship between the country's economy and the development of the navy.[109] In fact, it places some of its hopes on future development, emphasizing the need to maintain funding levels for R&D. The authors stress, in particular, the great strides and generous funding of Western naval R&D and imply that the Soviet Navy could be left behind in the future if sufficient resources are not provided.[110] The navy's implied long-term "wish list," including items such as submarines with a speed of 100 knots, able to dive 2,000 meters and to fire torpedoes traveling at 200-300 knots, relies heavily on continued R&D funding.[111] The navy has attempted to latch on to additional new missions which could be used to strengthen its case for such R&D funding. For example, *The Navy* maintains that naval forces can play a significant role in countering the aerospace threat against the U.S.S.R.[112] Some civilian proponents of cuts, for their part, have sought to soften general military opposition by holding out the lure of enhanced military capabilities in the long-term in exchange for a deferral to the civilian sector at present.[113]

Despite its attempts at damage control, the Soviet Navy may find itself reduced to hoping that, through a focus on R&D and the entry into service of those ships already in the pipeline, it will be in a position to resume its development if an atmosphere economically and politically conducive to naval concerns once more pervades the Kremlin.

Notes

1. According to Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, in public testimony before Congress on 22 February 1989.

2. See A. Gol'ts, "Istoriya: daty i razmyshleniya. Vnov' po puti samuraev?" [History: Facts and Reflections. Again on the Path of the Samurai?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 2 September 1988, p. 3, and V. Vinogradov, "Im tesno?" [Do They Find it Crowded?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 April 1989, p. 3.

3. In an interview with a Czech journalist, for example, Gorbachev noted that "Behind the unbridled arms race isn't there an attempt to undermine the USSR and the socialist community economically? . . . we will do everything in order to prevent these evil plans from succeeding. We will be active immediately and in several directions: diplomatic, military, political, and—yes, yes!—with propaganda, but, above all, economically." *Pravda*, 9 September 1986, in *M.S. Gorbachev: Izbrannye rechi i stati* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1987), v. 4, p. 77.

4. "Istoki napryazhennosti," [The Sources of Tension] *Pravda*, 4 May 1989, p. 4.

5. Cited by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, "Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya KPSS: Vneshnyaya politika i diplomatiya," [All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy] *Pravda*, 26 July 1988, p. 4.

6. "Prioritety novogo myshleniya," [The Priorities of New Thinking] *Izvestiya*, 9 July 1988, p. 4.

7. *Vestnik ministarstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, no. 22, 1 December 1988, p. 13.

8. For an exceptionally insightful discussion of current security thinking in the U.S.S.R., see Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking," *International Security*, Fall 1988, pp. 124-163.

9. "Zalog stabil'nosti—v peremenakh" [The Guarantee for Stability Is in Changes], interview by A. Kuvshinnikov, *Izvestiya*, 28 March 1989, p. 5.

10. For example, now-Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii, while still an academic, already had developed the seminal concept, subsequently adopted by Gorbachev, that the goal of the United States was to "attempt through another cycle of the arms race to undermine the economies of the states of the socialist community." *Razoruzheniye: kontseptsiya, problemy, mekhanizm* [*Disarmament: Concepts, Problems, and Mechanism*] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), p. 55.

11. Albert Plutnik, "Urok voennogo dela; polemicheskiye zametki shtatskogo cheloveka o perestroyke v armii" [A Lesson on Military Affairs; Polemical Notes by a Civilian on Perestroyka in the Army], *Izvestiya*, 20 March 1989, p. 3.

12. *Izvestiya*, 28 March 1989, Kurshinnikov, p. 5.

13. Interview by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kocharev, "Razornzheniye i bezopasnost'" [Disarmament and Security], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1988, p. 5.

14. Interview "Vremya glubokikh preobrazovanii" [A Time of Far-reaching Changes], *Morskoi sbornik*, September 1989, p. 4.

15. V[yacheslav] F. Khalipov, *Voennaya politika KPSS* [The CPSU's Military Policy], (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1988), p. 32.

16. "Kak razvivat'tsya flotu?" [How Should the Navy Develop?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 1.

17. A. Mineev, A. Chernyak, and G. Yastrebtsov, "Perestroyka kasaetsya kazhdogo" [Perestroyka Applies to Everyone], *Pravda*, 3 October 1987, p. 1.

18. *M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 246. The Russian-language original was published in 1985.

19. "Skol'ko oborony dostatochno?" [How Much Defense is Enough?] *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), March 1989, pp. 45-46.

20. G. Kunadze, "Ob oboronnoi dostatochnosti voennogo potentsiala SSSR" [On the Defense Sufficiency of the USSR's Defense Potential], *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, October 1989, pp. 74, 78.

21. *Ibid.* p. 78.

22. "Voennaya moshch—skol'ko, kakaya, zachem?" [Military Power—How Much, of What Kind, and for What?] *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, August 1989, p. 8.

23. V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and A.V. Kortunov, "O razumnoi dostatochnosti" [On Reasonable Sufficiency] *SShA*, December 1987, p. 17.

24. *Ibid.* p. 17.

25. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', March 1989, p. 45.

26. *M. V. Frunze*, p. 245.

27. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Valentin Kozlov, "O sluzhbe morskoi" [About Sea Duty], *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, p. 1.

28. "A Farewell to Admiral Gorshkov and a Look to the Future of the Soviet Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, (on press).

29. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, March 1989, p. 45.

30. S. Blagovolin, p. 8.

31. See Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Uvolen bez pensii. . . ." [Dismissed without a Pension. . .], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 June 1989, p. 2.

32. "K novomu urovnyu kachestva" [To a New Level of Quality], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 January 1989, p. 1.

33. "Otvetstvennost' za perestroyku" [Responsibility for Perestroyka], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 June 1989, p. 2.

34. Admiral V.M. Grishanov, *Vse okeany ryadom* [*All the Oceans Are Nearby*], (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1984), p. 31.

35. *Ibid.* p. 31.

36. "Pod flagom rodiny" [Under the Homeland's Flag], *Trud*, 31 July 1988, p. 3.

37. "Postscript" to G.V. Smirnov, *Korabli i srazheniya* [Ships and Battles], (Moscow: Detskaya Literatura, 1987), p. 158.

38. Karem Rash, "Okeanicheskoe myshleniye" [Oceanic Thinking], *Morskoi sbornik*, July 1989, p. 10.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 January 1989, p. 1.

41. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 1.

42. According to Vice-Admiral A. Smolin, reported by A. Gorokhov, "Okeanskaya vakhta" [Ocean Watch], *Pravda*, 31 July 1988, p. 2.

43. See "Nasha voennaya doktrina v svete novogo politicheskogo myshleniya" [Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political Thinking], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 17, September 1987, pp. 9-15. This journal is intended for political officers in the Armed Forces. A similar hardline evaluation of the threat and prospects for accommodation with the West appeared in his "Dve politiki, dve doktriny" [Two Policies, Two Doctrines], significantly on the eve of Gorbachev's first trip to the United States, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1987, p. 3.

44. "Oboronitel'naya napravlennost' sovetskoi voennoi doktriny" [The Defensive Direction of Soviet Military Doctrine], *Morskoi sbornik*, February 1988, pp. 9, 12-13.

45. "Gotov' sebya k sovremennomu boyu" [Prepare Yourself for Modern Combat], *Morskoi sbornik*, January 1989, p. 8.

46. Interview in *Morskoi sbornik*, September 1989, p. 4.

47. Interview by A. Ivanov, "Uvol'neniye iz armii" [Dismissal from the Army], *Pravda*, 13 April 1989, p. 6.

48. L. Aleksandrov, "Kto zhe ugrozhaet mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti?" [Who Really Threatens International Security?], *Morskoi sbornik*, March 1989, p. 17.

49. Interview by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kocherov, "Ugroza iz okeana. Kak ee predotvratit'?" [The Threat from the Ocean. How to Ward it Off?], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 April 1989, p. 3.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, p. 1.

52. For example, an authoritative navy book, published in 1988 by Rear Admiral Nikolai P. V'yunenko, Captain 1st Rank Boris N. Makeev, and Captain 1st Rank Valentin D. Skugarev, *Voenno-morskoi flot: rol', perspektivy, razvitiya, ispol'zovaniye*, (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1988) [The Navy: Its Role, Prospects, Development, and Employment] (hereafter The Navy), p. 90.

53. Vice-Admiral Vasilii I. Panin, "Korabli i lyudi" [Ships and People], *Trud*, 26 July 1987, p. 3.

54. Interview, "Protivostoyaniye" [Confrontation], *Agitator armii i flota*, no. 9, May 1988, p. 7.

55. "Okeanskii shchit rodiny" [The Homeland's Ocean Shield] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 July 1984, p. 2.

56. Interview "Flot—rodom iz Oktyabrya" [The Navy: Born in October] *Voennyi vestnik* (Moscow), February 1988, p. 19. Vice-Admiral Panin has also expressed the need for "a modern missile-nuclear ocean-going fleet" for this same purpose, *Trud*, 26 July 1987, p. 3.

57. *The Navy*, p. 237.

58. "Okeany pokoryayuttsya otvazhnym" [The Oceans Submit to Those Who Are Brave], *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, pp. 2-3.

59. From Chernavin's written responses to questions in "Chernavin Responds," *Proceedings*, February 1989, p. 75.

60. Captain 1st Rank V. Kuzar, "Kuda derzhit kurs amerikanskaya armada" [Where the American Armada's Course Is Heading], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 October 1987, p. 3. *The Navy* also makes an extensive argument in this vein, pp. 96-98.

61. Captain 1st Rank S. Bystrov, "Gde ne vidyat bereg mesyatsami" [Where They Do Not See the Shores for Months], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 6 September 1988, p. 2.

62. Interview, "Konvoi" [Convoy], *Trud*, 13 February 1988, p. 3.

63. Interview "Lyudi, korabli, okean" [People, Ships, the Ocean], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 July 1987, p. 2.

64. "Okeanskiye vakhty flota" [The Navy's Ocean Watch], July 1987, p. 6.

65. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 July 1987, p. 2.

66. "Na okeanskikh rubezhakh" [On the Ocean Frontiers], *Tyl vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), July 1988, p. 3.

67. Interview in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 April 1989, p. 3.

68. According to public testimony by Rear Admiral Brooks, 22 February 1989.

69. "Problemy tikhogo okeana: Sderzhannost' dolzhna byt' vzaymnoi" [The Problems of the Pacific Ocean: Restraint Must Be Mutual], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 December 1988, p. 3.

70. Interview in *Agitator armii i flota*, May 1988, p. 7.

71. Hong Kong Agence France Presse (AFP) in English, 21 March 1988, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Soviet Union (SOV)-88-054*, 21 March 1988, p. 23.

72. "Ekonomiya i berezhlivost'—zadachi gosudarstvennoi vazhnosti" [Savings and Thriftiness Are Tasks of State Importance], *Morskoi sbornik*, December 1987, p. 6.

73. *The Navy*, pp. 46, 80.

74. Captain 1st Rank G. Yakushev, "Ne v ushcherb flotu—na pol'zu lyudyam" [Not to the Detriment of the Navy, but for the Benefit of People], *Morskoi sbornik*, January 1989, p. 62.

75. Admiral V[italii] Ivanov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, "Ob armii sudit' ob'ektivno" [It Is Necessary to Judge the Army Objectively], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 June 1989, p. 2.

76. Admiral Kapitanets, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 2.

77. Captain 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, identified as "a senior officer on the Main Navy Staff," "Den'gi . . . v trubu" [Money Up in Smoke], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 January 1989, p. 2.

78. Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Korabli i rubli; flot tratit bol'shiye den'gi na remont tekhniki i vooruzheniya. Pochemu?" [Ships and Rubles; The Navy Spends Huge Sums of Money on Maintaining Technical Equipment and Weapons Systems. Why?], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 12 May 1989, pp. 1-2; also, Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Vedomstvennyi diktat" [Departmental Dictate], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 June 1989, p. 2. Admiral Kapitanets repeats these accusations as an explanation for the recent spate of naval accidents, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 2.

79. Captain 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 January 1989, p. 2.

80. Interview "Gotovnost' k konstruktivnomu obsuzhdeniyu" [A Readiness to Discuss Constructively], *Pravda*, 28 May 1989, p. 4.

81. Interview by E.N., "I nodi militari da sciogliere" [The Military Knots that Have To Be Untied], *La stampa* (Turin, Italy), 29 May 1988, p. 5.

82. "Sootnosheniye voennykh sil v Evrope i peregovory" [The Balance of Military Forces in Europe and Negotiations], *Pravda*, 2 March 1989, p. 4.

83. *M.V. Frunze*, p. 246.

84. Major-General of Aviation (Ret.) V. Surikov, "Ne na slom, a vo blago" [Not for Demolition, but Rather for Benefit], *Pravda*, 29 April 1989, p. 4.

85. *The Navy* p. 261.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 25, 42, 84, 88, 253, 261, 263, 268.

87. Interview by Miroslav Lazanski in Kagreb's Croatian-language weekly *Danas*, "Kasto Zapad oklyeva" [Why the West Stalls], 30 May 1989, pp. 52-53.

88. V.N. Kuznetsova, "Chemu uchila voina" [What the War Taught], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 July 1988, p. 4.

89. Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Mezhdu morem i beregom" [Between the Sea and the Shore], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 12 August 1988, p. 2, and "Kommentarii Glavnokomanduyushchego Voenno-Morskim Flotom strany admiral flota V.N. Chernavina" [Comments by the Commander in Chief of the Country's Navy, Admiral of The Fleet V.N. Chernavin], *Pravda*, 19 October 1989, p. 3.

90. Gennadii Gerasimov, "Toward Security in Europe," *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 11, 18-24 March 1989, *FBIS-SOV-89-054*, 22 March 1989, p. 1.

91. Interview with General Yazov, *Pravda*, 28 May 1989, p. 4.

92. For example, General of the Army V.M. Arkhipov, Director of Rear Services, "Prodaetsya voennyi korabl'" [A Warship Is Up for Sale], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 March 1989, p. 1.

93. JIJI (Tokyo) in English, 14 April 1989.

94. Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Problema trebuet resheniya. Zastyvshiye u prichala" [A Problem in Need of a Solution. Paralyzed at their Mooring], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 April 1989, p. 2.

95. General Gelii Batenin, AFP (Paris) in English, 18 December 1987, *FBIS-SOV-87-243*, 18 December 1987, p. 67.

96. Mikhail Moiseev, "Oboronnyi byudzhet SSSR" [The USSR's Military Budget], *Pravda*, 11 June 1989, p. 5.

97. The idea of economically induced long-term cuts of the U.S. Navy budget is raised by V. Sukhoi, "Byudzhet zamedlyaet khod?" [Is the Budget Slowing Down?], *Pravda*, 3 May 1989, p. 1.

98. See the perceptive and well-reasoned arguments by Captain Arthur K. Cebrowski, "A Matter of Timing?" *Proceedings*, May 1989, p. 138.

99. See, for example, A. Gorokhov, "Opasnye glubiny; trevozhnyi schet chrezvychaynnykh proisshestvii na more" [The Dangerouse Depths; The Alarming Numher of Extraordinary Incidents at Sea], *Pravda*, 28 June 1989, p. 6.

100. Interview by Akira Furumoto in *Tokyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), 25 October 1988, p. 9. Other personal or professional conflicts from that era are now also coming to light, such as one between the cliques around Gorshkov and Vice Admiral Georgii N. Kholostyak of the Northern Fleet, although in this case the context remains obscure, beyond apparent long-standing mutual personal antipathy, Captain 3rd Rank V. Urban, "Trevozhnye kolokola Kholostyakova" [Kholostyakov's Alarm Bells], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1988, p. 4.

101. Retired Admiral Amel'ko admitted that "I would be a renegade to deny that disagreements did take place on this issue when it came up for discussion. Yes, the military did find it difficult to digest this decision," "The Politics Behind Vladivostok," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 November 1988, p. 1235.

102. G. Alimov and A. Orlov, "Mir i my. Propishetsya li merkurii vo Vladivostoke?" [The World and We. Will Mercury be Registered in Vladivostok?], *Izvestiya*, 10 April 1989, p. 5.

103. In his 1 November 1988 speech to Foreign Ministry personnel, Shevardnadze noted: "In effect, we are slow in working out and in implementing [*konkretizatsiya*] a military doctrine and to give it a strictly defensive tenor," *Vestnik*, December 1988, p. 13.

104. Interview by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Boevaya podgotovka trebuet reorganizatsii" [Combat Training Needs to be Reorganized], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 January 1989, p. 3.

105. For example, Gorshkov has been blamed for his alleged sentimental attachment to even obsolete destroyers, which are now being eliminated; Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 April 1989, p. 2. Likewise, Gorshkov is portrayed unsympathetically because of his cavalier treatment of Vice-Admiral Kholostyak, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1988, p. 4.

106. Vice-Admiral R. Golosov, Captain 1st Rank V. Koryavko, and Captain 1st Rank E. Shevelev, "Nekotorye uroki iz istorii sozdaniya otechestvennogo flota" [Some Lessons from the History of the Creation of the National Navy], *Morskoi sbornik*, July 1988, pp. 18-26.

107. Captain 2nd Rank (Ret.) N. Badeev, "Flagmany. Chelovek gosudarstvennogo uma" [Commanders. An Individual with a Statesman's Mind], *Morskoi sbornik*, March 1989, pp. 84-85. He presents his argument by using quotes from unpublished portions of Admiral Kuznetsov's memoirs, providing some plausible denial on a sensitive topic.

108. Captain 2nd Rank V. Myasnikov, "VMS SShA: strategiya i modernizatsiya; 4. Snova gonka?" [The U.S. Navy: Strategy and Modernization; 4. A Race Again?], *Agitator armii i flota*, no. 15, August 1989, p. 31.

109. *The Navy*, pp. 43, 65, 76

110. *Ibid*, pp. 44-45, 63.

111. *Ibid*, pp. 107, 113, 115. That emphasis on R&D is continuing is indicated by the Soviet attempts, despite "new thinking," to purloin naval technology from the West, as in the past, to supplement domestic efforts. See, for example, John F. Burns, "Canada Indicates Russians Sought U.S. Naval Secrets," *The New York Times*, 23 July 1988, p. 1.

112. *The Navy*, pp. 235-236.

113. For example, Albert Plutnik, *Izvestiya*, 20 March 1989, p. 3.: "Does not economic and scientific progress strengthen defense capabilities? Is not the training of a good specialist a contribution to our defense capabilities?"

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Ψ

Misperception and Incidents at Sea: The *Deutschland* and *Leipzig* Crises, 1937

Willard C. Frank, Jr.

After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, most of the major naval powers, along with a few lesser states, sent and kept warships in Spanish waters. Governments sent them into the war zone to evacuate endangered citizens, to maintain and defend embassies and consulates, to protect shipping, to safeguard economic and strategic interests, to gather intelligence, and to watch over each other.

Britain and France had hoped to contain that war by sponsoring a nonintervention agreement among the Enropean powers, the essence of which was that no signatory power would send military aid to either side in Spain. The powers' ambassadors in London constituted the Non-Intervention Committee to oversee the agreement. In April 1937 the Committee inaugurated naval patrols. Warships of the four great European naval powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Germany) patrolled assigned sectors of the Spanish coast to report any violations of nonintervention. If one were confirmed, states were expected to apply appropriate legal or political remedies. To prevent them from being fired at in the war zone, patrolling warships wore broad three-color recognition stripes, according to their respective national colors, on turrets or gun shields, fore and aft.

The patrol scheme was a farce. Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union, all signatories of the nonintervention agreement, continually sent arms to one side or the other in the conflict. All three states found loopholes in the agreement regarding categories of ships subject to control. Italy sent arms to the Nationalists in exempt "naval auxiliaries" and falsely flew the Spanish flag, also exempt, on Italian merchant ships. German arms ships flew the exempt Panamanian flag. Soviet arms for the Spanish Republic usually arrived

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in exempt Spanish-flag ships. So the stream of war materiel flowed unimpeded, and commanders of warships on nonintervention duty could observe only the letter of their instructions. The pretense was sufficient. "A monotonous and disheartening duty," one British Admiralty official described it.[1]

Despite the tedium, Spanish waters were dangerous. From the beginning of the Spanish War, neutral warships and merchant ships came under attack, often due to mistaken identity. Late in 1936 the destroyer U.S.S. *Kane* was bombed by Nationalist aircraft, despite an American national ensign being displayed like an awning, while the big new gunboat, U.S.S. *Erie*, found itself in the way of Nationalist naval gunfire. Luckily, neither was hit. U.S. commanding officers were instructed to avoid all hostile encounters and, should their ship be attacked, to consider "the probability that the shot was fired as a result of mistaken identity or mistaken motives. Nothing in these remarks, however, shall be construed as precluding Commanding Officers from exercising the well known right of self-preservation when, in their opinion, the situation demands it."[2] U.S. warships never returned fire. Early in 1937 a Nationalist bomber dropped six bombs near the French destroyer *Maille Brézé*, to no effect. The crew did not return fire, even though the standing orders in the French Navy were to authorize the use of force to respond without delay to any attack on the French flag. In February the British destroyers *Havock* and *Gipsy* were similarly attacked, as was the *Gallant* in April; all these ships returned antiaircraft fire. In the same period the battleship HMS *Royal Oak* was the subject of two attacks. The Republican authorities admitted responsibility in both cases. In none of these incidents was there any significant damage.

The streak of luck ran out on 13 May. It was to be a bloody month. The destroyer HMS *Hunter*, on nonintervention patrol six miles off Almería, drifted into a German mine laid one week before. Six sailors were killed and 15 wounded. The destroyer's back was broken but the ship was towed to Gibraltar. This was the most serious incident to date. The Nationalist authorities denied responsibility, and when the German markings on mine fragments were reported, the German press denounced Britain for falsely provoking anti-German sentiment. The German naval high command, the *Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine* [OKM] in Berlin, knew better. The minefield was part of German clandestine naval aid to Franco. The British government claimed damages of the Nationalist government, while in practice let the matter drop.

British naval officers wondered if risking such high-value vessels as destroyers for Spanish patrol duty was worth it. Armed trawlers were suggested, but they would have had less ability than destroyers to defend themselves, and the destroyers remained.

In March the Republican navy gained the services of a Soviet bomber unit whose operations would escalate the incidents. The chief Soviet naval adviser in Spain, Captain First Rank N. G. Kuznetsov, persuaded the Soviet bomber commander, I. I. Proskurov, to use his newly arrived twin-engined SB-2 bombers to cooperate with the Republican fleet. The main targets were to be the Nationalist cruisers, three in number, that were menacing Republican supply lines. Proskurov's aircrews, however, were unable to recognize one warship from another. To preclude mistakes until proficiency in ship recognition improved, Soviet bombers were restricted to bombing ships only within Nationalist ports.[3] Both sides had warned foreign vessels away from each other's harbors, but ships on nonintervention patrols off these harbors needed port periods for rest, refueling, and contact with their consulates. Despite the warnings, foreign warships of all flags were constantly found in Spanish military harbors.

The Nationalist naval port of Palma was crowded with foreign ships when the SB-2s made raids on 24 and 26 May. Their assigned targets were Nationalist warships, especially the cruiser *Baleares*. The aircrews could not single out Spanish from foreign vessels and dropped their bombs on ships at random, bombs landing as close as sixty yards from the German torpedo boat *Albatros*, which did not return fire. The *Baleares*, not attacked, left the harbor. The armored ship, or "pocker battleship," *Deutschland*, also headed for the open sea. Two days later the Soviet aircraft returned. Bombs again landed close to the *Albatros*, only twenty yards from the British destroyer *Hardy*, and hit the Italian auxiliary cruiser *Barletta*, demolishing the wardroom and killing six officers and wounding three. That day there were no Spanish Nationalist ships in port.

Rear Admiral Hermann von Fischel, the senior German naval officer in Spanish waters who wore his flag in the *Deutschland*, took action. He ordered the armored ship *Admiral Scheer* to Palma to give antiaircraft protection to German vessels in port, with permission to open fire on any approaching Republican aircraft. The OKM, more wary, considered Republican raids on Palma to be legitimate military actions to be anticipated, and that specific targeting of German ships had not been proved. Fearing that the situation could get out of control, the OKM cancelled Fischel's orders and for the purpose of safety ordered German ships out of Palma. German warships were not to open fire except in a clear emergency requiring extreme measures of self-defense. Meanwhile Britain and Italy dispatched protests to the Republican government, and on 27 May Britain gained an agreement with Republican Defense Minister Indalecio Prieto for a safety zone for foreign ships in Palma harbor. After hearing a thorough denunciation of the Republican action by Italy on 28 May, the Non-Intervention Committee contented itself with passing a resolution deploring the incident.[4]

Fischel was not satisfied with these measures. He wished to defend his ships and agreed with British naval officers in Palma that the 24 and 26 May attacks on foreign warships appeared to be deliberate. There had been other provocations. On 31 March, while the *Deutschland* patrolled off Valencia, a Republican destroyer, approaching at high speed, trained its guns and torpedo tubes on the German flagship. The German crew sprang to action stations, and the destroyer veered off. At other times Republican aircraft aroused his suspicions by maneuvering around the *Deutschland* at sea. On 29 May Fischel received permission from the OKM to demand from the Republican government an apology for the Palma raids and to warn that any repetition of the attack on German warships would lead to "countermeasures." The Republican Minister of State, José Giral, answered with a defense of the Republic's right to attack a rebel port notorious for its traffic in war materiel and with a warning that "the legitimate Spanish government" would "not restrain its action."[5] Fischel then broke off the exchange of messages in a scathing reply. He was convinced that the attacks were deliberate attempts against German and Italian warships, carried out by Republican forces with the intelligence cooperation of French warships at Palma. There is no evidence of deliberate Republican targeting of foreign warships or of French complicity, but Admiral Fischel was wedded to these assumptions out of the ideological similarity between the French and Spanish Republican governments and German antagonism to both.

At 1830 on that same day, 29 May, Admiral Fischel's flagship, the *Deutschland*, anchored in the quiet roadstead of Ibiza to refuel. The oiler *Neptun* and the torpedo boat *Leopard* already lay in the inner harbor. It was the OKM's wish that German naval vessels not risk themselves in Palma, and Ibiza was not only quiet, but closer to the German nonintervention patrol zone. An OKM estimate concluded that it would be in the interest of the Republican government not to create an incident with the patrolling powers. Therefore the OKM had designated Ibiza as a safe roadstead for refueling German warships. The *Deutschland*'s boats were put in the water and the crew was relaxing after supper. Only a limited lookout and antiaircraft watch was maintained. It would be an hour or so before the *Neptun* was scheduled to come alongside the *Deutschland* for refueling. The ship's band started to perform a concert. Captain Paul Fanger entertained a group of dignitaries that had come out from the town, while Admiral Fischel settled in to take a warm bath. The sea was calm and visibility good. The red-white-black recognition stripes on the turrets shone brightly in the late afternoon sun.

This peaceful scene would change abruptly. By chance, at that very moment Ibiza became the focus of a diversionary operation by the Republican navy and its supporting squadron of Soviet SB-2 bombers. The large Spanish arms ship *Magallanes*, from a Soviet port, was expected off Algiers on 30 May and would make a run for Cartagena under escort of Republican warships.

Knowing that the ship was tracked by Nationalist intelligence, the Republican naval command decided to stage a raid on Ibiza on the evening of 29 May to shift Nationalist attention from the arriving arms ship. Warships and the bombers would attack the town from the sea and air. Then, under the cover of falling darkness, the warships would rendezvous with the *Magallanes* and escort this valuable supply ship safely into Cartagena. A specific hope was to attract the newest Nationalist cruiser, the *Baleares*, whose position was unknown, toward Ibiza and away from the convoy. Better yet would be for the bombers, in the execution of the Ibiza mission, to discover and attack the *Baleares*. At the moment that ship was the only Nationalist cruiser available for Mediterranean operations. Should the *Baleares* be discovered and put out of action, the security of Republican supply lines would be greatly strengthened. This was the dream of Soviet SB-2 aircrews.[6]

At 1850, only twenty minutes after anchoring, *Deutschland* lookouts clearly saw emblazoned by the setting sun two cruisers and eight destroyers maneuvering fifteen miles to the east. Four destroyers pealed off from the formation and rapidly approached the roadstead of Ibiza, reforming 20 minutes later as a firing line eight miles out. Captain Fanger apprehensively watched this looming threat to the east. He requested that his visitors return to shore, and put the ship on a ten-minute standby to get underway. At that moment, at 1912, an air lookout suddenly sighted in the opposite direction, out of the setting sun, two bombers approaching the ship at an altitude of about 7,000 feet. The glare of the sun made it impossible to distinguish their identity. A signalman sounded the alarm, but almost immediately the aircraft were passing over the starboard quarter at 5,000 feet and dropping four 50 kg. bombs. For a split second crewmen thought these were leaflets fluttering down, but they quickly learned better. One bomb penetrated the deck amidships and exploded below, starting a major fire fueled from a paint locker. A compartment where crewmen were waiting in line at the ship's canteen was quickly gutted. Another bomb exploded topside, spraying fragments everywhere and setting fire to the ship's seaplane, whose burning gasoline engulfed the upper deck amidships aud poured down the ventilators to start fires below. A third bomb destroyed the captain's gig which lay at the boat boom. The fourth bomb missed. The aircraft sped away to the east before any antiaircraft guns could be put into action. Captain Fanger could only concentrate on saving his ship and crew, at once ordering damage control parties into action and the watertight doors closed.

Immediately thereafter shells from the Republican destroyers splashed 1,000 yards to port of the damaged ship. The second salvo straddled the *Deutschland*. The closest shell fell perhaps fifty yards to port, while another landed to starboard in the wake of the boat with departing Spanish dignitaries. A third salvo landed close to the Botafach lighthouse off the port quarter. Fanger quickly responded to this new threat by ordering the *Deutschland*'s 11-inch



main battery to open fire on the Republican ships. Meanwhile, in the few seconds since the first air alarm, Admiral Fischel had leapt from his bathtub and had run to a porthole, through which he observed the fire of the destroyers. He assumed at that moment that it was these destroyers that had damaged the ship and shouted to his orderly a message to that effect for Berlin.

In the event, the *Deutschland* never engaged the destroyers. Due to the closure of the watertight doors and the fire and smoke, the guns could not be manned quickly. Many of the crew of the fore turret were dead or wounded, and the gunner with the key to actuate the after turret was also among the dead. In any case, the destroyers soon ceased firing and turned away at high speed. With the ship at anchor, it would have been impossible to hit any of the Republican destroyers due to their rapidly increasing distance and the smoke that obscured vision. To get underway at that moment would have impeded the efforts to control the flames. Admiral Fischel therefore cancelled the captain's order to fire on the Republican ships.

Hurrying out from the inner port, the torpedo boat *Leopard* came alongside the *Deutschland* and helped fight the fire, which was brought under control at 1935. Captain Fanger then weighed anchor to move out of the target zone, but by that time the aircraft had long since headed back to base, and the Republican destroyers were nearly out of sight. Neither the *Deutschland* nor the *Leopard* ever opened fire. In these first moments, 23 sailors were killed

and of the 83 wounded, many were badly burned. Over the next days the toll mounted to 31 dead.[7]

All of this was furthest from the desires of the Republican political or naval leadership. In the approach to Ibiza, the Republican fleet commander, Admiral Miguel Buiza, and his Soviet advisor, Commander V. A. Alafuzov, had seen from the bridge of the cruiser *Libertad* the strange vessel lying in Ibiza roads. When they recognized it as the *Deutschland*, they signaled a recall to the destroyers that had been dispatched to the firing line. Neither the Spanish nor the Soviet officer had any wish to complicate the international situation, and the mission of attracting enemy attention to Ibiza had already been accomplished. But, as we have seen, the destroyers got a few shots off before they received the signal and broke off action. There was no way to communicate with the Soviet aircraft which were about to drop their bombs. As smoke rose from the damaged *Deutschland*, the Republican fleet sped out of the area toward its rendezvous with the arms ship off the African coast.[8]

Upon returning to base, the bomber aircrews climbed out of their SB-2s jubilantly shouting that they had bombed a Nationalist cruiser. Doubters queried if they were sure of their target, and were reassured that the ship had fired first. The Soviet pilots, new reliefs, admitted being unable to identify the target ship, but one Soviet bombardier was congratulated for his excellent marksmanship.[9]

The flow of information to Berlin was at first confused. Admiral Fischel's first report of 1920, that the *Deutschland* had been fired upon by the "red fleet," was corrected a few minutes later with his report that it had in fact been an air attack. Observers on board the pocket battleship variously reported the attackers as single, twin, and trimotor aircraft. No one saw any national insignia. Because Italy employed trimotor bombers in Spain, Fischel inquired of the Nationalists and the Italians if any of their aircraft had operated around Ibiza at that time, and notified OKM of his uncertainty at 2159. That evening, officers in Berlin receiving these messages could not reach the chief of the German Navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, and no orders were issued from Berlin.

Admiral Fischel became evermore convinced that the attack was a deliberate Republican provocation and on his own prepared to retaliate. He ordered the *Admiral Scheer*, and three torpedo boats under the command of Captain Otto Ciliax of the *Admiral Scheer*, to form off Cartagena and be ready to bombard the Republican naval base if the "reds" were found to be the guilty party and if he were given a green light from Berlin. Admiral Fischel and Captain Fanger wanted the *Deutschland* to participate in any act of revenge, but the condition of the badly burned sailors in the ship prompted Fischel instead to speed on to Gibraltar where the British authorities prepared the hospital for the worst cases. In the darkness of the early morning of 30 May, the returning Republican fleet, with the arms ship *Magallanes* in company, passed close by the darkened German squadron waiting to take

reprisal. The Republican ships went to general quarters for fear that they had stumbled upon a Nationalist force, but relaxed when the Germans turned their searchlights on their swastika ensigns.[10] Republican sailors were unaware of what these ships were preparing for them.

In Berlin the next morning Admiral Raeder was informed of the attack, but as yet no responsibility had been fixed. The chief of the naval command office, Rear Admiral Günther Guse, suggested that if responsibility lay with the Republicans and if the political situation allowed, a reprisal bombardment should be exacted against either Valencia, Cartagena, or Almería. Raeder and Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, the war minister, agreed that a reprisal would not be an appropriate response, for it could all too easily drag the German Navy into an unwanted shooting war.

Later in the afternoon the report came in that the Spanish Republicans had just admitted responsibility. The Republican government had announced that reconnaissance aircraft had bombed a warship at Ibiza that had "opened heavy anti-aircraft fire on our aircraft without any preceding aggressive action whatever on the part of the aircraft, either against the said vessel or against the city." The communique expressed no regret over the bombing.[11]

Flushed with rage, Hitler was ready for a massive military response and even considered declaring war. Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Göring agreed that it was time for the mailed fist. Hitler's foreign minister, Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, alone argued for a moderate approach that would gain international sympathy and minimize political risks. Regaining his composure through hours of debate, Hitler agreed to avoid such extreme measures that were likely to provoke others and tie down German policy in the Mediterranean. Hitler and the others met with the military chiefs at 1830. Hitler demanded at least a reprisal bombardment of Valencia, the Republican capital. Raeder warned that both Valencia and Cartagena were protected by minefields, and if a reprisal were required, a less risky target would be Almería, where the old Republican battleship *Jaime I*, with its undisciplined crew, was based. The argument continued for some time, with Hitler reluctantly giving in to Raeder's choice of Almería. The order went out at 2015 for the *Admiral Scheer*, the *Deutschland*, and the torpedo boats to bombard Almería the next dawn and also to destroy the battleship. Any interfering Republican naval or air forces would be destroyed. Further, Hitler was determined to leave the Non-Intervention Committee.

Berlin was not aware of all the facts. Admiral Fischel had to reply both that the *Deutschland* had just arrived at Gibraltar and was unavailable for the raid, and that the *Jaime I*, whose destruction Hitler especially emphasized, had left Almería for Cartagena. Admiral Fischel was eager for an effective reprisal focused against the Republican navy, not just a port. He was particularly angered by the Republican communiqué accusing the *Deutschland* of opening fire first, when he had to answer to Berlin why the ship had not

returned fire at all. So he recommended at 0400 that the pending bombardment of Almería be cancelled, and that the reprisal be shifted to Cartagena and its satisfying naval targets the following morning. Captain Ciliax's reprisal squadron had to wait off Almería beyond the scheduled bombardment hour for a final decision from Berlin. Without the battleship *Jaime I* as the primary target, Raeder was reluctant to go forward with a bombardment of only the town, certain that the world would brand the Germans as "babykillers," as they had been after Hipper's shelling of Scarborough and Hartlepool in December 1914. He preferred to follow Fischel's recommendation and bombard the military port of Cartagena the following morning. Blomberg, however, not wanting to confront Hitler with any delay, ordered the bombardment of Almería to go on as scheduled. Due to a coding error the order did not reach Ciliax until 0650 on 31 May, after dawn had removed the element of surprise.

Nevertheless, Captain Ciliax was ready. His ships had refueled and his captains had held a conference the preceding day. Remembering that the *Hunter* had been damaged by a mine in these very waters, he streamed paravanes as a precaution. Also remembering the damage caused by the burning float plane on the *Deutschland*, he sent off his float plane to remain out of the area during the reprisal operation. Ciliax then led his squadron on a non-suspicious course until he turned sharply toward the city and opened fire at 0730, eight miles out. Almería was blanketed in a low mist, but the German gunners were able to range on the tops of the larger buildings which were projecting above the mist. The few weak Republican batteries returned fire and themselves became targets. Republican fire was more accurate than Ciliax had expected, but the closest shell came no nearer than thirty yards. In thirty minutes German guns had showered 94 eleven-inch and 148 smaller shells onto the town, destroying 35 buildings. At first count 19 townspeople were killed outright and 55 wounded. As the ships steamed away from Almería they hoisted the Imperial war ensign at the topmast in commemoration of the twenty-first anniversary of the Battle of Jutland that very day. Now that German honor had been avenged, the government announced that the *Deutschland* case was closed.[12] The fallout, however, had just begun.

The Republican cabinet met the same day to decide what steps to take. Defense Minister Prieto proposed that Spanish forces seek out the raiding German squadron for combat. He sought to provoke a German declaration of war, which he hoped would lead to a full European conflict as the best circumstances for the survival of the Republic. Not ready for such a radical step, the cabinet instead adopted an appeal to world opinion and the League of Nations. A communiqué claimed Almería to be an "open city," and Raeder's fear of world censure came to pass. Even Hitler was agitated about the "open city" claim until a report arrived describing the return fire of the city's defensive batteries.[13]



Also on 31 May, the OKM ordered the German naval squadron in Spanish waters to be doubled in size. On the same day, Germany and Italy withdrew from the Non-Intervention Committee and its naval patrols until they should receive a positive guarantee that the *Deutschland* attack would not be repeated. Britain launched intensive diplomatic efforts to lure Hitler and Mussolini back. On 12 June agreement was reached that both Spanish parties be asked to guarantee the safety of foreign warships and to establish safety zones in Spanish ports. Should the Spaniards fail to agree, or should there be any interference, the four naval powers would consult on further measures to be taken. Germany and Italy returned to the Non-Intervention Committee and the naval patrols, but the OKM prepared draft retaliation measures against the Cartagena naval port and Republican naval forces, should the four-power efforts fail and there be another incident.[14]

Germans were on edge both in Berlin and in Spanish waters. They expected another incident and they found one. On the morning of 15 June the hydrophone operators of the German cruiser *Leipzig*, on patrol off Oran, thought they heard the sound of three torpedoes being fired. There was no other evidence and the cruiser's commanding officer, Captain Otto Schenk, considered the reports a false alarm and did not bother to report them. Then on 18 June the hydrophone operators again thought they heard the sounds of a torpedo, and sailors topside reported a turbulence in the sea surface that

might have been caused by the ejection of air from the discharge of a torpedo from a submarine torpedo tube. Days later, other sailors who had been on a lower deck at the time came forward with the story that they had heard an impact on the outside of the hull and a scraping sound as if the ship had been struck by some object. No bubble track or other evidence was noticed. This time Captain Schenk was certain that his ship had been attacked by one or two Republican submarines. Captain Scheuk, however, had no way of knowing that no Republican submarines were at sea on either day.[15]

On receiving Schenk's contact report, Admiral Fischel was ready with a plan for a deniable clandestine retaliation, unlike the earlier plans for a highly visible surface bombardment of a Republican port. He ordered submarines *U-28*, *U-33*, and *U-34*, which were operating in the Atlantic off the Strait of Gibraltar, to prepare to enter the Mediterranean and attack Republican warships and escorted merchant ships as they approached Cartagena. However, when Fischel requested Berlin to order the retaliation, he received no satisfaction from the OKM, which preferred to allow the four-power nonintervention consultation process to take effect.[16]

On 19 June Neurath informed the three other naval powers who were party to the 12 June agreement that four times on 15 and 18 June the *Leipzig* had been attacked by "Spanish-Bolshevist submarine pirates." In an emergency four-power meeting, Germany demanded the internment of all Republican submarines, "an immediate joint naval demonstration by the four powers off Valencia," and "a stern warning to the Valencia Government that any further attack would result in immediate military reprisals by the four powers." Neurath told the German representatives that if any of the other powers doubted the attacks had actually taken place, such doubts must be "sharply rejected even to the point of walking out of the conference."[17]

As Berlin reacted in bold certainty, Admiral Fischel, on reflection, became increasingly doubtful that there had been any attacks at all. He confided to British officers in Gibraltar that the supposed attack on the *Liepzig* might well have been caused by porpoises. German tests in these same waters later that summer showed that hydrophone indications of torpedoes often were actually machinery noises from one's own ship. Nevertheless, Admiral Fischel assured himself that, even if these were false alarms, the allegations could become the legal basis for any future reprisals, for "one has to expect the possibility of a submarine attack" sometime. He prepared an even more deniable retaliation plan for implementation whenever it might be ordered. The same three U-boats were to enter the Mediterranean secretly, paint over their boat numbers, flying false colors or none at all when on the surface, and use only electric torpedoes that left no bubble track. Their targets would be Republican submarines only.[18]

The Spanish Republic totally rejected the German allegations ("a flat denial to cut short a vile maneuver," was its language), and shifted the blame for

the crisis onto Germany.[19] A Republican acceptance of the internment provision was clearly unlikely. Hitler, remaining in an agitated frame of mind, would accept no international measure short of a naval demonstration and a sharp waning to both sides. Hitler also abruptly cancelled a projected visit to London by Foreign Minister Neurath. The cancellation delighted Neurath's rival, German Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop in London, and frustrated and irritated the British who had placed hopes on direct conversations with Neurath on the broad range of issues which threatened the peace of Europe.

From 19 to 22 June a series of ambassadorial-level meetings of the Four Powers was held in London to consider the German demand for a joint naval demonstration off Valencia. The British and French governments would take no action prior to a thorough inquiry, while the German and Italian representatives demanded an immediate naval action. With the failure to reach an agreement, on 23 June Germany and Italy for the second time withdrew from the naval patrols. Hitler was surprised and "extremely wrought up" that Britain did not immediately accept the German proposals. The British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, who tried to look for the best in the German leadership, could not but express his profound frustration: "It is impossible to reason with Germans that action should come after but not before inquiry. No German wants more evidence of attack on the *Leipzig* than statements of their own sailors and press bureau. In British and all impartial eyes this is utterly unreasonable."[20] Henderson, at least, was relieved that Germany had not taken any retaliatory action.

No further incidents involving German warships in Spanish waters arose to become international crises, but the potential for a major incident remained. Since 23 June standing orders among German naval forces in Spanish waters considered any approach of Republican ships or aircraft to German ships or the movement of any submerged submarine in the vicinity of German ships to be a hostile act calling for the destruction of the Republican vessel or aircraft. The Republican navy was especially careful not to trigger a German retaliation. Yet on 25 June and 16 July 1937 the German cruiser *Nürnberg* reported hearing submarine and torpedo noises on its hydrophone. This time OKM was skeptical enough that no action was taken.

Nevertheless, the potential for a major incident remained. Before dawn on 30 June the *U-35* was on the surface off Santander when a convoy escorted by the Republican destroyers *José Luis Díez* and *Ciscar* came into view. At 0500 one of the destroyers spotted the U-boat, but not the recognition stripes painted on the conning tower. Amid a flurry of signals, one of the destroyers turned and sped directly toward the *U-35*. Following standing orders to react to such behavior as hostile intent, at 0510 the *U-35* submerged and tried to attack the approaching destroyer, but could not get into firing position. At 0625 the *U-35* left the area and at 0810 surfaced to an empty horizon. In reviewing this incident, Rear Admiral Hermann Boehm, who had relieved


N
42°
BARCELONA
LEIPZIG
REPRISAL PLAN
19 JUNE 1937
SPAIN
40°
2°
PALMA
MALLORCA
VALENCIA
IBIZA
ALICANTE
0°
38°
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CARTAGENA
U-28
U-33
SOVIET SUPPLIES
ALMERIA
ALGIERS
U-34
X
LEIPZIG INCIDENT
2°
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ORAN
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0
25
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NAUTICAL MILES

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Admiral Fischel in command of German ships in Spanish waters, remarked that the conduct of the destroyer was quite understandable, just as the reaction of the submarine was proper.[21] Each vessel attempted to attack the other on the assumption of original hostile intent by the other. Yet the assumptions in both cases were wrong. Without the addition of insight and judgment, the rules of engagement could have led to unfortunate consequences.

On the basis of this set of experiences more than fifty years ago, one may put forward a few considerations as we face the possibility of further such incidents at sea in our own time.

- Decision makers must ask the basic questions. What is the policy objective? Are naval forces able to accomplish it? Are alternative means available? What are the benefits, costs, and limitations of each? Is the objective worth the risks?
- Keep cool. Edgy German crews in the *Leipzig* and the *Nürnberg* thought they detected a threat where none actually existed. They anticipated an incident, and so, in the case of the *Leipzig*, created one.
- Nevertheless, strive to expect the unexpected. The commanding officers of the *Kane*, *Erie*, *Hunter*, *Barletta*, *Albatros*, and *Deutschland* were all unprepared for the attacks that actually came. Admiral Fischel and the OKM thought they were ensuring the safety of their ships by assigning them an anchorage off Ibiza. (Similarly, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. *Panay* thought the same when he moved his river gunboat upstream of the fighting in China in December of that same year. He, too, was surprised when his ship was attacked.)
- Beware of assumptions. It is a corollary of the above point to be wary of jumping to conclusions. Admiral Fischel assumed that the attack on the *Deutschland* was deliberate, while Captain Schenk of the *Leipzig* assumed that he was being attacked by Republican submarines. The antagonism between Germany and the Spanish Republic made these assumptions appear logical, but they were wrong. Similarly, the Spanish destroyer skipper off Santander erroneously assumed the submarine on the horizon to be hostile solely because it was a submarine.
- Deploy the proper naval force for the circumstances. Ships that are easily confused with other vessels that some party sees as a direct threat invite trouble. The *U-35* was an inappropriate vessel to exercise presence in a convoy zone with a perceived submarine threat. Similarly, if ships are too weak they invite trouble. The proposal to replace British destroyers in Spanish waters with trawlers needed greater consideration of the ability of such vessels to defend themselves. In fact, a few months after the trawler proposal was aired, warplanes, with impunity, destroyed an unarmed French naval patrol vessel in these waters. Yet, too overbearing a force could provoke when it is intended

to deter, as did building the German High Seas Fleet prior to World War I and as did maintaining the U.S. battle force at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

- Evaluate carefully whether it is safer to advertise your movements or not. Germany did not want to draw Republican attention to the fact that German ships would be using Ibiza roads for an anchorage. Yet, since the Republic had sought a diversionary action free of risks, notice of ship movements would have saved the *Deutschland* from being attacked. Similarly, the *U-35* would have been safer by conspicuously advertising its identity and intentions. Yet announcing one's movements puts one's ship at risk of those who might wish to precipitate an incident.
- Do not think that telling commanding officers that they have the authority to defend their ships if threatened solves much. Judgment is needed to evaluate a possible threat in its political context. Such judgment is crucial but very difficult to make. Captains and governments are caught in a dilemma. If commanding officers are too cautious or complacent, and attacks occur, they will be held responsible for not properly defending their ships. Yet if they react prematurely or erroneously, they will be responsible for causing unsought crises that may ensue. Instructions that require a specific retaliatory response may trigger an unintended incident, such as between the *U-35* and the Republican destroyer. Leave room for judgment.
- If an incident occurs, leaders would do well to reflect before reacting. Hasty defensive verbal responses can be counterproductive and can escalate an incident into a crisis. After each event the Spanish Republic created more difficulty for itself by accusing the *Deutschland* of opening fire first, by claiming that Almería was an open city, and by accusing Germany of a plot over the *Leipzig* incident. The attempts of the Republican government to justify the attack on the *Deutschland* only exacerbated German hostility and led directly to the reprisal against Almería.
- Especially think long and hard before retaliating. If you decide to retaliate, first reduce to a minimum the political and military risks. Too much can go wrong. Ill-considered action could be costly with public opinion and provoke uncontrolled consequences. This was Neurath's argument with Hitler. The bombardment of Almería, Hitler's "moderate" response—both branded Germans as "babykillers," as Raeder feared, and led the Republican government to consider raising the stakes and force Germany into an unwanted shooting war.
- Finally, ask "What have I forgotten to ask?" This is the hardest but most important question of all.

Notes

1. *Hasty* Report of Proceedings, ADM 116/3519, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO).

2. Commander Squadron Forty (T) A4-3/(159) of 5 December 1936, Box 2134, RG 80, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

3. N. G. Kuznetsov, *Na dalekom meridiane* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1966), pp. 207-208.

4. Kriegstagebuch (hereafter KTB) des Befehlshaber der Panzerschiffe (hereafter BdP), RM 50/10, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i. Br.(hereafter BA-MA); Exchange of notes in R-1073/2&3, Archivo General y Biblioteca, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (hereafter AGB-MAE), Madrid; Stenographic Notes, 22nd Meeting, N.I.S. (36), FO 849/1, PRO.

5. R-1073/2&3, AGB-MAE.

6. Orden de operaciones no. 116, 28 May 1937, Archivo Rojo, N.C. 25-13:II, Servicio Histórico de la Armada, Madrid; V.L. Bogdenko, "Stranitsy starykh bloknotov," in *Leningradtsy v Ispanii: Sbornik vospominanii*, 2nd ed. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1973), pp. 164-166; Kuznetsov, pp. 207-208.

7. KTB *Deutschland*, RM 92/5033; KTB des BdP, RM 50/10 BA-MA; Hans Georg Prager, *Panzerschiff Deutschland—Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow: Ein Schiffs-Schicksal vor den Hintergründen seiner Zeit* (Herford: Koehlers, 1981), pp. 180-187.

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9. Andrés García Lacalle, *Mitos y verdades: La aviación de caza en la guerra española* (Mexico: Oasis, 1973), pp. 267-269; Kuznetsov, p. 208; G. Prokofiev, "El cielo español en llamas," *Bajo la bandera de la España republicana* (Moscow: Progreso, n.d.), pp. 400-401; Ignacio de Cisneros, *Memorias*, v. 2 (Paris: Globe, 1964), p. 405.

10. BdP message file, RM 20/5036; KTB des BdP, RM 50/10, KTB *Admiral Scheer*, RM 92/5047, BA-MA; Bogdenko, p. 169. Both Captain Fanger and Admiral Fischel served their normal tours of duty in their respective commands and were relieved only at the time of normal rotation.

11. "Aviación," communiqué of Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2200, 29 May 1937, R-1073/2&3, AGB-MAE.

12. BdP message file, RM 20/5036; KTB der BdP, RM 50/10; KTB *Admiral Scheer*, RM 92/5047, BA-MA; Comandante Militar de Almería to Ministro de Defensa Nacional, 0800, 31 May 1937, R-1037/2&3, AGB-MAE.

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14. *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, 1918-1945, ser. D, v. 3: "Germany and the Spanish Civil War" (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1950) (hereafter *DGFP*), pp. 297, 299-300, 326-327, 343-344, 348, 349; *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919-1939, 2nd ser., v. 18 (London: HMSO, 1980) (hereafter *DBFP*), p. 836; "Denkschrift," 14 June 1937, RM 20/1222, BA-MA.

15. KTB *Leipzig*, RM 92/5070, BA-MA; S.O. (I) Gibraltar to Admiralty, 30 June 1937, W12635/7/41, FO 371/21339, PRO. Spanish naval archives show all submarines in port.

16. KTB des BdP, RM 50/10, BA-MA.

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19. Prieto statement of 20 June in *The Times* (London), 21 June 1937.

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In military emergencies it is impossible to have the storehouse of the mind too full of resources against all possible contingencies.

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A. T. Mahan (1911)
Little, Brown (1918), p. 343

Petroleum Transport System: No Longer a Legitimate Target

Major Kevin B. Jordan, U.S. Marine Corps

The names *Argo Merchant*, *Amoco Cadiz* and, most recently, *Exxon Valdez* evoke none of the nostalgic fascination often associated with the wreck of great ships. Instead, the mere mention of these hapless tankers induces an uneasiness that quickly builds to revulsion and then disgust when one considers the environmental implications of such mishaps. The recitation of the names of these unlucky vessels has a macabre ring evocative of a death knell.

The political impact of environmental disasters, particularly those that affect the sea, should not be ignored by military planners. The public is no longer willing to accept environmental desecration by industry, and should not be expected to tolerate it as a collateral effect of war if we hope to retain the popular support so crucial to military success.

Heightened environmental awareness has altered the political reality of what is and is not an acceptable military course of action in pursuit of operational goals. For example, the worldwide outcry over the environmental implications of the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents renders the idea of attack against an enemy's nuclear utility plants unthinkable in conventional war. By the same logic, the use of a herbicide like Agent Orange on the tropical rain-forest sanctuary of a guerrilla force, though acceptable only a generation ago, would be politically inadvisable today. Public outrage at the sickening devastation to Prince William Sound as a result of the *Exxon Valdez* grounding suggests that attack on an enemy crude oil tanker would meet with resounding denunciation, regardless of the theater of operations in which the attack took place.

The environmental, and therefore political, costs of conducting attacks against an enemy's crude oil transport system are unacceptably high. Theater

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commanders must determine how best to achieve the operational goal of disrupting enemy fuel supplies without resorting to attack on the environmentally sensitive crude oil transport system. The desired result can be achieved with much less environmental risk by focusing interdiction efforts on the enemy's refinery capacity and distribution network for refined petroleum products.

The term "crude oil transport system" refers to that segment of the international oil industry concerned with the transport of crude oil from the wellhead to the refinery by ship or pipeline or, as is frequently the case, some combination of the two. Crude oil production and shipment to the refinery is referred to within the industry as the "upstream" stage, while the production and distribution of refined petroleum products is referred to as the "downstream" stage.[1]

This distinction between the upstream and downstream stages of the industry is important from a military perspective because attack against the tankers, port facilities, drilling platforms, and pipelines of the upstream stage poses much greater environmental risks than attack against the refineries and small-volume carriers of the downstream stage. The difference in degree of risk is directly related to the volume of petroleum subject to leakage into environmentally sensitive areas as a result of attack.

Large concentrations of crude oil are moved through the upstream stage daily. It is estimated that as much as three billion barrels of crude, much of it concentrated in the fragile hulls of gigantic tankers, is moving through the transport system at any given time.[2] While the average tanker transporting crude oil in World War II displaced 12,000 deadweight tons (dwt), its modern counterpart displaces from 200,000 to 300,000 dwt with behemoths in excess of 500,000 dwt not uncommon.[3] In comparison, a *Nimitz*-class carrier displaces approximately 90,000 displacement tons.[4]

The environmental effects of an attack which would result in the sinking of a modern tanker would be similar to those caused by the wreck of the *Amoco Cadiz* off the Brittany coast in 1978 in which 223,000 tons of crude oil were spilled. In addition to the fouling of hundreds of kilometers of pristine coastline, oyster fisheries were contaminated and growth defects noted in certain species of bottom fish as a result of petroleum pollution.[5] Other more sinister long-term effects of catastrophic spills must also be considered in weighing the efficacy of such an attack. Researchers have found that phytoplankton, the plant life that forms the lowest level in the marine food chain, is highly intolerant of even very low levels of petroleum pollution.[6] In addition, evidence gathered after the wreck of the *Argo Merchant* off New England in 1976 indicates that the eggs of commercially important species such as cod and pollack suffered a 50 percent mortality rate in waters affected by the spill.[7]

Attack against the offshore drilling platforms of the upstream stage of the enemy's petroleum industry would also pose grave environmental risks. The accidental blow-out of the Mexican offshore well Ixtoc 1, in the Gulf of Mexico in June 1979, provides a convenient example of what the outcome of such an attack might be. Despite the efforts of the Mexican government to bring the erupting well under control, it spewed oil continuously for almost nine months before it was successfully capped. The Ixtoc 1 disaster is the largest oil spill on record.[8] The resulting environmental damage to fisheries and tourist industries along the Mexican and Texas coasts has embroiled the two governments in a bitter dispute over compensation.[9]

Yet in October 1987, the United States chose to conduct just such an attack. Naval vessels of the Middle East Joint Task Force shelled the Iranian oil platform *Rashadat* to demonstrate, in the words of President Reagan, a "prudent yet restrained response" to Iranian provocations in the Persian Gulf.[10] The fact that the Iranians were using the platform as a surveillance and operations base did not make more acceptable the very serious environmental risks associated with destruction of an offshore well. One has to wonder if the theater commander and the National Command Authorities even considered the possible environmental crisis that might have resulted from this "prudent yet restrained response."

Perhaps the most convincing argument against further pollution of the sea as a consequence of the indiscriminate use of military force is the implication for world food supplies. If current birth rates continue, the present world population of 5.2 billion will almost double by 2025 and triple before the end of the next century.[11] The only hope of feeding such a multitude rests in expanding the annual harvest from the oceans. Scientists estimate that the haul from conventional fishing methods could yield up to four times the present catch, while anticipated developments in "aquaculture" could increase that yield considerably.[12] Wanton disregard for the environmental consequences of military action might well result in the loss of this vital protein source to future generations, precisely when it is needed most.

Attack against the crude oil pipelines of the upstream stage also poses significant environmental risks. The factors relating to potential environmental damage are line capacity and proximity of the target section to ecologically sensitive areas such as watersheds and arable land. The large volume capacity of many of the world's pipelines indicates the dimensions of the environmental crises that might result from such attacks. Approximately 50 percent of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, or 4.7 million barrels per day (mbd), is transported by pipeline.[13] The Iraqi pipelines terminating in Turkey and Syria each carry approximately .5 mbd.[14] As a point of comparison, the Alyeska pipeline in Alaska has a capacity of 2 mbd.[15]

The greatest environmental risk in pipeline attack is the contamination of ground water supplies by the highly toxic water-soluble components of crude

oil known as aromatic hydrocarbons.[16] Studies of ground water systems or "aquifers" throughout the United States indicate that aromatic hydrocarbon contamination has already occurred in dangerous concentrations, particularly in oil-producing regions and areas where petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides have been used extensively.[17] The most disturbing aspect of the contamination threat posed by these highly toxic carcinogenic compounds is their alarming persistence. Once an aquifer has been contaminated by water-soluble organic chemicals, it can remain so for the indefinite future, possibly thousands of years.[18]

While attack on pipelines of the capacities described above might well result in lasting ecological damage, the military advantage to be gained would likely be temporary and of little strategic importance. Evidence from the Iran-Iraq War indicates that Iran was readily able to repair damage to its Kharg Island pipeline system despite frequent Iraqi air strikes.[19]

Interdiction of an enemy's fuel supply in the downstream stage of the petroleum industry allows the theater commander to employ more discriminate means of attack against targets that are not likely to generate unwanted environmental and political repercussions. The key to conducting environmentally less damaging attacks against this stage of the industry is to avoid large-volume targets such as the storage tanks and pipeline terminals associated with refinery installations.

Primary emphasis should be placed on attacking the refinery process plant in which crude oil is converted into numerous useful petroleum products.[20] Since the process plant can handle only a limited volume of petroleum at a given time, elimination of this facility would interrupt fuel production without serious environmental impact.

By adjusting the scope of an attack against an enemy's refinery process plant, the theater commander can choose either to completely disrupt fuel production or merely to prevent production of the more highly refined products such as gasoline and aviation fuels. The fundamental step in refining crude oil involves the separation of the naturally occurring hydrocarbons that comprise the resource into components or fractions. This separation is accomplished by heating the crude in a distillation column or tower. The lighter fractions, precursors of high-performance fuels, are bled off the top of the column while heavier fractions are extracted from the lower part of the column. The lighter fractions require further refinement to form gasolines and aviation fuels, while the heavier fractions can frequently be used without further processing as low-grade diesel, ship bunker fuel, boiler fuel for electric utility plants, and heating oils.[21]

The next step in the refinement of the lighter fractions involves heating them under pressure in the presence of catalysts that promote formation of new compounds. This process is called catalytic cracking and is accomplished in a facility called a catalytic reformer.[22] By destroying the catalytic reformer,

the commander can disrupt the enemy's ability to produce gasoline, high-quality diesel and aviation fuels, without affecting enemy ability to produce the low-grade fuels which power industrial production. If interdiction of all fuel production is the commander's objective, attacks can be directed principally against the distillation towers, with secondary emphasis on the catalytic reformers.

This idea of precisely focusing an attack so as to achieve a desired limited result can be taken a step further. Through use of the broad range of intelligence capability available to the theater commander, the enemy's source for the discrete catalysts required for refined fuel production can be identified. A variety of means, not necessarily military, might then be employed to deny the enemy access to industrial chemicals vital to his ability to wage war.

A secondary means of interdicting an enemy's fuel supply in the downstream stage involves attacks designed to disrupt or destroy critical points in the lines of communication through which refined products must pass to reach consumers. Railroads, bridges, and port facilities that serve the refineries are the obvious targets. This category of attack would also include destruction of railroad tank cars and other small-volume carriers of petroleum products. A well-coordinated effort to eliminate small-volume carriers could have decisive results: 90 percent of the Soviet Union's refined petroleum products are transported via railroad tank cars.[23]

Attacks against refinery capacity and the lines of communication for refined product distribution are ideally suited for employment of "surgical" weapons such as precision-guided munitions. These targets are also vulnerable to strikes by special operations forces who can be trained to knock out key nodes in the enemy's downstream petroleum industry with little risk of collateral environmental damage.

In order to avoid the unwanted environmental and political costs of interdicting enemy fuel supplies in the upstream stage of the oil industry, the following rules of engagement are proposed:

- Destructive attacks against offshore wells, crude oil tankers, and pipelines be prohibited.
- Destructive attack against crude oil and refined petroleum product storage facilities (tank farms) be prohibited.
- Tankers may be stopped, searched and, if found to be transporting war materials other than crude oil, seized.

The proposed rules of engagement are not intended to deny operational commanders the advantages to be gained from disrupting enemy fuel supplies. Rather, they would serve to focus interdiction efforts on the key nodes of the environmentally less risky downstream stage of the industry.

Rules of engagement designed to limit the collateral environmental damage resulting from military action offer only a partial solution to the larger problem of waging limited war in an ecologically fragile but heavily armed

world. The logical extension of this concept would be an international agreement to protect aspects of the environment vital to human survival by prohibiting attack against environmentally risky targets such as the upstream stage of the petroleum industry. Such an agreement would, in effect, be a form of arms control with emphasis not on reducing the number and type of weapons, but rather on limiting the categories of targets against which weapons could legitimately be employed. An arms control agreement of this nature would be effective only so long as states perceived their enduring interests to be served by the accord. However, protection of the ecological fabric that sustains life is arguably the most enduring interest of all.

Such an agreement would likely have broad political appeal both on a national and international level: Appeal on a national level, because it addresses environmental concerns of an increasingly more alert and informed populace; appeal on an international level, because it would extend the focus of arms control discussions from the present bipolar orientation to a multinational one in which all states could express an interest in an area of mutual concern. It is precisely this broad international support that would encourage states to abide by the restrictions of the agreement rather than endure international condemnation.

The exercise of restraint in war is not a concept born of the nuclear age. Warriors have, since ancient times, recognized the need for limits on the use of violence in furthering political aims. The olive branch as ancient symbol of peace, security, and the fecundity of nature takes root in this idea. Indeed, it was the longevity of the olive tree and its central role in Mediterranean culture that caused the ancients to regard its destruction in war as an act beyond moral justification; hence its enduring symbolic appeal.

As the weapons of war have grown more lethal, the environmental consequences of their injudicious use have become more costly. We must expand the concept of restraint to include the protection of those aspects of nature vital to human survival. Prohibition against attack on the upstream stage of the enemy's petroleum transport system is an example of restraint in the ancient tradition which recognizes that there will be generations to follow long after our war and its objectives have been forgotten.

Notes

1. "Oil Transport and Storage Industry," *OPEC Bulletin*, no. 14, 1983, p. 55.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 58; Ferdinande E. Banks, "Oil Tankers: Some Basic Economics," *OPEC Bulletin*, no. 18, 1987, p. 10.

4. Warships' size is almost always given in displacement tons. Nowadays the U.S. Navy uses full-load displacement, which includes the ship and everything in her. Deadweight tonnage, applied to merchant ships, only measures the ship's carrying capacity. The full-load displacement of a fully laden tanker would be more than her deadweight tonnage.

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6. Robert H. Howarth, "Fish versus Fuel: A Slippery Quandary," *Technology Review*, no. 83, 1981, p. 74.
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16. Howarth, p. 72; Laubier, p. 272.
17. David E. Burmaster and Robert H. Harris, "Synthetic Organic Chemicals Are Contaminating Groundwater in Many Parts of the Nation, Possibly Posing Unacceptable Risks to Human Health," *Technology Review*, no. 85, 1982, p. 52; Larry Freuhling, "Please Don't Drink the Water," *The Progressive*, no. 50, 1986, p. 31.
18. Burmaster and Harris, p. 54.
19. Axelgard, p. 28.
20. Alan D. Plaistowe, "Key Developments in the Petrochemical Industry to the Year 2000," *OPEC Bulletin*, no. 18, 1987, p. 11.
21. *Basic Oil Industry Information*, (Vienna: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 1983), pp. 30-31.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.
23. "USSR," *OPEC Bulletin*, no. 16, 1985, p. 69.

Ψ

In the open field of the sea the most direct route is the most natural, and, other things being equal, the best; but many circumstances may influence the decision. Paramount among these is the strength of the navy as compared with that of the enemy,—a strength dependent not only upon aggregate tonnage or weight of metal, but also upon the manner in which those aggregates have been distributed among the various classes of vessels and upon the characteristics of each class in point of armament, armor, speed, and coal endurance. All these qualities are elements in strategic efficiency, sometimes mutually contradictory; and the adjustments of them among themselves may seriously affect strategic calculations. This illustrates that the composition of a national fleet is really a strategic question.

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A. T. Mahan (1911)
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Naval Force Planning Cases: Organizing Our Thoughts and Weighing Alternatives

Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman

At the highest level, a nation's grand strategy influences its choice of naval forces. So, in turn, do military and maritime strategies. Each supports the higher order strategy while providing further insight into specific forces required.[1]

Strategies, however, guide naval force planners only so far. Where should they go to gain more insight into future requirements? We suggest that the next step is to study three general planning cases. Examining a meaningful set of starkly different situations in which naval forces have been used should stimulate deeper thinking about the appropriate level and mix of naval forces to support national policy. Since force planning is usually constrained financially, this effort should result in a sense of priority. Some forces will always be more important than others; the difficulty lies in deciding.

Cases Defined

War at Sea. In peace, the purpose of naval forces is to apply strategic leverage against a rival seapower to deter war. Should peace collapse, the purpose is to help end the ensuing war favorably, specifically by ensuring the passage

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of friendly shipping and denying transit to the enemy's shipping. Generally, this is done by destroying or blockading the enemy's fleet. This case focuses on the Soviet Navy today.

War against the Land. Under this case, naval forces apply strategic leverage directly or indirectly against the territory of a major land power. The goal is to assist joint and combined forces in deterring war or ending it on favorable terms. In recent years, this case has applied to Soviet-controlled territory in Eurasia.

War in the Third World. Here, strategic leverage is applied by naval forces to control developing crises, to deter war, or, again, to resolve conflict on favorable terms. This third case applies to all situations not covered by the first two. Although concerned primarily with non-Soviet contingencies, limited conflict against Soviet forces under highly constrained regional circumstances is possible. Such a conflict would likely occur well beyond the borders of both superpowers, jeopardizing the vital interests of neither.

War at Sea

From 1945 through the mid-1970s, naval planners had little need to think seriously about war at sea. We rarely noticed our major rival in foreign ports or on the high seas. Furthermore, Soviet fleets were hampered by geography. Their basing areas in the Barents Sea, Baltic Sea, Sea of Japan, Black Sea, and Sea of Okhotsk were widely separated and vulnerable to piecemeal destruction. Except for the Barents, they were also restricted by narrow, foreign-controlled exits, ice (during parts of the year), or both.

During these years, U.S. naval warfare concerns were confined to war in the Third World. Korea and Vietnam were limited wars from our perspective; both were long and difficult. However, neither required combat against a formidable navy or the landmass of a major power such as China or the Soviet Union. The U.S. maritime forces of choice were carrier-based aviation and combined arms marine forces ashore. Only once, at Inchon in Korea, were marines used in an important amphibious assault. Coastal and riverine forces found employment, but again, only once, this time in Vietnam. In both cases, strategic sealift was safe from attack.

Western naval planners began to think seriously about the Soviet Navy in the mid-1970s. A series of articles by its commander, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, trumpeted the rise of Soviet naval power as proof that Moscow had become a superpower equal to the United States. Western studies obligingly concluded that the Russian bear had learned to swim.[2]

A massive buildup of Soviet air, ground, and naval forces—coming hard on the heels of the fall of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Angola and Ethiopia—exacerbated growing U.S. concerns. More than ever before, Western planners saw serious reasons to worry about the survivability of Nato. The central front in Germany and the protection of tankers bringing oil from the Middle East were of particular concern. In the event of war, Soviet naval forces might be used to sink those tankers and provide support from the seas to advancing Warsaw Pact armies.

This assessment of Western weakness and Soviet strength was reinforced by the unexpected Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. More than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, we had reason to worry about Soviet expansionism throughout the Eurasian landmass and perhaps beyond. Furthermore, belief grew that Soviet maritime capabilities posed a threat to the U.S. Navy's ability to operate unimpeded throughout the world.

It was against this background that naval thinkers developed the "Maritime Strategy" in the 1980s. Instantly and harshly condemned by the Soviets, it marked a renaissance of aggressive spirit and doctrinal innovation for the U.S. Navy. Some of the "Maritime Strategy's" key concepts apply to all potential naval actions. Under any crisis circumstance, U.S. naval forces would be expected to deploy early and move well forward. But which enemy would they fight, and where? Primarily against the Soviets at sea, against the Soviet-controlled landmass of Eurasia, or in the Third World? These are perhaps the most important questions one could ask about the future of the U.S. Navy.

The war at sea offers important opportunities for strategic leverage. A core concept has been the "threat of a long war." Western purposes would be to control, contain and destroy the enemy fleet; deny the enemy access to the sea so that he can neither reinforce his forward units nor resupply his industrial base; and bolster our own economy with the resources of the world. Thus the West could hope to continue the war at times and places of its own choosing and present the adversary with the prospect of a protracted and unwinnable war. Such a prospect, of course, would not be entirely pleasant for the West, whose potential for mobilization has been generally atrophying over the past several decades. Even so, the lessons of the Napoleonic wars, World War I, and World War II all suggest that the Western maritime coalition would have long-term advantages over its rivals, once enemy naval forces were neutralized.

The war at sea might require attacks against a wide range of sea, air, land, and space objectives. The key distinction here is that these attacks *directly* harm the adversary's maritime capability. For example, strikes against naval facilities on the Kola Peninsula would support the war at sea. (On the other hand, attacks intended to divert Soviet air and land forces

from some threatened Allied position ashore would be part of the war against the land.)

A second and more controversial concept deals with "attrition of Soviet SSBN Forces." The purpose would be to put pressure on Moscow's strategic nuclear reserves, thus influencing the overall correlation of nuclear forces in the West's favor. Advocates contend that such a campaign would moderate Soviet behavior and increase the chances for negotiation, bargaining, and war termination on favorable terms. But exactly the opposite—and no less hypothetical—argument has also been made by those who contend that the anti-SSBN campaign is escalatory, destabilizing, and unwise.

Whichever view one holds, destruction of Soviet ballistic missile submarines is considered a part of the war at sea. However, as an integral part of the Soviet long-range nuclear force—which is predominantly located ashore—these boats are also tied to the war against the land. Their role in the overall correlation of nuclear forces thus puts them in a special category, which reflects an underlying tension among the cases.

Campaigns for executing the war at sea will have a strong bearing on the choice of forces to be bought, trained, and maintained. As a general rule, the maritime strategy encourages early, forward and offensive actions against enemy forces. But how early, how far forward, and how offensive? The answers to these questions will depend upon the type of campaigns envisaged and will thus exert a direct influence upon the technological sophistication and number of weapon systems required to implement them.

For example, would highly aggressive campaigns to destroy Soviet naval forces in their bastions (Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk) require larger numbers of our most sophisticated systems? If so, then possible force emphases might be on multicarrier battle forces, Aegis cruisers and destroyers, submarine-launched land-attack conventional missiles, and forward deployments of maritime patrol aircraft.

What about moderately aggressive campaigns, perhaps aiming to contain Soviet combatants within their bastions, as opposed to sinking them? Blockading Soviet bastions, instead of penetrating them, might favor greater numbers of attack submarines, but fewer carriers, and less reliance upon the Aegis screening ships (because of greater distance of carrier battle groups from Soviet land-based aircraft).

Would other, essentially defensive approaches (such as choke-point barriers), satisfy Western needs? If so, should the force planner consider radically different levels and mixes of forces, possibly emphasizing remote sensors and mines more than the previous two campaign options?

Having considered these related questions of strategy, campaign planning, and force structure, are there other important factors affecting the war at sea? Technology might be such an influence. Should surface ship design move toward less observable hulls? Do emerging options for propulsion, weapons,

sensors, and satellite communication indicate radical departures in force planning? Or does the Gorbachev era drive our threat perception away from the war at sea entirely?

War against the Land

From the 1950s through the 1970s, American naval planners thought of the war against the land in terms of nuclear platforms deployed around the Eurasian continent to help contain and deter the Soviet Union. The forces of choice were submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles and attack aircraft operating from forward-deployed aircraft carriers.

Such thinking changed sharply in the 1980s. Now naval thinkers identify several nonnuclear alternatives in the event of war against the Soviet-controlled landmass. Their common denominator is gaining strategic leverage from the sea to support joint and combined operations on the Eurasian continent. One possibility is to apply "pressure to the flanks" of a combat theater. Such operations might seek to protect friendly populations and territory, divert enemy land and air forces from the main axis of attack, disrupt his strategic time lines, interdict lines of communication and damage his exposed industrial base. A more ambitious goal would be to open up a new front within the theater.

A second alternative involves the concept of "horizontal escalation." The purpose would be to extend the conflict to an entirely new theater of war, thus confronting the Soviets with the dilemmas of conflict in widely dispersed areas. An example would be a campaign in the Pacific following Soviet aggression in Europe. This could take the form of strikes against Soviet forces, lines of communications or the industrial base. A more demanding and risky campaign might involve landing forces and seizing territory on the Kamchatka Peninsula or the Kurile Islands.

"Direct support" of allied air and land forces opposing the main axis of a combined-arms Soviet attack is an even more demanding alternative. Western thinking about such a possibility has tended to focus on Nato, although the same ideas apply to Southwest Asia or the Pacific. For a Nato central front scenario, this could take the form of one or two marine expeditionary forces deployed to such areas as Denmark or Northern Germany to defend otherwise vulnerable territory. Such deployments might be backed up by powerful carrier battle forces, providing air defense and striking power against enemy forces or lines of communication.

"Deep attacks within the Soviet homeland" would be a further alternative, differing in the nature of its target-set and escalatory implications. The targets might include strategic command and control nodes, air defense nets, or critical industrial assets. Such objectives would imply an emphasis on different

types of highly sophisticated forces such as stealthy, sea-launched cruise missiles and long-range attack aircraft.

Our concern for the war against the land during the late 1970s and 1980s created a bias for particular kinds of maritime forces. These included:

- Highly defensible carrier battle forces capable of operating near a Soviet-controlled landmass;
- Deep-strike capabilities against land targets;
- Large numbers of systems to permit decisive concentration of forces, action simultaneously in more than one theater, and the offsetting of losses which would occur in such high-threat environments.

But does the war against the land still deserve the same level of attention that it once received? If so, are the same force emphases still valid? And if not, where should emphasis go?

War in the Third World

Naval forces have been widely used for a long time as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and crisis intervention. But to what extent should this role affect force planning? Is it safe to assume that the forces developed for the war at sea and war against the land are sufficient for lesser contingencies?

There are many lessons to be learned from the Falklands War, the interventions in Grenada and Panama, the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, the multinational task force in the Persian Gulf, and the raid on Libya. Likewise, any future contingencies should be used to review traditional assumptions and the priority of the Third World case for naval force planning.

Finally, how should force planners look into the future? Is there a need for radically different intervention forces to achieve decisive political results, for example, forces capable of more stealth and speed? If so, to what extent should they be naval forces? How should they be equipped for the growing threat of highly sophisticated technology in the Third World, such as chemicals, toxins, precision-guided munitions, and a bizarre mix of Soviet, Chinese, European, and American weapons?

Analyzing the Cases

Thinking in terms of these cases can materially help force planners. The first step is to consider each case separately, as if it were the only one required of naval forces. Given the threat, what are the dominant tasks and forces? What critical shortfalls exist? Clearly, there will be other tasks and forces, as well as less painful shortfalls, but this array is sufficient to start the analysis.

A matrix, such as the one that follows, can be used to help organize data, identify key problems, and seek opportunities.

Matrix for Naval Force Planning

Case	War at Sea	War against the Land	War in the Third World
Threat	Soviet Navy and supporting arms	Soviet combined land, air, and sea forces	Primarily non-Sov. • Possibly hi-tech • Single theater • Wide range of quality and quantity
Dominant Tasks	Sea denial & Sea control	Power projection & Strategic lift	Crisis control
Dominant Forces	SSN Aegis MPA CVBG	CVBF MEF (Heavy) TLAM (C) SSBN	CVBG MEF (Light)
Critical Shortfalls	Sensors • Capabilities Weapons • Numbers Logistics support ships ASAT	Long-range strike assets • Attack A/C • TLAM (C) CVBF defenses Logistics support ships Amphibious assanlt ships Fast sealift ASAT	Military assistance Minesweepers Brown water forces Special forces Search and rescue Breakbulk sealift

Let us next consider all the cases at once to develop a sense of priority among them. If we judge that one naval planning case ranks higher in priority than the others, this does not mean that it would necessarily absorb all available resources. But it does mean that naval force planners should make key decisions for that case before proceeding to the others.

The third step is to develop an integrated priority list which cuts across the three cases. Each case will logically have its own force planning requirements, ranging from most essential to least essential. The resulting list would not necessarily rank all the highest priority items of one case ahead of the priorities of the other two.

Such a list should be tested thoroughly. This requires reexamining campaign plans within the cases, mission area analyses (such as AAW, ASW, or mine warfare), and lessons learned from recent conflicts.

Our Priorities for the Naval Force Planning Cases

In our view, the war at sea should be number one for the 1990s. We base this judgment on several considerations:

- We cannot adequately reinforce, resupply, open new theaters, trade, or fully mobilize the industrial base without being able to use the seas when and where we choose. Hence, controlling the sea is a necessary condition for our national strategy of forward defense.
- Victory at sea, in a war against a continental power, might not guarantee ultimate victory for the West. However, defeat at sea would deprive our maritime alliance of the substance that bonds its members and provides the enduring flexibility historically essential for ultimate victory.
- The Soviet Navy is a formidable threat to our maritime alliance. Not since the German and Japanese navies of the 1940s have we known such a rival at sea. We doubt that any foreseeable breakthroughs in arms control will change this situation.
- There are many options for employing the Soviet Navy. They range from the conservative bastion concept (which would stress the defense of SSBNs in Soviet waters) to more risky assaults upon Nato's flanks and shipping in combined arms assaults against adjacent land theaters.[3]

We rank war in the Third World second in importance for force planners. In our view, naval forces will remain the instrument of choice for the following reasons:

- Crises in the Third World will continue to arise from shifts in the balance of power, international terrorism, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and intractable regional rivalries.
- Most of those crises are likely to occur near navigable waters.
- Freedom of the seas will remain a key principle of international relations.
- The growing constraints on our overseas basing structure, overflight rights, and alliance commitments restrict the employment of U.S. ground and ground-based air forces more than ever before.
- Naval forces provide an over-the-horizon, discreet capability to embolden friends, discourage enemies, influence events, and intervene when necessary.

We see more and more reason to question the traditional assumption that preparing for the "worst case" of war with the Soviet Union will leave us well-prepared for combat in the Third World. That assumption may be defensible when we have adequate time on our side to concentrate forces, improvise joint actions, mobilize reserves, and convince allies to join us. However, that assumption is indefensible when fast-breaking events open us to attack by increasingly sophisticated enemies in the Third World—long before we can marshal all the assets theoretically available to us. Therefore,

we suspect there will be a growing demand for specialized forces, capable of fast, stealthy, decisive action against Third World targets.

Finally, we see war against the land as priority three. Real breakthroughs in U.S.-Soviet relations have been occurring, and Moscow appears to be moving toward a more defensive posture. Furthermore, declining U.S. defense budgets will constrain force planners and put a premium on well-reasoned priorities. Under all these circumstances, naval planners may find it wise to think less in terms of hazarding scarce naval assets for campaigns against Soviet-dominated territory and, instead, placing more stress on ensuring superiority at sea and controlling Third World crises.

* * *

The process jnst outlined should help naval force planners clarify their thinking. We view force planning hierarchically. At the highest national level are the interests, threats, and objectives which set the stage for force planning and provide a general sense of purpose and direction. Strategies—national, military, and maritime—further guide our choice of forces. However, specifying the actual level and mix requires further analysis at lower levels of detail. The next step is to analyze the three naval force planning cases, as shown above. They have received too little attention, in our opinion, as an important link between strategy and campaign planning.

As we look to the future, we sense the importance of building further consensus about the logic chain for naval force planners. The "Maritime Strategy" has served us well, but it is not enough. The complete conceptual framework should include the naval planning cases, campaign analyses within those cases, mission area analysis (AAW, ASW, and ASUW) within the campaigns, and lessons learned from recent crisis and conflict experience. To the extent that Gorbachev has shaken many of our traditional assumptions about the Soviet threat, we would do well to return to the basics of the major naval planning cases.

Notes

1. Bartlett, Henry C. and Holman, G. Paul, "Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1988, pp. 15-25.

2. The genesis of Gorshkov's proclamations on the importance of a navy seems to be his 1965 article in the restricted General Staff journal, *Voyennaya mysl'*, which he greatly expanded in his book, *Sea Power of the State*, and the series of commentaries, *Navies in War and Peace*. For a Western analysis, see John G. Hibbits, "Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought," in Paul J. Murphy, ed., *Naval Power in Soviet Policy: Vol. 2, Studies in Communist Affairs*, published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1978).

3. We should not forget the influence of Soviet Army officers who dominate Moscow's General Staff. Their stress on combined arms operations suggests that naval forces might be used to support deep strike operations if required. Their use of Soviet naval forces might be analogous to their hypothetical air operation, a non-nuclear joint onslaught whose goal is to confound enemy hopes for air supremacy—

even at the cost of massive losses to Soviet air assets—and thus to assure Soviet victory on the ground. For a thoughtful analysis of the mentality of the Soviet General Staff, see Christopher Donnelly, *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* (Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988), pp. 140-141.

Fourteenth Military History Symposium

The Department of History (United States Air Force Academy) will sponsor the Fourteenth Military History Symposium, 17-19 October 1990 on "Vietnam, 1964-1973: An American Dilemma." The symposium will examine the disparate nature of America's combat involvement in Vietnam, focusing on the "dilemmas" caused by U.S. participation in the war during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. The symposium will begin with an assessment of the war's scholarship on the afternoon of 17 October. That evening, the Thirty-third Harmon Memorial Lecture will probe the ambiguities of American involvement. On the second day, the morning session will examine the war during the Johnson era; the afternoon session will analyze Vietnamese perspectives of the conflict. On the evening of 18 October, a formal banquet will assess cinematic and literary views of the war. The final day's sessions will evaluate the war during the Nixon administration, and the symposium will conclude with a panel discussion of Vietnam's impact on the United States. For more information concerning the symposium, contact: Captain Scott Elder, Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO 80840-5701, telephone: 719-472-3232.

Strategic Choices and Emerging Power Centers in the Asia-Pacific Region

Claude A. Buss

I

For forty years, the United States has based its policies and strategies in Asia and the Pacific on the assumption that our overriding interest in that region was the containment of communism and/or the Soviet bloc. The costs have been substantial—in lives, dollars and spiritual malaise—but the rewards have also been great. Our own security has been preserved; our friends and allies have prospered; and our adversaries are in disarray. Our basic values are universally respected and envied; the pursuit of communism has led only to disappointment and disaster.

Our choices for new strategies must not rest solely on the premises of the Cold War, but must reflect our concerns with the conflicting interests of *all* the nations and peoples who lie at the geopolitical heart of the Asia-Pacific region.

I prefer to characterize the changes in process in the Asia-Pacific region as "emerging power centers" rather than "emerging multipolarity." Japan and China—possibly Korea and Australia—are emerging powers, but they are not "poles" around which their neighbors would cluster for protection. I see three power centers—Northeast Asia, China, and Southeast Asia—simply as geographic areas in which each resident nation is striving for its

Dr. Buss has extensive experience in Asian-Pacific affairs. From 1929 to 1935 he served in China as a member of the foreign service, and in 1940 he became the Executive Assistant to the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines. During World War II he was interned by the Japanese in Manila, transferred by them to Tokyo in 1942, and repatriated to the United States in December 1943. Subsequent government service took Dr. Buss to Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Since 1976 he has been adjunct professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

own place in the sun. An effective American strategy must pay attention to the weak as well as the mighty.

In choosing new strategies, we must of course continue to concentrate on the role of the Asia-Pacific region in the global challenge of the Soviet Union to our security. Without endangering that primary obligation—and in light of all the changes that are taking place in the strategic environment—we can seek new opportunities to encourage genuine independence on the part of the former Soviet satellites; elicit more understanding and cooperation from the non-aligned; contribute to the settlement of disputes among our friends; and address differences with our allies without fear that arguing for our own position will drive them into the arms of an adversary. If we have the good sense, we can parlay all our assets—military, diplomatic, economic and political—into a stronger edifice for enhanced stability and lasting peace.

In analyzing the emerging power centers in the Asia-Pacific region, we must keep uppermost in our minds that we are dealing with sovereign nation-states. They have their own interests—usually expressed in some fashion similar to the preamble of our Constitution: "a more perfect union, justice, the common defense, domestic tranquility, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity." Priorities will differ from state to state, depending upon particular problems and immediate needs. Every nation-state has "no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; only permanent interests" and will shift tactics and strategies to accomplish its own objectives. We cannot dictate to nations with whom we deal. We will influence them where we can, compromise where useful, and coexist in peace when our differences are irreconcilable.

II

In examining the emerging power centers of Northeast Asia, China, and Southeast Asia, I shall rely upon historical roots to indicate future trends. I shall select those historical highlights that I consider most helpful in contributing to the solution of current regional conflicts. I shall ask such questions as: which nations are involved; what are their vital interests; whom do they now perceive as friend or foe; and what are their problems in relations with the United States?

Northeast Asia, where the interests of four major powers meet and sometimes clash, is that part of Asia where a local conflict would be most likely to blaze into a global conflagration. But mounting evidence of the comparative strength of ourselves and our allies—and of the inherent weakness of our adversaries—indicates that we have a broader range of options for maintaining our own security than we have previously been willing to consider.

Soviet territory extends through eleven time zones from the Polish border to Vladivostok, but Siberia only became important to Russia geopolitically when the railway from Moscow reached the shores of the Pacific in 1890. Siberia is vast, rich in resources, but, lacking capital, underdeveloped. Its climate is too rigorous for significant population growth. Of every ten European Russians who emigrate to eastern Siberia, eight go back home. In spite of all this, and its isolation, the Soviets' eastern Siberia military district has been built into a formidable base of operations. Any international agreement on arms control must ultimately deal with Soviet assets in Asia as well as those in Europe.

Gorbachev has given every indication that he intends to safeguard the position of the Soviet Union as a Pacific and Asian power. In his talk four years ago to the people of Vladivostok, he announced that, without exception, the U.S.S.R. would invigorate its relations with all countries in the region. At Krasnoyarsk in 1988, he put forth seven proposals to improve security throughout Eastern Asia, including an offer to give up the Soviet's material and technical supply station in Cam Ranh Bay if the United States agrees to eliminate its military bases in the Philippines. His pronouncements may be only for public relations, but they impact upon all of Asia. They call for an appropriate American response.

Across the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok lies Japan, the strongest power with its home base in Northeast Asia. Long the enemy of Russia and the Soviet Union, it is now the linchpin of the U.S. defense position in the Pacific region. But it has not always been that way.

Although Japan boasts an ancient culture, it is a comparative newcomer in the Western state system. *Glasnost* began in Japan with Commodore Perry in 1853, and *perestroika* with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In the ensuing decades Japan based its security on an industrious, disciplined people, a strong army, a consistent continental policy and, between 1902 and 1922, an alliance with Great Britain.

Following the victory over the Russians in 1905, Japan adopted an aggressive course that propelled it into dominion over Korea, a couple of invasions of China, an alliance with Germany and Italy, and the tragedy of World War II. Japan was determined to create a co-prosperity sphere on the rubble of the old European East Asian empires and staked its "destiny for a hundred years" on the war of greater East Asia.

After defeat, and occupation, Japan was forced to rethink its place in the world. The vital interests of the nation remained constant: survival, laying a new foundation for the prosperity of its people, and rekindling the glory of the nation. But Japan's tactics—its policies and its strategies—changed 180 degrees. It entrusted its security to the United States, and looked to a strong economy to accomplish what had eluded its military leadership.

Throughout the Cold War, Japan never completely accepted the American perception of the communist threat. Japan cooperated with us in the Korean War (for its own benefit) and subsequently normalized its relations with South Korea (with our prodding). Japan tailored its policies toward Taiwan and the PRC to accord with our whims. But Japan opposed the American crusade in Vietnam and stayed as far away from us as possible in our global commitment to containment.

As of now, Japan still regards the Soviet Union with deep animosity. Japan has ended the state of war with the Soviet Union but has not as yet concluded a treaty of peace. Now regarding the U.S.S.R. as an adversary rather than an enemy, Japan will negotiate as long as necessary over such issues as the "Northern Territories," mutual exploitation of the resources of the sea, and economic assistance for the development of Siberia.

Now that the Cold War is fading, the hopes for continued peace and stability in Asia depend in large measure on the health of the U.S.-Japan connection. Our common purposes, whether or not embodied in a formal alliance, must not be allowed to suffer because of differences of opinion.

Although Japan devotes almost all its attention to economic rather than military matters, it concedes the importance of the military factor in comprehensive security. In the shelter of Article IX of its constitution, Japan has built up its "Self-Defense Forces" to take care of the immediate demands of home defense. Japan has as many destroyers as the Seventh Fleet and more tactical aircraft than deployed by the United States in Japan, Korea and the Philippines combined. Its defense budget is larger than all the defense budgets of greater East Asia put together. Its neighbors would panic if Japan's 1 percent of the GNP for defense were to be increased to the 14 percent of the U.S.S.R. or even the 6 percent that is spent by the United States. It is by no means sure, however, that the proud young men of a later generation will be satisfied to leave the protection of their divine land to allied forces in Yokota, Masawa, Sasebo and Yokosuka. The controversy over the FSX affords a slight glimpse into the future.

When airing our respective positions on defense and economics, we and the Japanese on occasion seem to be talking past one another. We say, "No more free ride," and they respond, "Take care of your deficits." For every Japan-basher in the United States, there is a Japanese counterpart who laments the decline of American power. We say, "Open up your markets," and they respond,"Stop meddling in our internal affairs." Former Ambassador Mike Mansfield has pointed out that the U.S.-Japan relationship is probably the most important in the world, and in the final analysis, when we consider the strategic choices before us, we must not lose sight of that fact.

In spite of its regional predominance, Japan alone cannot prescribe the patterns for peace, stability and progress in Northeast Asia. Japan must eventually come to terms with the growing power of Korea, no matter how

much they dislike and distrust one another. Since the days of the Nixon-Sato communiqué, we and the Japanese have agreed that peace on the Korean peninsula is a vital interest of both Japan and the United States. Korea is the home of a distinct people with a common language and a rich culture. Ascending the throne of the Hermit Kingdom (as it was called) one hundred years before Columbus discovered America, the Yi dynasty lasted until driven into exile in 1910. In its latter days it accepted a tributary relationship with its neighbors, the Manchus, who ruled the Chinese Empire from Peking.

With its isolation shattered by Meiji Japan, Korea was ushered into the Western state system, primarily as a result of the initiative of an American naval officer, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt. It became a pawn of global diplomacy until 1910, when it was absorbed into the Japanese Empire. The spirit of independence was kept alive by underground Korean patriots at home and by exiles in Russia, Manchuria, China and the United States. Their dreams became possible with the outbreak of World War II. Hopes of independence spread to the Korean masses, who were further embittered by four years of forced participation in a losing war.

At Cairo in 1943, the Allies declared that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." At a conference in Moscow at Christmastime 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed upon plans for a provisional government for liberated Korea. Then the destiny of Korea became hopelessly entangled in the Cold War. The struggle between conflicting factions in Korean domestic politics was subordinated to the upstage quarrels between the Soviets (backing Koreans in the north) and the Americans (backing Koreans in the south). The inevitable result was the war of 1950 between the "forces of freedom" (as we billed ourselves) and the communists (the North Koreans, the Soviets and their new allies, the Communist Chinese).

An armistice was concluded in 1953. The PRC and North Korea signed for the communists, and the United States signed for the United Nations. South Korea refused to sign, claiming that the continuing stalemate was no guarantee for its national survival.

Since that armistice thirty-seven years ago, changes in Korea have occurred that need to be considered in reassessing our strategic necessities. North Korea, still a Stalinist-style state armed by its allies, seeks reunification on its own terms. South Korea, backed by the United States and dedicated to democracy and free enterprise, also seeks reunification, but likewise on its own terms. As long as the two armed camps face each other eyeball to eyeball at the 38th parallel, the possibility of global war will lurk in the shadows.

Not much in the direction of peaceful reunification can be expected from the North. It is a closed society, an economic basket case, and a political graveyard for human rights. It has no friends in the outside world to whom it could turn for economic assistance. Its military numbers are favorable, but

its allies are in no mood or condition to condone any reckless military adventure.

In contrast, the South is in a favorable position to lead from strength in the interest of improved relations. Its armed forces are formidable, making up with quality what they lack in numbers. Its economic strength is unbelievable, although it suffers from the usual difficulties between management and labor, the rich and the poor, the countryside and the burgeoning municipalities. The government of South Korea still needs to achieve a working balance between the executive (including the armed forces) and the legislature; between the requirements of social order and the demands for human rights—as seen in the frequency and violence of student demonstrations. In foreign policy, the South has depended (perhaps too much) on the United States. With the achievement of economic success, South Korea is now energetically reaching out to the entire world, including even its late enemies, the PRC and the Soviet Union.

It is perhaps the United States and South Korea, together and in consultation with Japan, that can take the most significant steps toward reducing tensions in Northeast Asia. It is important that we cooperate, whether or not we continue our alliance in its present form.

We need to address our economic differences and strengthen those interlinked economic and defense ties essential to mutual understanding. We should reexamine the outmoded military provisions of the 1953 armistice. It is good that we are moving our headquarters (including the golf course) out of Seoul. Such moves are essential if we are to halt the growing anti-Americanism in the south. But why wait until 1995? Our national security may no longer require all or even any of the Second Division on Korean soil. Not even to satisfy the psychological needs of the Koreans would I sacrifice a single American soldier as a "trip wire," ostensibly to symbolize our credibility. Our record provides ample evidence that we live up to our commitments.

The disillusionment of both the Soviet Union and China with their North Korean ally increases as they are wracked by reform and reaction. Kim Il-Sung cannot be sure that he wants any glasnost or perestroika at home. His own position grows shakier every day. He is old and his son is an untested leader. His ridiculous ideology contains no promise of economic or democratic progress. More North Koreans are aware of their predicament as they are allowed to travel abroad or to have access to outside TV and radio broadcasts.

As North Korea sinks deeper into difficulty, it offers us an opportnnity to consider a new approach to our Korean problems. Under no circumstances will we abandon our interests in Korea, but perhaps we can strengthen our security by stepped-up political actions. Whether South Korea approves or not, we can confer with other outside powers on confidence-building measures that would strengthen deterrence. We can deal with North Korea

with at least as much flexibility as South Korea and the Soviet Union show in dealing with each other. Peace on the Korean peninsula is in everyone's interest.

III

China is equally involved in the strategic configuration of Northeast Asia, but when I look at that country's demographic charts, I am not nearly so alarmed by its potential power as I am by the size of its problems. Can any aggregation of government officials keep the country from falling apart, provide food and jobs for a billion people, and reconcile the conflicting necessity of preserving the social order with the recently capped (but not absent) demands of human rights?

China has a gripe against modern history, having suffered a century of decline until that fateful 1 October 1949, when Mao Zedong told a million screaming Chinese in Tienanmen square, "*Wa men chi lai la*" [we have stood up]. The communist victory in the civil war held out the promise of recovery from years of suffering at the hands of Japan and the West. When Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan, the communist leadership proceeded to restructure China in the image of its Stalinist model.

The basic interest of the communist regime was, as far as possible, to satisfy the basic needs of the Chinese masses. The party commanded the government and the armed forces, while various individuals and factions waged a constant struggle for control of the party. At any one time, a small clique of leaders set the guidelines for national development. The right to rule was based on rigorous thought control and occasionally on horrendous purges.

Economic policies zigzagged through assorted stages of social experimentation until Deng Xiaoping emerged with his four modernizations—agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military—as the bedrock of his policies of reform. Ideology was cast aside when Deng announced, "It does not matter if the cat is black or white as long as he catches the mice." China inched its way past central planning towards a modified free market economy.

The path of change was painful—two steps up and one step back. Rapid growth brought inflation and spiritual pollution. Popular resentment against official abuse and discrimination led to demands for political reform. The armed forces chafed against their loss of prestige while journalists, teachers, students and workers joined in demands for freer enjoyment of human rights. At one time, the party permitted big letter posters and the "Democracy Wall." More recently, it tolerated fraternization between soldiers and demonstrating students before the brutal massacre at Tienanmen square.

China is superbly confident in its management of foreign affairs. It looks upon foreign policy as the servant of domestic policy rather than vice versa.

It denies aggressive designs against anyone and fears no attack from any outside power. Neither its new navy nor its missile program is necessarily evidence of aggressive intention. It seeks an alliance with none and friendship with all. It wants no more than help wherever it can find help, and the right to sell anything and everything wherever it can find a market.

For the first twenty years of its communist existence, China was the ally of the Soviet Union. It was the Asian anchor of the communist bloc and the co-supporter of communist wars of liberation, especially in Southeast Asia. But by 1969, the Chinese and the Soviets were at one another's throats in Northeast Asia.

On 15 May 1989, Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping signed an agreement in Beijing once again normalizing their relations. They reaffirmed their endorsement of the principles of peaceful coexistence. They reached a common understanding with regard to Vietnam and Cambodia, the reduction of military forces on the border (including Outer Mongolia), the peaceful settlement of border disputes, expansion of trade, and denial of hegemonic ambitions. They welcomed the relaxation in the international situation and took a positive view on steps to reduce arms and scale down military confrontation, as well as the progress achieved in settling regional conflicts.

China's policies toward the United States have varied inversely with its policies toward the U.S.S.R. Until the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972, the United States and the PRC were on opposite sides of the Cold War. Relations were normalized under President Carter in 1979. Since then we have extended substantial military assistance to China, made heavy investments in China, provided China with much-desired high technology, and reached acceptable understanding with regard to Taiwan. China is not happy about American trade regulations, and the United States is uneasy about Chinese arms sales to warring nations along the Persian Gulf. Although without tangible effect, President Bush has expressed his displeasure over the tragic events in Tienanmen square. At least for the moment, good relations between China and the United States are on hold.

China has also normalized its relations with Japan. It has built up an enormous trade with Japan, and willingly accepted Japanese advice and investments. The two nations carry on an extensive cultural exchange program. China is still touchy on anything reminiscent of Japan's actions in World War II—such as the textbook controversy[1]—and it would register violent protest if Japan were to over-militarize or to build nuclear weapons.

Neither we nor the Soviets will have much influence on China's search for its own security. The problems of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia, and India and Pakistan will be solved exclusively by China and the parties directly involved. I recognize that the domestic situation in China could explode at any rime, but for the moment, at least, China seems to be stable.

IV

In contrast to China, Southeast Asia is a power center that cannot be identified as a single pole. Southeast Asia is a convenient expression for a region in which ten sovereign nations pursue their individual national interests. Every one of them, except Thailand, is an emerging power in the sense that it gained its independence only as a result of World War II. None of them is primarily concerned with the Cold War—or any war. I think they would be very happy if the outside powers would exclude Southeast Asia from their security calculations.

The great regional concerns of the United States in Southeast Asia are to oppose the spread of communism; to maintain its military position, particularly the bases in the Philippines; and to keep open the lines of communication between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific. To accomplish these objectives, it must deal separately with every single nation.

Two situations challenge us to reassess our current strategic stance in Southeast Asia: the possible normalization of relations with Vietnam, and the renegotiation of our mutual security agreements with the Philippines.

The normalization of relations with Vietnam is primarily an American decision. Vietnam has told its friends and neighbors that it wants the Americans back, and has given many signals that it would welcome such a move. Hanoi has toned down its anti-American propaganda and has given assistance to American delegations in search of MIAs or missing POWs. It has opened its doors to Americans who wish to visit.

The Australians and Indonesians think that a positive approach toward Vietnam is advantageous as an offset to the ominous Chinese presence in the region. Malaysia and the Philippines are indifferent, and Singapore is reconciled to the possibility of U.S.-Vietnamese reconciliation. Thailand has at last come around to accepting Vietnam as a peaceful neighbor in Cambodia. The prime minister of Thailand personally invited Hun Sen, the prime minister of Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia, to Bangkok for friendly visits.

In the aftermath of the Vietnamese War and the broken peace of 1972, the American government has remained aloof from Vietnam. As expressed by one ambassador who dealt with the North Vietnamese negotiators for many months, "I want nothing to do with a people whose only word is 'no.' " The underlying assumption is that the Vietnamese are unreconstructed communists, deserving all the suffering they now endure. The Vietnamese are branded as thoroughly ambitious, determined to extend their sway over neighboring Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, they are seen as proxies for the Soviet Union—a cover for Soviet expansion into the southern oceans. Therefore, the conclusion is that it is not yet time to change existing policies.

Other arguments suggest an opposite conclusion. The Vietnamese excursions into Cambodia and Laos do not constitute conclusive evidence of an aggressive intention, because plenty of provocation existed in both cases. In any event, much of the Vietnamese army of occupation is reported to have left Cambodia. It cannot be assumed that Vietnam covets control of all of former French Indochina. Vietnam will be satisfied as long as there is a friendly government in both Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Nor can it be assumed that Vietnam is a proxy of the Soviet Union. With nowhere else to turn for help, the Vietnamese gladly accepted the offers of the U.S.S.R. Of course, a suitable price had to be paid. But a nation that has fought a thousand years to preserve its independence from China, and has fought to victory against France, Japan and the United States, will not stay subservient to the Soviet Union any longer than absolutely unavoidable.

Help to Vietnam might hasten its opportunity to regain independence and to weaken its communist bonds. A rehabilitated Vietnam could become an accepted member of a reconstructed ASEAN. It could assist in making that organization a more effective agency for regional peace. Diplomatic recognition of Vietnam would not solve American problems with Vietnam, but it would give us another locale in which to continue our negotiations. An embassy in Hanoi would certainly enhance our intelligence and information-gathering capability.

Our second critical situation in Southeast Asia covers the whole gamut of relations with the Philippines. The problems of supporting democracy, strengthening counterinsurgency, improving the armed forces, providing economic and military assistance, renegotiating the bases agreement, and reviewing the mutual defense treaty of 1951 are all strands in a single diplomatic pattern.

It is easy to consider the people's revolution of 1986 as "restoring democracy" because it destroyed the superstructure of martial law. It brought back the excitement of popular elections, but with it came the old rule of graft, guns and goons. Democracy Philippine-style leaves much to be desired, but as Churchill said, the democratic system is still the best there is. Cory too is the best there is, in integrity and devotion to public service. I think our government has been justified in giving her unequivocal and enthusiastic support.

In strengthening the Philippine battle against the so-called "communist insurgency," we are guilty of some questionable assumptions. There is not one insurgency; there are many. Some are communist-led and communist-inspired; many are not. Kalingas in northern Luzon and Muslims in Mindanao have nothing in common except their state of insurgency against the powers that be.

It is wrong to equate the New People's Army (NPA) with the total communist movement. It is only the armed branch of the communists, numbering by best guesstimates in the neighborhood of 20,000 persons. Their

quality is often shown in TV presentations. Some NPA are well-disciplined ideologists providing their districts with an alternative government. Others, perhaps the vast majority, are different. Their only creed is to shoot on sight anyone who happens to get in their way.

The biggest segment of the communist movement, perhaps the most dangerous from the long range point of view, is the National Democratic Front, the mass base of as many as *5 million* "fellow travellers." These are the representatives of students, teachers, workers, jeepney drivers, liberation priests and nuns, and the unemployed, whose social protests are rooted in the poverty in which they are obliged to live. To win them from communism, to prevent them from going over completely to the insurgents, will demand a great deal more from the government than a military victory over the NPA.

So much of our well-intentioned economic and military assistance is so misused that it turns out to be more harmful than helpful. Once it gets into Philippine territory, it is beyond our control. Father Bolweg, the leader of the insurgents in northern Luzon, once said to an American, "You tell your president to keep the guns coming in. He is our only source of supply." Many of our assistance projects are never completed: countervailing funds are not forthcoming, and our own supplies disappear before their benefits can reach down to the poor for whom they were intended.

Reforming the armed forces of the Philippines is often a discouraging business. Their military goal is victory over the insurgents; ours is to make a fighting machine that would be credible even in the event of a war against an outside aggressor. American supplies and training are generously given but indifferently received. The result is a military establishment lacking in morale and professional spirit. The officers are faction-ridden and prone to set up profitable rackets on the side. Nobody likes the bloody business of fighting the insurgents, least of all the wretchedly paid enlisted men. President Cory has survived a half dozen attempted military coups, and the charismatic coup leader, Colonel Honasan, is still on the loose.

Our most immediate and most serious problem with the Philippines is the renegotiation of our entire security relationship. The Philippine government may recognize the importance of a U.S. military presence in the Philippines, but at an ordinary cocktail party or reading the daily press, you would never know it. Our critics say we want the bases for our designs of coping with Soviet power in distant places, or for the more efficient utilization of nuclear power. They say that no other nation in Southeast Asia would put up with an alien base in its homeland, and that the whole region would be better off if it were a nuclear weapons-free zone or a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Most Filipinos do not concede that the U.S. military is helpful to them in combatting the conditions that have given rise to communist insurgency.

The Philippines will never drop its argument over adequate rent. President Quezon was willing to consider "rent-free use of the bases," but that was

long ago. I travelled the length of the Philippines before the last bases review, and I never heard a single voice that would drop the argument for adequate rent. Compensation was the *only* issue in the 1988 batch of negotiations. The demands of responsible officials ranged from a minimum of a billion dollars a year to assumption of the entire $28 billion debt. Senator Dole's assertions that "we too can play hardball" and "we will not be blackmailed" hoist a clear signal of stormy weather ahead.

A realistic phaseout could be five years or ten years, but as one responsible official told me, "You must be prepared to take a lot of abuse and to pay through the nose." We will have to decide whether the game is worth the candle, i.e., how much we will be willing to spend to preserve the present strategy of forward deployment.

The greatest obstacle of all to a new agreement is a Filipino demand that a new bases agreement not even be discussed without at the same time discussing a new assistance agreement based on cash; a new security agreement incorporating the obligation of automatic response and the same conditions of alliance that are now in the Nato treaty; and that the whole body of agreements be combined in a single document, to be ratified by the senates of both the United States and the Philippines. Insistence on such terms as these would, in my view, kill the negotiations before they begin.

V

In conclusion, I would like to quote Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf, who observe that "what is most needed in the next few years is more thinking about the nature of the multipower world that probably lies ahead, more imaginative description of the likely behavior and strategies of the other major powers, and clearer formulation of the new plausible scenarios and contingencies to be considered."[2]

They add that "problems will increasingly arise in regions about which we know relatively little. For the longer term, programs are needed to recruit young analysts, and provide them with language training and the opportunity to develop knowledge of Japan, China, Brazil, India and other future regional powers, in addition to their functional and analytical expertise."[3]

Notes

1. In 1982 and 1986 China and South Korea objected to official efforts in Japan to soften the treatment in school history texts of Japan's aggressive role in Asia, especially the war-time atrocities.

2. "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," paper submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy by the Future Security Environment Working Group (chaired by Andrew W. Marshall and Charles Wolf), (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, April 1988), p. 20.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

This article is adapted from a speech delivered by Professor Buss to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College on 14 June 1989.

U.S. Policies toward Latin America: Much Room for Much Improvement

Captain Jorge Swett, Chilean Navy

When viewed from south of your border, U.S. policies toward Latin America seem ill-defined—mere generalizations designed to address collectively all the Caribbean and Central American countries, even though each country harbors its individual problems. Countries such as mine, far from both Central America and the Caribbean, often find themselves covered by the same policies. In any event, the policies fail to recognize the differences in each country's history, difficulties, size and aspirations, and seem always to be changing in unpredictable directions. And ultimately, when implemented, as we have seen recently, these policies are frequently perceived as acts of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Conversely, the U.S. populace is unable to understand what their country's interests in Latin America are that justify a close relation with that region. Drugs, debt, unstable democracies, inefficient economies, illegal immigration, military and communist dictatorships, and billions of dollars wasted in futile aid programs are the costs perceived.

I will attempt to explain the reasons behind the mutually negative perception each has of the other, and I will also propose steps that the United States can take to improve the effectiveness of its policy in this area.

U.S. National Interests, Objectives and Policies

The problem of defining a nation's interests, objectives and policies is, obviously, an issue for each country to resolve. Consideration should be given to allies and friendly nations, but clearly the United States is sovereign in defining what is best for the present and future well-being of its citizens. The task of defining the country's interests or changing their relative

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importance is given, by the Constitution, primarily to the executive branch of the government. As the government changes in its four-year cycle, so does the perception of the national interests and its derivatives.

Having these important foundations clearly defined, it should be a simple exercise to those in charge of foreign policy to observe the world and determine the realities, conditions, and historical trends that stand between the present situation and the one that is desired. Those in charge may then craft policies to circumvent or nullify adverse influences—the threats—and to enhance and foster the positive effects—the opportunities—of the environment. Rationality should play a major role in this process. The task of defining the foreign policy of each administration is likely to be time-consuming, but given clear directions as to what the interests and objectives are, it is only a matter of hard work and time before each administration generates its own. Or so one would like to believe.

Experience, however, has shown us differently. There is no consensus of what constitutes the realities, conditions and historical trends that should be considered. And even should they be agreed upon, there still remains the subjective evaluation of their impact on achieving the objective. This creates a never-ending debate within the administration, in Congress, and in public opinion. Personal values, roles of individuals or institutions, background, knowledge, interest in world affairs and so on form varying perceptions of what may be a threat or an opportunity. Furthermore, with time, perceptions change.

Eventually the concerned people do formulate what the national interest is, define the objectives, and decide upon the policies. The problem then arises on how to implement them. The world is too large and complex for only one foreign policy to include all the issues and regions that need to be addressed. If only one policy were defined, it would be either too general or too detailed to be of practical use. Therefore it is logical to formulate foreign policy according to the issues being addressed, and according to geographical areas. These areas should combine nations with common characteristics.

Is there a role for the other countries in the crafting of this process? It would appear that the answer is they have none. However, while they do not participate in the creation of policy, it is they who are most affected by it. The power and size of the United States often makes U.S. national interests, objectives and policies dominate how the other nations define their own interests, objectives and policies. Current U.S. policies toward Nicaragua, Colombia and El Salvador, for example, probably raise major considerations in each of these countries' determination of their own objectives and policies. Therefore, it is most important that the United States define and convey its policies clearly so that everyone in the international scene knows the position held by the United States.

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U.S. Policy toward Latin America

I will apply the three steps just described—defining, implementing and communicating—to U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in the last forty years. In the process I will identify the problems I see, which will help in understanding the reasons for the mutually negative perceptions I have mentioned.

Defining Policy. First we need to address the problem of "what are the U.S. objectives in Latin America." President Reagan was the last president to state publicly his administration's perceptions of what constituted U.S. national interest and major objectives.[1] The objectives, as defined by him, are: to maintain the security of the United States and its allies; to respond to the challenges of the global economy; to defend the cause of democracy, freedom and human rights throughout the world; to resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world; and to build effective and friendly relations with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concerns. It can be assumed that these objectives have not been changed by the present administration.

While clearly stated, these objectives provide only a beginning, since they are too general and all inclusive to be practical. Therefore, a survey for more specific goals is needed.

Depending on what you read or whom you ask, different objectives will be stated. Promoting democracy and human rights, encouraging market economies, and preventing communist expansion are commonly found in recent publications. Lars Schoultz[2] states, in my view, the best analysis on this subject. His thesis is that U.S. objectives in Latin America have been dominated by national security concerns. National security objectives, in turn, have been challenged by threats to stability. Stable, and the United States hopes, friendly governments in Latin America have been perceived as the best assurance in fulfilling the U.S. national interest of peace and prosperity. Therefore, stability has been the ultimate objective in the foreign policy of the United States toward Latin America.

And what have been the threats?

At the end of World War II, the United States was concerned with Soviet expansion in the world. In Latin America, growth of communism was perceived as the main threat to stability. "Communism caused instability, therefore, communism was the root of the problem." Policies followed, such as the Rio Pact of 1947, the Organization of American States charter of 1948, and the revamping of the Inter-American Defense Board created during World War II. These policies generated a large U.S. presence in the armed forces of most Latin American countries through military assistance advisory

groups, military assistance programs, and training of Latin American military officers and men, primarily in counterinsurgency operations.

By the sixties, the perception that instability was a major threat to U.S. objectives in Latin America was still believed to be correct. The cause for it, however, was no longer clear. Scholars and politicians began to question the axiom that communism was the root of instability. They claimed that perhaps poverty was the real culprit. Poverty led to political mobilization and eventually to instability. Therefore, U.S. policies should strive to change the political and social structure that was preventing economic development. Policies followed, such as President Kennedy's Alliance for progress, the Peace Corps, and more foreign aid.

Perhaps the failure of the Alliance for Progress to achieve its objectives of economic development and social reforms—a failure caused by both lack of interest in the United States following the death of President Kennedy and, in Latin America, the frequent mismanagement of the funds provided—or frustration with the lack of progress in improving the living conditions of the masses, led in the seventies to a new school of thought. It questioned the notion that U.S. objectives in Latin America should be dominated by national security concerns. Its followers argued that a national security threat did not exist, that stability should not be a concern. Instability was precisely what the region needed to break the oligarchies, military or civilian, that would never relinquish power by peaceful means. The human rights and pro democracy policies of President Carter can be cited as typical of this school of thought.

The process of establishing a foreign policy toward Latin America has been influenced by these changing perceptions of what the objectives and threats are. Today's policies (or lack of policies, as critics would contend), have elements of the three views just described. The first supported by conservatives, the second by moderates and the third by liberals. A lack of focus has resulted.

Implementing Policy. Let us turn our attention to the problem of implementing policy in Latin America. As previously mentioned, partitioning foreign policy by issues and by areas is the next logical step in dealing with the diversity of problems the United States has to face. Therefore, the geographical area of the world located below the U.S.-Mexican border has been termed Latin America, and policy has been created to handle U.S. relations with the governments of that region.

Two questions follow: first, what constitutes Latin America? and second, does this partition contribute to good policies?

To answer the first, Latin America is a name given to a loosely defined area that starts at the Rio Grande and ends at Cape Horn. It includes an area of about eight million square miles and a population of 360 million,

incorporating eighteen Spanish-speaking countries, plus Brazil, Haiti, six former British colonies, a Dutch colony, and a number of dependencies of France, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.[3] The majority of these nations share a common colonial past, with Spanish the common language and Catholicism the predominant religion. Most also share a tradition of unstable governments and modest economic development. Many other common characteristics could be cited to justify treating them as one homogeneous conglomerate.

While the similarities among these countries are perceived by most people in the United States, few are aware of the differences. Size, population, history, racial composition, economic development, and most important, proximity to the U.S. border make each country a different nation. Even countries neighboring each other, such as Brazil and Argentina, Peru and Chile, or Bolivia and Paraguay, have marked differences. These differences, in some instances, have been the root of bloody wars that have left suspicion and animosity in their relations today. Political and economic cooperation have been scarce; competition has been common.

Besides, the obvious differences in size and population, racial composition also tends to pull them apart. The original Spaniards of colonial days mixed with different large and sophisticated Indian cultures such as Aztecs, Mayas, or Incas, producing diverse racial mixtures. In some, the racial mix included blacks. Further immigration, especially from Europe in the latter half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, has added to racial and cultural diversity.

Latin America, then, can be defined precisely only in geographical terms. To describe generally its cultural, social, economic or other attributes is difficult, since there are scarcely any two countries that can be treated similarly.

I can now answer the second question concerning implementation. The obvious answer is that the diversity among the countries does not contribute to defining a good common policy. The countries of Latin America are indeed different and *feel* different. They have become separate nations, that is, groups that share a common past and a desire to maintain their individuality in the future. It is no wonder that a single U.S. foreign policy toward the whole area does not fit any one country in particular. This helps to explain the Latin American criticisms. Most either feel left out or wrongly assimilated to policies that clearly do not fit their perceptions of themselves.

To some in the United States, the attempt to differentiate the countries of Latin America may seem trivial, since the facts show that the Latin American countries share most of the important attributes such as economic, social and political development (or underdevelopment). Though these are facts, facts alone do not count in foreign relations. Perceptions are just as important. If the United States wants its policies toward Latin America to

achieve the intended objectives, it must recognize the differences in each nation and adjust its policies accordingly.

Communicating Policy. Writing on the role of the United States in the Malvinas/Falklands War, David Lewis Feldmand blames the United States for Argentina's decision to go to war.[4] He states that, as perceived by Argentina's rulers, U.S. policy toward their country led them to believe that the United States would stay neutral in the conflict. (Argentina at the time strongly supported President Reagan's policy toward Central America.) Their assumption turned out to be wrong. U.S. logistical assistance to Great Britain in that conflict was a major factor, albeit not the decisive one, in Argentina's defeat. Whether accurate or not, Feldmand's article does show that unclear signals of what U.S. policy objectives are can be just as damaging as having no policies at all.

Good communications regarding policy are a victim of the complex U.S. policy decision process. Latin American countries are accustomed to authoritarian and centralized governments. They assume that the U.S. government functions more or less in the same manner. That is, the executive branch runs foreign policy, with some contribution from the legislative branch and perhaps public opinion. Once a decision is made, they reason logically, the policy is implemented and everybody follows it.

But foreign policy in the Unites States does not conform to this process. The different perceptions of threats and opportunities, the permanent disputes between Congress and the President on foreign policy matters, the role of lobbyists, church groups, think tanks, labor unions, the news media, and even independent organizations or individuals, confuse the issues of what the policies are and who is in charge of them. Acts of individuals or organizations, such as financial aid to some labor union by the AFL-CIO or to a political party by the National Endowment for Democracy, are misinterpreted as official policies of the U.S. government, adding further to the confusion.

Latin America's lack of importance to the United States has spawned poor communications between them, a fact that cannot be contested. Just as with individuals, countries like to feel important and to be recognized as part of the society in which they live—in this case, the Western Community of Nations. Hence, diplomatic practice dictates that if a country or region is of secondary political, economic or strategic interest, the truth should be shrouded to soften the blow. I believe that while this may be good politics, it is bad policy, for it makes mutual relations frivolous and sows misunderstanding. As we have seen in the Malvinas/Falklands war, it can have, in addition, tragic results.

Most Latin American politicians, whether of the right, center or left, and almost all senior military officers, still believe that the main objective of U.S.-Latin American policy is maintaining stability at any cost. They believe this

because it was clearly stated to them in the fifties and early sixties when the United States actively pursued this objective. Since then, U.S. policies have not been as strongly supported as formerly and have been less precisely conveyed. Hence, a change in policy has not been clearly perceived in Latin America.

Improving U.S. Objectives and Policies toward Latin America

How does the United States repair this situation? The ideas I recommend call for rationality, in spite of the difficulties in using this approach. More rationality can, perhaps, help policy making and implementation as practiced in the real world.

The most important thing to be done is to prioritize U.S. objectives toward Latin America. Which objective is first in importance? President Reagan included all of them—political, security and economic—in his document. What are the opportunities and possible threats that stand in the way of achieving these objectives? With this information in hand, the U.S. government can decide which is first in importance, which is last, and so on. It will be nearly impossible to uncouple them, but it should be feasible to assign priorities, after which, effective and well-focused policies can be designed and implemented.

A brief look at the realities of Latin America reveals that a military threat no longer exists. As a source of strategic materials, alternative suppliers have removed its importance. Even the Panama Canal has diminished in strategic value. It is more important to the western countries of South America than it is to the United States. The situation in Central America is controlled and has never constituted, in my opinion, a military threat to U.S. security.

Politically, the countries of the region are more independent and pursue their own interests more than before. U.S. hegemony has dwindled, and everyone seems to accept this fact. The United States does pursue political objectives in its thrust toward freedom, democracy and the respect of human rights, but the violation of these standards cannot be judged as a vital threat to its national interests.

Things have also changed economically. Most countries are facing great economic and social difficulties. Their economies are in chaos. Relative to that in other regions, U.S. investment has declined. In 1985 it amounted to 13 percent of all U.S. foreign investment. In 1950 it had been 38 percent.[5] As a market for U.S. exports, Latin America constituted 13.6 percent of the total in 1988, down from 18 percent in 1981. The United States imported from Latin America 11.7 percent of its total in 1988, down from 14.9 percent in 1981.[6] Notwithstanding these figures, the United States has moved from a trade surplus of $1.3 billion in 1981 to a trade deficit of $9.9 billion in 1988. This fact stems from the needs of the Latin American countries to increase

their exports and reduce their imports to pay their large foreign debt. As recipients of massive loans from major U.S. European and Japanese banks, if they lose hope of being able to pay their debts, Latin American countries have the capacity to damage the U.S. and world economy by defaulting on their payments, a fact that should be given proper notice.

New threats have appeared in the last decade. Illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, is reaching the magnitude of a peaceful invasion of the United States. Poverty, in addition to strong U.S. demand, is behind the production of drugs or drug-related crops. Concerns in the exploitation of the Amazon region are viewed by environmental groups in the United States and Europe as a threat to world ecology and perhaps the planet's weather. Democracy in the region is being undermined by an economic base that cannot support its purported freedoms.

These new threats to U.S. objectives originate in Latin America's failure to develop economically. It is perhaps timely, then, to make clear the change in emphasis from security objectives to economic objectives and to focus in every way on the latter instead of on the former.

Sound economic practices should be valued and rewarded just as strongly as today's policies value and reward democracy and respect for human rights. Moreover, a free market model of economic development should be clearly differentiated from democracy as a form of government. Both should be stressed, and on equal terms, as U.S. objectives.

Economic development through foreign aid, such as the Alliance for Progress, has failed. If repeated, it will fail again. What must be done has to be done by the countries themselves. For years most have had socialist-type economies. As Hernando de Soto points out, mercantilism is practiced in much of Latin America, with all its consequences, without opposition, internal or external. The inefficiencies implicit in the management of the economies of these countries by such practices, should be viewed as contrary to U.S. objectives.[7]

Once the United States defines its policies, it shonld implement them iu a form that fits the different countries. The very concept of a "Latin American" policy is inadequate. Policies toward Mexico should address Mexico's problems with the United States. If they are to work, policies toward Brazil will have little in common with those toward Costa Rica or Honduras. If groups are to be formed, issues, and not primarily geography, should drive their formation as targets of a policy. Happily, just such an approach has been used lately. For example, the drug problem forced the United States to identify a special policy for Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (and to christen the group "The Andean Countries"). Similarly, the debt issues have been handled by the banks, not by the government, on a case-by-case policy. The result has been highly effective for the banks (but, alas, to the detriment of the debtor countries).

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The problem of improving communications is difficult to solve. The confusing U.S. system of government will not change. The public and the news media will continue to participate in policy making and in some cases will intervene directly in its implementation, sometimes for and sometimes against the U.S. government's position. A similar judgment can be made of the forms of governments, institutions and traditions of the countries of Latin America. A mutual educational process through exchanges and visits can be of some help. Good embassies, staffed with persons who can convey to their governments the intricacies of the other countries' internal politics, would also contribute.

Above all, a sense of respect, tolerance and understanding of the institutions and values of each other has to be bred and nourished into every level of this old and often ill-tempered relationship. It is worthwhile to change our mutual perceptions from negative to positive. After all, our relationships are permanent.

Notes

1. President Reagan's Second Report to Congress on National Security Strategy as printed in *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1988, pp. 1-13.
2. Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 308-330.
3. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin American Politics and Development*, 2nd ed., (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 5.
4. David Lewis Feldmand, "The United States Role in the Malvinas Crisis, 1982: Misguidance and Misperception in Argentina's Decision to go to War," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Summer 1985, p. 1.
5. Abraham E. Lowenthall, "Rethinking US Interests in the Western Hemisphere," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Spring 1987, p. 7.
6. *Direction of Trade Statistic*, IMF, Washington, D.C., May 1989.
7. Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

Ψ

. . . a sustained familiarity with the international relations of the day, as well as an historical acquaintance with the political history of the past three centuries, is essential to an officer's equipment for such duties.

Naval Strategy
A. T. Mahan (1911)
Little, Brown (1918), p. 375

Changing Northern European Views on Security and Arms Control

Johan Jørgen Holst

The northwestern region of Europe has traditionally been viewed as an isolated flank area relative to the central front. Limited war and *fait accompli* scenarios dominated security thinking during the 1960s and 70s. However, during the 1980s the north and the center came to be considered as an integral theater for military planning. Developments in military technology, renewed attention to the problems of trans-Atlantic reinforcements, changed maritime perspectives, and the new phase of conventional arms negotiations in Europe have stimulated more holistic approaches. Thus the defense of Norway must be viewed in a European context, and the strategic position of the country in an Atlantic, and increasingly, an Arctic perspective.

From the perspective of the central balance of nuclear deterrence, the northwestern region of Europe provides an important avenue of approach as well as an arena for forward defense and deployment. With regard to the global naval balance, the area encompasses primary routes of access to blue waters for the Soviet Union, while it contains a forward defense zone for the trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication for the Atlantic alliance. It is also an important zone of deployment for Soviet submarine-based missile systems. Hence, the security order in Northern Europe is linked inextricably with the variable geometry of the East-West military competition.

The Nordic Security Pattern

The Nordic area does not provide a sufficient framework for regional security. It is woven into various dimensions of the East-West military competition. However, in spite of the strategic significance of parts of the region, it has remained on the whole an area of low tension. A central goal

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of Norwegian security policy is to maintain that state of low tension, not as an end in itself but as a means to an end: to prevent the outbreak of war; to safeguard our sovereignty, freedom, and right to determine how to develop our own society; and to prevent developments in a sensitive region from jeopardizing East-West stability.

Each of the Nordic countries has imposed limits on direct military engagement in the Nordic area by outside powers. The Nordic area does not contain irredentist pressures or aspirations, nor are minorities threatening the social and political framework of the Nordic countries. The area is politically stable. Cooperation is both extensive and intensive among the Nordic countries in all matters of policy, except those of high policy relating to security.

Instead of establishing a Nordic pact, the Nordic states, for a variety of historical, geopolitical and strategic reasons, have chosen different roads to security. However, in charting their courses they have taken into account the impact of their choices and dispositions on each other. Their circumstances and range of choice have been and remain different, but over time their chosen policies have crystallized into a coherent pattern of mutual consideration and restraint. Sometimes the term *Nordic Balance* has been used to depict this pattern. The term is in some sense misleading; no balance has been established among the Nordic states, since they are not poised against one another. The Nordic pattern of mutual consideration and restraint applies most particularly to military engagement in the Nordic area by outside powers. Restraint in respect to one set of outside powers may serve as an obstacle to others. There is, however, no symmetry with respect to external linkages. Norway, Denmark and Iceland are allied with the Western powers in a much more encompassing and committed manner than Finland is tied to the Soviet Union through its treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Sweden has chosen a policy of non-alignment in peacetime, aiming for armed neutrality in the event of war.

Norway's Security Calculus

In many ways Norway has had a decisive impact on the pattern of restraint and mutual consideration in Northern Europe through a policy of prudence that welds deterrence and confidence-building into a composite security posture. In relation to the Soviet Union, Norway's policy of prudence reflects a trade-off between considerations of deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence inheres primarily in making credible the proposition that an attack on Norway will not be confined to a fight with Norway. Reassurance is made up of a series of unilateral confidence-building measures designed to communicate peaceful intentions and avoid challenging vital Soviet security interests during peacetime. They do not amount to concessions, but are rather measures for


BARENTS SEA
SVALBARD
Bear I.
Jan Mayen I.
North Cape
Murmansk
KOLA PEN.
FINNMARK
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NORWAY
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Leningrad
Shetland Is.
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Scale in Miles

the protection of Norwegian security interests, taking into account the net effects of the interdependence which exists in the realm of international security. The policy of not permitting the stationing of foreign troops in peacetime, the rejection of stockpiling and deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the imposition of geographical, quantitative and qualitative constraints on peacetime allied military activities in Norway constitute the main elements of restraint.

This policy of prudence has been pursued by Norway since joining Nato as a founding member in 1949. It is recognizable and predictable, thus contributing to stability. The policy commands broad multipartisan support in Norway, and it has been accepted by her allies. It constitutes an important element in the equilibrium of the local order in Northern Europe, which in turn forms a component of the overall security order in Europe.

The policy of prudence encompasses self-imposed restraints rather than treaty commitments vis-à-vis other powers. Norwegian constitutional authorities will determine at any given time what measures are needed to preserve the security of the realm. The base policy, for example, is a conditional restraint which applies only as long as Norway is not attacked or threatened with attack.

Norway's policy on nuclear weapons does not imply that Norway is excluded from the joint defense strategy and operations plans of the alliance. The approved defense plans for Norway are based on conventional defense and reflect the special conditions obtaining on the northern flank. Direct contiguity with Soviet base areas for central war forces and global naval forces makes the danger of escalation pervasive and special. The geopolitical circumstances produce shared interests in reducing expectations of rapid escalation to nuclear war, particularly because the danger of inadvertent escalation is deemed to be considerable. Many of the nuclear weapons on the Kola peninsula constitute a direct threat against the United States; hence, Norway must expect real behavior in a crisis in the northern areas to be dominated very largely by prudence and restraint. Consequently, Norway seeks through her nuclear weapon policy to raise the nuclear threshold while emphasizing the Nato connection. The strategy of flexible response neither prescribes nor proscribes the use of nuclear weapons. The response has to be tailored to the challenge and circumstances at hand. A significant capacity for conventional defense raises the nuclear threshold and enhances the credibility of resolute resistance in the event of an attack on Norway. The burden of nuclear initiation should be transferred to the adversary.

In addition, Norway maintains the qualification that foreign naval vessels not carry nuclear weapons during visits to Norwegian ports. Similarly, our nuclear-weapons-state allies adhere to the qualification of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board their naval vessels (the main reason being one of security). They are therefore unwilling to issue

declarations concerning their weapon loads. In accordance with international law, naval vessels have immunity and cannot be subjected to mandatory inspection. Hence we have a situation which is characterized by a "double qualification," one maintained by the flag state and the other by the port state. It is a situation which is acceptable to both parties. Norway depends on allied assistance in the event of crisis or war. Such assistance must be practiced in peacetime to remain feasible and credible. Hence, Norway will not change her policy in directions which would prevent allied naval vessels from paying visits to Norwegian ports or conducting exercises in Norwegian waters.

Much of the internal discussion in Norway, as well as between Norway and outside powers, has focussed on ways of adjudicating competing considerations in relation to specific issues. A policy of prudence involves avoiding the extremes. Unmitigated pursuit of deterrence could result in provocation, while maximizing reassurance could lead to appeasement. Automatic solidarity could lead to an abdication of responsibility, and a single-minded emphasis on precaution could result in escapism.

Norway's Strategic Situation

Norway's strategic position is determined by her geographical location in general, and by proximity to Soviet forces and military installations on the Kola peninsula in particular. The military situation in the northern areas is dominated by the strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the increased capacity of the Soviet navy for power projection and interposition. Military units which are operating or based in Norway's immediate proximity may be employed in areas very distant from Northern Europe. Conflicts arising in distant areas of the globe may thus affect Norwegian security directly. Norway can no longer enjoy security as a result of distance from the sources of international conflict or a peripheral position of but marginal significance, nor can she rely exclusively on the protective shield of friendly naval powers.

The main forces on the Kola peninsula are elements in the global competition between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and her Western allies on the other. They are not directed at Norway specifically. However, they affect and complicate Norway's position. The global power game could create incentives and needs which would bring Norwegian security into the zone of danger. At the same time, the Soviet Union would hesitate in putting at risk vital strategic interests for the attainment of limited local gains. Thus, a certain amount of paradoxical protection for Norway is inherent in the proximity of vital Soviet central war forces and installations.

The defense of Norway and the central front are closely connected. If Nato were to lose its ability to counter an attack in Central Europe, it would be

extremely difficult for the alliance to extend credible military assurances to Norway. If Norway were to fall into enemy hands, it would be extremely difficult for Nato to prevent or contain escalation of a war on the central front. Norway's coastal position on the rim of the Atlantic Ocean contributes to this predicament. Norway and the central front depend on the trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication for resupply and reinforcement. These vital lifelines could be threatened by hostile aircraft operating from airfields in Norway, or protected by allied aircraft operating from those airfields.

Developments in military technology and strategy cause Norway's security calculus to be influenced directly and tangibly by the buildup and operational deployments of naval forces and submarine-based strategic nuclear forces by the superpowers. Submarine-based strategic missiles have determined to a large extent the predominant strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the northern areas. The increased range of these missiles now enables the Soviet Union to rely on rearward strategic submarine patrols in the north (and below the polar ice cap) and the United States to rely on rearward patrols south of the Norwegian Sea. These Soviet strategic submarines on rearward patrols are capable of threatening targets in the United States and Western Europe from positions in the north. At the same time, Soviet submarines equipped with missiles of lesser range have been redeployed from patrol areas off North America to patrol areas off Western Europe. The conversion of Soviet ballistic missile submarines to launch platforms for long-range cruise missiles compounds the strategic challenge for Europe. The Old World has not been removed from the danger of nuclear destruction by the conclusion of the INF Treaty, important though that treaty is for the security of the West.

The Nuclear Predicament

A stabilization of the central balance of nuclear deterrence would tend to reduce the pressures of competition affecting the policies of the major powers in regard to developments in the North. The outlook which prevails in Northern Europe comprises a set of assumptions and assessments which may be summarized as follows:

- First of all, the principal powers have discovered the limited convertibility of nuclear forces into politically useful currency. Their function is confined very largely to mutual denial. Coercion through nuclear diplomacy has not provided credible options. Neither side can realistically expect to acquire meaningful superiority within the system of nuclear deterrence. The principal powers, therefore, share an interest in limiting, rather than expanding, the nuclear competition. They recognize that this very competition harbors the danger of inadvertent conflict, which could result in catastrophe for both sides. Hence, they share an interest in stabilizing the

competition to prevent concerns about the balance from pushing them to points of no return. It is the dangers of August 1914 rather than September 1939 which loom on the horizon.

- Second, the unique quality of nuclear weapons has penetrated the moral consciousness of humankind. They are different from other weapons, not only because of their capacity for instant and extensive destruction, but because of their largely unpredictable genetic and ecological consequences which could involve the destruction of the conditions of life as we know them for future generations. Hence, the consequences of nuclear war would not be confined to the distribution of power and influence among states, but would extend to the very essence of human life. Since nuclear weapons do not lend themselves to disinvention and since nuclear deterrence cannot be made foolproof, nations cannot escape from the imperative of minimizing the danger of nuclear war.
- Third, stability (in the sense of low expectations of first strikes) requires careful effort and cannot be taken for granted. Technological developments create changing requirements of deterrence. The system of nuclear deterrence is not the ultimate means for the preservation of peace but rather a temporary expedient both in regard to moral imperatives and practical opportunities. However, it cannot be transcended by unilateral means or technological manipulation. Such attempts are likely to generate more competition and less stability. Orderly transition to security arrangements beyond deterrence can only be accomplished as a cooperative undertaking, reflecting a shared conceptual framework of common security. Progress is likely to be incremental rather than systemic in this momentous endeavour.
- Fourth, the North will continue to provide the most direct avenue of approach for strategic weapons travelling between the heartlands of the two principal powers. By extension, the North will constitute a forward area of warning and defense against attacks by such weapons. Furthermore, it will provide patrol areas for submarine-based strategic systems. Protection, surveillance and challenge of such patrols will define some of the major tasks for the navies of the principal powers. Rules of engagement and disengagement in that context will impact on the political position of the littoral states.

The nuclear debate in Europe has abated, but it could reemerge on short notice. The consensus is changing under the impact of the mobility in East-West relations, a reduced sense of threat, and a growing recognition of the limited utility of nuclear weapons. Although the North Europeans are less immediately involved than those in Central Europe, these general trends extend to a considerable degree to the north.

The Soviet Union appears to be promoting the denuclearization of Europe. Most West European governments consider that an unequal and destabilizing vision as long as nuclear weapons exist on Soviet territory and Soviet strategic

weapons threaten targets in Western Europe. There is no escape from the nuclear threat except through universal abolition, an idea which still seems hopelessly removed from present political realities. The issue, then, is to fashion arrangements which contribute to overall security, taking into account the interrelation between conventional and nuclear force levels and structures.

Two different perspectives contend in the analysis of the issues involved, one political and the other strategic. Obviously the two are interconnected, but for purposes of discussion it seems useful to maintain the dichotomy. The political perspective is dominant in Northern Europe. This perspective emphasizes the need to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, while the strategic perspective stresses the need to preserve deterrence by maintaining credible options for nuclear use, including first use. The political perspective is also animated by a concern to maintain broad social support for prudent defense policies. In an era of a declining fear of deliberate attack, attention is focussed on the task of preventing inadvertent escalation. As the threat of Soviet invasion is no longer considered imminent, in the view of many the threat of nuclear war has replaced it.

Theater nuclear forces presumably contribute to specific deterrence by imposing on the adversary a need to disperse conventional forces and thus limit their capacity for surprise attack and breakthrough, and by threatening retaliation in kind should the adversary initiate the use of theater nuclear weapons. They are thought to contribute to general deterrence by conveying a threat to lose control since no one can have high confidence in the ability to limit war beyond the nuclear threshold. Finally, they are meant by West Europeans to contribute to general deterrence by coupling the defense of Europe to the American nuclear umbrella.

Concerns about the strategic requirements for specific deterrence lead to the development of selective options and many weapons, while a focus on the political requirements for general deterrence now points in the direction of fewer weapons. The latter is gaining ground in Europe, particularly as the Soviet threat of military attack on the ground is vanishing.

The INF controversy provided an example of how these contending perspectives converge and diverge. The primary concern in the West about the deployment of the SS-20 was not the military capacity of the system in the context of the balance of power between East and West. That capacity was of marginal significance. The primary concern was that the continental range SS-20 missiles provided the Soviet Union with an option for preferentially threatening the non-nuclear weapon states in Europe in the event of a crisis. The SS-20 constituted above all a challenge to the political order in Europe rather than to the balance of military power between the two alliances. The INF agreement successfully resolved the issue and *de facto* established the norm that continental range nuclear strike systems should not

be allowed to challenge the extended deterrence provided by intercontinental systems from the United States to her West European allies.

The strategic perspective focussed on the requirements posited by the strategy of flexible response, on the need for a continuum of strike options, a seamless web of deterrence coupling the option to strike Soviet territory from Western Europe with the central systems in the United States. It was concerned about preserving the integrity of a strategic concept which emphasized selective options. The North European perspective was predominantly political.

The number of theater nuclear weapons on both sides in Europe is very large and seems incommensurate with the concept of nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence rather than warfighting, even when we concede that there is no clear-cut distinction and that the two are connected through operational considerations. The current arsenals suggest warfighting roles and perspectives, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that most of them are short-range battlefield weapons. The emerging political perspective points in the direction of fewer weapons, less reliance on battlefield systems, and withdrawal of nuclear weapons from forward positions in order to lessen the danger of embroilment in the "use them or lose them" syndrome in a crisis. North European governments embrace this perspective.

The Soviet Union has been pushing hard to prevent Nato from going through another round of nuclear modernization, this time of their short-range nuclear forces (SNF), a category in which the Russians command a very large preponderance. Nato has been considering a Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) missile with a range which would allow for fairly invulnerable deployment in the rear and for cross-corps targeting. This strategic perspective competes with the political perspective, which considers an emphasis on deep nuclear strikes out of tune with the processes of political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and with the priority of political reconstruction across the system barriers in Europe. Instead, negotiations about short-range nuclear missiles are offered as an alternative. Some strategists despair because they see negotiations leading to the consummation of another zero-option and a further dismantling of the strategy of selective options. The political perspective, however, is predicated on the idea of existential deterrence, on the deterrence inherent in the residual uncertainties posed by the nuclear forces remaining even after an SNF agreement and a build-down of battlefield nuclear weapons. It is concerned also about political reconstruction in Europe, about overcoming the confrontation rather than consolidating it. The prevailing view in Northern Europe follows this political trajectory. A comprehensive assessment is needed in order to prevent single-weapon issues from dominating visions. It should encompass the implication for stability of the composition, size and deployment of reduced theater nuclear forces as well as the interrelation

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between conventional and nuclear force postures. A stable situation could provide a framework for transition to more concerted and cooperative security arrangements between East and West in Europe in order to preserve common security in a period of prolonged change.

At this juncture Norway believes that the issues must be viewed in the context of the political changes in Eastern Europe and the evolving balance and structure of conventional forces in Europe. We strongly supported the agreement in Nato on a compromise between the contending views concerning negotiations about SNF. The negotiations about conventional forces in Europe should eliminate some of the critical asymmetries which have determined in part Nato's perceived requirements for nuclear forces. Hence, SNF negotiations should start once the implementation of a first agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe is under way. Upon its completion, the implementation of an SNF agreement should start. In this way, a balanced overall outcome can be ensured. In the meantime, the Soviet Union could contribute to mutual confidence and subsequent negotiations by implementing substantial unilateral reductions in her SNF posture, thus emulating Nato's substantial unilateral nuclear reductions during the years when the Soviet Union modernized and expanded her SNF arsenals in Europe.

Nato and European Security

Cooperation in Nato is predicated on a dual security strategy, encompassing military insurance through the maintenance of a credible defense, and political detente through arms control and disarmament as well as cooperation across the political lines of division between East and West. The two objectives are interlocking rather than competitive. Our military defenses must be capable of blocking important attack options for a would-be adversary, while our efforts to reach agreements concerning arms control and disarmament must aim at ensuring stability and essential equilibrium at the lowest possible level of forces.

In order to ensure military stability in Europe in general and for the frontline areas in particular, it is important to eliminate the capacity for surprise attack and sustained offensive operations. This implies a concerted and comprehensive long-term structural scheme for the preferential build-down of artillery, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, missiles, helicopters and combat aircraft, as well as battlefield nuclear weapons.

In order to create the conditions for a viable and equitable political order in Europe, the capacity for invasion and occupation should be eliminated. As long as the Soviet Union maintains such a capacity, the framework for peaceful change will remain too restrictive for a more cooperative order to emerge in Europe. Consequently, deep cuts in troop levels leading to essential

balance at much lower levels constitute a prerequisite for the political reconstruction to succeed.

Confidence-building measures and increased cooperation and transparency could contribute towards cutting the sharp edges off the military confrontation. However, states ignore the realities of the military confrontation at their peril. Frontline states like Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany can least of all afford to ignore the realities, nor can they cease their efforts to ease and transform a confrontation which contains the seeds of disastrous conflagration.

Some of the essential building blocks are now being put in place for a more stable and cooperative security order in Europe. The Soviet Union has adopted the concepts of "reliable defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" as guiding concepts for the future size and structure of her armed forces. Soviet leaders have announced a deliberate move away from the offensive emphasis in their military structure, deployment and operational doctrine. The new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) reflect a structural emphasis on stability by focussing on the removal of capacities for surprise attack and sustained offensive operations. There is agreement about the need for a preferential build-down of some of the force components which contribute most to offensive capacities: tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, aircraft, and personnel. However, the parties have concentrated on reaching agreement on the specific definition of the treaty-limited items: on the size of the tanks, the categorization of armored troop carriers, the caliber of the artillery, the exclusion or inclusion of transport helicopters, and the mission characteristics of the aircraft. There is also the question of access to depots containing treaty-limited items and their distribution. But such definitional issues are unlikely to prevent agreement in the end.

Stabilizing the military situation in Europe at lower and essentially equal levels could contribute to reducing the impact of the military factor on the process of political relations, particularly if the residual levels and force structures effectively remove the standing threat of military invasion from the East. Furthermore, it could change some of the strategic requirements generated by the prevailing force postures and lead to more defensively oriented postures, particularly if the force reductions encompass deep cuts.

Agreements on deep cuts could open up new vistas for removing the military pressure on political relations in Europe. The offensive nature of Soviet ground forces (combining an echeloned force structure with highly mobile operational maneuver groups) led to a perceived requirement in Nato for forces which could disrupt the follow-on echelons before they could reach the front. The concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) was born and seemed attractive to military planners because the Soviet offensive depended on very tight time tables. From a political perspective, however, the combined

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effect of the two strategies was the ominous prospect of high-velocity warfare exercising a momentous pressure on the ability of human beings to retain control. The danger of inadvertent escalation was pervasive.

The negotiations about conventional forces in Europe comprise the area from the Atlantic to the Urals and, we like to add in Norway, from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. The principal reason for this amplification is the concern about the coherence and cohesion of the security order in Europe, about the maintenance of the links and drawing rights on the general equilibrium provided by the Western alliance. Regional differentiation by the establishment of special zones for arms limitation could sever these links and expose the peripheral areas to the military preponderance of the dominant heartland power on the Eurasian landmass. Norway, for example, has been concerned about the need to preserve the holistic notion of a single European security region wherein a variable geometry would apply to the regulation of different categories of forces and equipment, rather than constructing fixed zones for arms control purposes within Europe. The issue is one of political equilibrium and stability. Hence, the Western powers have proposed an approach based on concentric, interlocking regions for some of the major treaty-limited items. The Eastern states have proposed fixed regions for all of the six categories of treaty-limited items.

The rimland states of Western Europe share a continent with the Soviet Union. They have a strong interest in developing rules of engagement for managing their cohabitation on the same continent. It is in their interest to develop cooperative relations which reduce the saliency of the military confrontation, to institute confidence-building measures which will protect political relations from being disrupted by routine military activity, and to conclude arms control agreements which will enhance stability by reducing the threat of attack, particularly surprise attack, and military invasion. They have to pay particular attention to the geographical parameters of potential arms control regimes so as to protect their interest in equal security for all of the states in Europe. In order to prevent hegemony, they insist that no state should have more than a fixed share of the residual holdings of any treaty-limited item following a first agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Similar limits should apply to foreign-stationed troops.

Nordpolitik and Naval Challenges

The correlation of ground forces on the northern flank is such that maritime power is likely to dominate a land campaign. It is questionable whether allied forces could hold very long in northern Norway in the absence of forward naval reinforcements. The Striking Fleet Atlantic would double the number of interceptors in northern Norway and increase air defense in the region by a factor of about five. Its presence would prevent the Soviet Union from

employing her local naval superiority in support of ground troops and from cutting Nato's lines of supply by, for example, tripling the number of antiship missiles at sea and increasing the antisubmarine capability by a very substantial factor. Should Nato lose a battle for the control of the Norwegian Sea, it would most likely lose a land campaign in northern Norway. And should Nato lose a land campaign there, its ability to prevail in a maritime campaign for sea control in the Norwegian Sea would be seriously reduced. Should Nato lose such a campaign, its ability to prevail in a land campaign on the central front would be very much degraded. Should Norway fall into hostile hands, Nato's defenses in Europe would be seriously impaired.

The U.S. Atlantic fleet is one of the most important sources of reinforcement to Norway. It exercises in northern waters at irregular intervals. The strategy of Nato presupposes that the common defense extends to forward areas. This principle is also valid at sea. A strategy of forward defense is certainly not synonymous with an offensive strategy.

Naval forces are mobile and not tied to specific areas. This ability to redeploy has led to discussion of a potential for horizontal escalation, wherein a naval power would attempt to apply pressure on an adversary in areas where it has the upper hand in order to counter or distract the employment of his forces in a conflict elsewhere. It is unreasonable, in our view, to claim that the United States would engage in such action in the northern waters. It would be politically inadvisable to suggest such options. The Soviet Union enjoys local superiority in the areas close to the Kola peninsula. Furthermore, the risks of escalation are substantial in an area comprising a large number of nuclear weapons and installations vital to the Soviet central war posture. It should be recalled also that the Norwegian Sea is one of the harshest and most difficult environments for naval operations. Hence, horizontal escalation hardly seems like a realistic American option in the northern areas. On the other hand, Norway depends on the ability of the U.S. Atlantic fleet to extend protection to Nato's northern flank to deter horizontal escalation should the Soviet Union attempt to exploit her inherent comparative advantages in the region.

The periodic presence of allied naval forces in northern waters, including Keflavik-based maritime air forces, contributes to general deterrence as well as to the direct defense of northern Norway. Such a presence has to be of sufficient magnitude and frequency to ensure and demonstrate a credible capacity to operate in northern waters, to counter impressions of Soviet naval preponderance, and to provide incentives for mutual restraint. Although a permanent surveillance effort is being undertaken in the Norwegian Sea, the permanent presence of allied naval surface patrols is neither practical nor desirable. Norway is interested in preserving stability and a state of low tension in the sensitive northern areas.

Norway depends on allied reinforcements in the event of war, as does the central front. Such reinforcements depend on Nato's ability to protect the sea lines of communication. Such protection can be extended most effectively by countering the threat against the sea lines of communication as far north as possible. Should Nato lose the ability to protect the sea lines of communication in forward areas, Norwegian airfields would be rendered more vulnerable to attack or conquest. Should enemy forces be able to neutralize or operate from Norwegian airfields, a battle of the Atlantic would be much harder to win for Nato, and its ability to prevail in a long war in Norway and on the central front would be seriously degraded. The air threat against Nato forces in the United Kingdom would increase significantly. The total effect would also entail serious disadvantages in a crisis short of war, and it would involve a higher dependence on early resort to nuclear weapons because of the degradation of the capacity for conventional defense.

Hence, an allied capacity for forward defense at sea in the north contributes to stability and credible conventional defense in an area where the Soviet Union enjoys conventional superiority. Such a capacity does not imply a first-strike threat against the Kola peninsula. Attack against the Kola peninsula would involve serious risks of explosive escalation due to the intermingling of nuclear, conventional, strategic, and theater forces and installations on the peninsula. The area is heavily defended, particularly against air attacks. However, in the event of an attack against Norway from the Kola peninsula, the Soviets could not expect that area to become a sanctuary. An allied capacity for forward defense in northern waters conveys this message and thereby contributes to deterrence.

One aspect of Nato's strategy for forward defense in the northern areas which has been criticized is the use of aircraft carriers. The concern has been that it constitutes an offensive threat to vital Soviet military installations and forces on the Kola peninsula. The questions raised are important and need to be carefully considered, lest the strategy be perceived as constituting a threat to the condition of low tension by introducing preemptive instabilities. For Norway the problem is familiar: How can we ensure that our plans for reinforcement are properly orchestrated so as to preserve a harmonious balance between the themes of deterrence and reassurance?

Deterrence in this instance inheres first of all in the substantial military capacity of carrier task forces. They constitute potential force multipliers in an area where the Soviet Union commands significant advantages in terms of stationed aircraft, airfields and capabilities for rapid air reinforcements. They have to exercise in the area in order to demonstrate an ability to operate effectively under the very special conditions which prevail in the north. Furthermore, aircraft carriers constitute enormous concentrations of value in terms of the size of their crews and the number of weapon systems.

Attacking them therefore involves crossing a significant threshold on the escalation ladder.

Reassurance involves the further removal of incentives for preemption. This is in many ways the most challenging of the tasks at hand. It must be taken very seriously indeed. First of all, careful attention must be paid to eschewing provocative behavior during peacetime maneuvers. This includes operating at a *reasonable distance* from Soviet national territory. Second, peacetime operations must be conducted in a manner which provides *maximum protection* against attacks by aircraft and missiles. The choice of the Vestfjord and Andfjord areas behind the protective shield of the leads appears to meet these two criteria. Third, the peacetime pattern of operations should emphasize the *defensive mission* in terms of the orientation and frequency of the exercises in which aircraft carriers participate. Fourth, public presentation should emphasize *prudence and caution*, avoiding resounding and pretentious claims of prowess and capacity which could give rise to fears of aggressive intent. Planners should pay careful attention to the delicate problems of crisis management in the sensitive region of the north by recognizing the need for caution and avoiding inadvertent escalation in periods of tension. Finally, in the years ahead, peacetime stability and public acceptance of prudent defense measures will require the exploration of arms control and confidence-building measures at sea to further reduce the fears of preemptive instability in northern waters.

Our strategy has to be flexible in order to adjust to the profound changes which are now under way in Europe, in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-American relations. The Soviet naval threat could change in the years ahead. It must be assessed in conjunction with the build-down and restructuring of Soviet ground and air forces. In a period of political reconstruction, the political and military utility of particular naval dispositions must be under continuous review. Accordingly, budgetary constraints could cause the United States to reassess the size and role of carrier task forces.

The Soviet naval building effort still continues at a substantial pace, however, peacetime operations have been reduced in space and time. The trend in the Soviet navy is toward fewer but larger and more capable units, with more firepower, more sophisticated weapons, and new sensors. The *Kirov*-class cruisers and the *Sovremenny* and *Udaloy*-class destroyers have entered the Soviet fleet since 1980. Two aircraft carriers of the *Tbilisi* class are currently being fitted out at the Nikolayev shipyard in the Black Sea, and a third carrier of a new class is reportedly under construction. Typhoon and Delta IV-class strategic nuclear submarines are in serial production. The Sierra, Akula, and Victor III-class nuclear attack submarines provide the Soviet Union with a fast and quiet submarine force. The SS-N-21 sea-launched land-attack cruise missile can be installed in a variety of general purpose ships and attack submarines. The supersonic naval cruise missile, SS-N-24, is

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approaching initial operational status. A large part of the Soviet inventory of naval vessels is approaching block obsolescence and may provide a temptation to propose deep mutual cuts in naval forces.

Perspectives on Naval Arms Control

In the current phase of intensified negotiations about arms control in Europe, the issue of naval arms control has also been raised. The West cannot retain a reactive and negative stance on this issue if it is to protect vital interests, exploit emerging opportunities, and maintain public confidence and support. Before the potential for naval arms control can be properly assessed, several observations need to be made about the essence of naval forces.

- First, naval forces constitute mobile military capabilities. Their reach is global. Hence, they do not lend themselves to regional limitation. Regional naval limitation regimes are likely to prove unstable as they would be inherently vulnerable to disruption by naval forces from outside the region.
- Second, naval forces constitute multi-mission military capabilities. They can be used in a variety of roles: to fight other ships for command of the seas; to chase and destroy submarines or surface vessels, including merchant vessels; to bombard targets on land; or to provide protection for forces on land.
- Third, naval forces constitute instruments for political influence. Enjoying freedom of navigation on the high seas, they cast political shadows before them, particularly onto the shores of the littoral states. They are flexible instruments for exercising influence: they can be intrusive or out of sight; they can be present without being committed. However, since the dependence of nations on supplies by sea varies considerably, symmetric limitations on access to particular ocean areas could have asymmetric political effects.
- Fourth, naval forces constitute military instruments which are deployed and operate largely outside the area of jurisdiction of the nation state. Therefore the regulatory powers of the coastal states constrain the freedom of maneuver of the flag state, but in rather marginal ways. Through the centuries sailors have had to develop "rules of the road" to reduce the danger of incidents at sea and their possible escalation to armed conflict.

Several conclusions suggest themselves concerning approaches to naval arms control which are consistent with the essential character of naval forces.

- First, as a general rule, limitations should be *global* rather than regional in scope.
- Second, limitations should focus on the *inventories* of specific types of naval forces rather than on missions, since the latter are typically conducted by a variety of forces in a multiplicity of combinations. In many instances

complete elimination, rather than limitation by agreed ceilings, could provide more stable regimes, particularly from the point of view of verification.

- Third, naval arms control must be considered in a *comprehensive strategic context*, taking into account the relative dependence of nations on the sea lines of communication.
- Fourth, confidence-building measures at sea should take into account the specific nature of naval operations, the navigational traditions which have developed over the years, the principle of the freedom of the seas, and the perspective of mutual advantage.

Nato is a maritime alliance which depends on exterior oversea lines of communication and supply. The Warsaw Pact is a continental alliance which depends on interior overland lines of communication and supply. Symmetric reductions in naval forces could therefore have asymmetric implications for the two alliances. Under conditions of reduced standing forces in forward positions in Europe, the importance of naval forces could increase for protecting the sea lines of communication, providing depth to the European theater, and for connecting the flanks of Western Europe to Nato's center—indeed, for preserving the integrity of Nato's defenses. However, deep cuts and substantial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would also reduce the need for rapid reinforcement. The relation between the evolving military situation in Europe and maritime requirements is a very complex one indeed.

Soviet proposals for naval force reductions to equal levels could suggest an interest in exploiting geographical asymmetries to her advantage, in possibly circumventing a future system of essentially equal security in Europe established by negotiation, and in weakening the umbilical cord of the Atlantic alliance. Negotiations on naval forces should be approached from the perspective of overall stability and should focus on a preferential build-down of those components which constitute the principal offensive threat to the trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication, which contribute to sustaining the balance of military power on the continent of Europe. In this connection, limitations should be considered on oceangoing attack submarines and naval bombers with stand-off weapons.

Norway has rejected Soviet proposals for arrangements which would limit naval access to northern waters on a symmetrical basis. Since the Soviet Union borders on these waters, since the most powerful of the Soviet fleets is homeported in the area, and since the U.S. Atlantic fleet is homeported in Virginia, the strategic consequences of such an arrangement would be asymmetric and in favor of the Soviet Union. Arrangements which would weaken or curtail the ability of the United States to project countervailing naval power into the northern waters would not enhance mutual confidence and could, in fact, weaken the tissue connecting Northern Europe to the overall security order in Europe.

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More attention should be devoted to confidence-building measures at sea. Such measures should be tailored to the special conditions which apply at sea rather than be transposed from the system developed on land. In fact, established practice contains important confidence-building measures. Navies from East and West have observed each other's exercises for years, and "observer" ships frequently join the exercise formations. This suggests that observation at sea may more fruitfully be conducted from the ships of the observing party rather than by observers on the naval vessels of the potential adversary, particularly since it is much easier for the host party to control and limit observation on board his own naval vessels than if observation is conducted from the vessels of the observing party. Similarly, for many years naval exercises have been announced publicly before they take place.

The best way to develop a system of naval confidence-building measures might be to build on the framework and foundation provided by the bilateral incidents at sea agreements concluded between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Canada and Norway on the other. Similar agreements could be concluded between other pairs of interested nations.

Norway has negotiated an incidents at sea agreement with the Soviet Union along the lines of the agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and each of the powers with major reinforcement roles in Norway and the ocean areas off Norway. This agreement also includes provisions obliging the parties to inform each other in the event of an accident or emergency at sea. Recently we have had several incidents of Soviet nuclear submarines in distress in northern waters where Soviet authorities failed to inform Norwegian authorities about the situation and the measures undertaken to deal with it, responding only to Norwegian requests for information.

A dialogue among the major naval powers about naval doctrine, strategy and peacetime naval deployments would seem to constitute a necessary step in preparation for possible future negotiations about naval arms control.

Strategic Arms Control and Northern Waters

When we consider the current agenda of strategic arms control and how it could affect developments at sea, several propositions may be advanced.

A strategic arms reduction agreement, based on a 50 percent cut, would likely result in a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear submarines operating in the Arctic and near-Arctic oceans. However, specific constraints on destabilizing heavy land-based missiles and an emphasis on survivability could cause a relative shift from land-based systems to sea-based systems, and from large strategic submarines with many missiles to smaller submarines with fewer missiles. Stability could be enhanced by reducing the ratio of warheads

to launchers, thus moving away from multiple-warhead systems and towards single-warhead systems.

A strategic arms reduction talks (START) agreement would affect both the size and the structure of the strategic nuclear forces maintained by the two principal powers. It would in all likelihood cause the Soviets to retire their strategic submarines with intermediate range missiles, presently patrolling the Norwegian Sea and presumably covering targets in Western Europe. The Soviet choice of a northern patrol option in or near the Arctic for their long-range strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force creates a situation in which they threaten targets in Western Europe and North America from the same positions and with the same systems. Paradoxically, they thus contribute to forging the strategic unity of Nato. However, a Soviet choice of short-range/short time-of-flight depressed SLBM trajectories could require forward patrols off the coasts of North America. This choice could constitute a potential first-strike threat against the land-based components of the U.S. strategic deterrent. In order to enhance stability, testing and deployment of such SLBMs could be prohibited in a START agreement. The long-range Soviet northern patrol option is more consistent with stability.

Long-range, nuclear-tipped, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) are operational with the navies of both of the principal powers. From a Norwegian perspective this development is a matter of concern. It threatens to redirect the nuclear arms competition to northern waters and may constitute a challenge to the condition of low tension which has prevailed in the European north. The impact might be particularly cumbersome in the context of progress in detente and arms control on the ground in Europe.

Many more potential targets for attacks with nuclear-tipped SLCMs are near the coasts in North America and Western Europe than in the Soviet Union. They are vulnerable because of the short flight times from Soviet surface ships and submarines. Norway has a very extended coastline and an extremely shallow territory relative to the coast. The general geographical asymmetry suggests a Western interest in limiting nuclear SLCMs.

Furthermore, SLCMs could introduce preemptive instabilities in a conventional crisis to which naval forces were committed, as nuclear cruise missiles are dispersed on a variety of ships. This in turn could reduce the flexibility of the U.S. Navy in extending conventional deterrence to the exposed areas of the European north, since vessels with SLCMs might be withheld for political reasons. Strategic systems presumably will be subject to tight central command and control. A ban on nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles will probably depend to a large extent on whether the principal powers are able to conclude a START agreement and develop force postures with survivable land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles. In the absence of such a regime, SLCMs may seem necessary in order to dissuade attacks by

multiplying the targets which an opponent would have to eliminate in a first strike. Furthermore, Norway's interests here are at potential variance with those of some of her continental Nato partners, who may view SLCMs as a substitute for land-based nuclear forces. However, in the event of substantial reductions in conventional forces on the continent of Europe and the reduction of their capacities for surprise attack, sustained offensives and occupation of territory, the presumed requirement for such nuclear strike options would diminish.

A total ban on nuclear SLCMs presumably would be easier to verify than a higher ceiling. A more radical solution, which has also been suggested, would involve the elimination of all nuclear weapons at sea, except on missiles in dedicated strategic submarines. Such a radical solution could enhance strategic stability by eliminating a naval nuclear threat to the survivability of strategic missile submarines. It would be consistent with a growing preference for existential deterrence rather than nuclear warfighting postures.

The idea of sanctuaries for strategic missile submarines has sometimes been suggested as an arms control measure. However, the monitoring of such sanctuaries would be extremely difficult. It would require extensive cooperation between the two principal powers, and such cooperation could easily translate into claims for preferential rights in the ocean areas in question. It would also affect the littoral states, whose security and sovereignty would become closely entangled with the management of the central balance of nuclear deterrence between the two principal powers.

A Broader Perspective

In closing, let me return to the northern areas after this excursion into the complexities of the strategic competition between the major powers. For in the high north, genuine security involves a much broader agenda of cooperative undertakings to protect and preserve a fragile environment, promote a sustainable and equitable exploitation of natural resources, and increase our understanding of our complex ecology. Progress in these areas could spin a network of cooperative threads across the divisions which have stimulated and sustained the military competition. Increased cooperation in the high uorth could reduce the saliency of military conflict and its impact on the conduct of our international relations. At the same time, arms control could gradually move the military effort away from the framework of competitive security to one of common security.

This article is adapted from a lecture delivered by Mr. Holst at the Naval War College on 19 September 1989 as part of the college's International Lecture Series. This series is sponsored by the Naval War College Foundation.

Neutrality and International Order

Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister

I am glad to be back in Newport, one of my favorite places, which I often visit as a guest of my good friend Senator Claiborne Pell and his wife Nuala. It is a particular honor and pleasure to be invited to speak at the Naval War College, which every two years gives a Swedish naval officer the benefit of a year's education.

My subject this evening is "neutrality and international order." By way of introduction, let me recall the story attributed to a famous British statesman, intimately familiar with warfare and in particular with the naval aspects of it. Once he rose to thank his hosts for a dinner and shocked the guests by saying that he had anticipated that honor and had prepared two speeches. Depending on the quality of the table, he would make use of one or the other. He said he had been treated well and therefore had decided to deliver them both. The brief speech went as follows: "Thank you!" And the longer one: "Thank you very much!"

I will do the same and deal with two slightly different but interrelated subjects: neutrality, and the policy of neutrality. I will naturally do so from a Swedish perspective, but in order to highlight that perspective I will briefly refer to the neutrality of other countries.

There are few neutral countries in the world, and their history, policies and problems are overshadowed by the flow of information from the great powers and their allies. I therefore believe that an introduction to neutrality is warranted.

A common denominator for the different forms of neutrality is that its meaning, in terms of international law and in military terms, is revealed only in time of war between foreign powers. That is the time when the rules of international law pertaining to neutrality enter into force, both for the neutral states and for the belligerents. Those rules, which are binding on both categories of states, are found in the fifth and the thirteenth Hague conventions of 1907. These conventions deal with the Rights and Duties of

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Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, and the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. (No such rules have been developed pertaining to the situation in the air.)

Neutrality does not cease to exist if it is violated either by the neutral state not fulfilling all its obligations or by actions perpetrated against it by a belligerent state. In accordance with international law, a neutral state using armed resistance to stave off an intrnder is not regarded as having committed a hostile act. At the same time, tlie neutral state is bound by the same rules to prevent its territory from being used for acts of war or as bases for such acts. A belligerent state is obliged to respect nentral territory and not to engage in acts of war there. And the neutral state is obliged to be impartial, that is, it may not engage in the war or support any of the belligerent states. Thus, neutrality must be applied equally toward the belligerents. At the same time, we should note that a neutral state is always free to offer mediation.

The rules laid down in the Hague conventions are based on long experience of what actions should not be tolerated by belligerent states, and what may lead them to regard a neutral state as a legitimate target for countermeasures, maybe even war. This applies, for example, to the obligation of the neutral state to refuse transit of troops, the duty to intern belligerent troops entering the neutral country and, if bans are imposed on exports of military equipment, the nondiscriminatory application of such bans to all belligerents. However, these rules say nothing about the general, nonmilitary trade, even if neutral states themselves often apply a principle of "normal trade."

When Sweden considered applying for membership in the United Nations in 1947 there was a dilemma, because adherence to the Charter of the UN is theoretically incompatible with neutrality if the Security Council decides to impose sanctions on a particular country. (There has so far been only one case of this kind: the resolution to impose sanctions against then Southern Rhodesia, a resolution that Sweden strictly implemented.) However, this limited waiving of neutrality is of little practical importance, because we are guaranteed *not* to be drawn into a military conflict that would encompass either one of the great powers or any of their allies. This is so because the great powers, that is, the five permanent members of the Security Council, must be in agreement before the Security Council can make a decision to apply military or other sanctions. They have a veto power, and therefore we run no risk of being ordered by the Council to declare war on either of them. As stated clearly in Parliament by the then foreign minister, it was for this reason that Sweden felt free to seek membership in the United Nations.

The international doctrine on neutrality has come to the conclusion that a neutral state must use its military resources to safeguard its neutrality. Of equal importance is the fact that there is no rule iu international law stipulating that a neutral state should possess a military capacity to stave off *all* incursions. International law does not require a neutral state to be an

impregnable fortress. There is no obligation for a neutral state to be at the peak of the spiral that technically drives the development of sophisticated armaments.

There are variants of neutrality by which a state, in peacetime, can be bound by arrangements in accordance with international law. In these instances the term *permanent neutrality* is often used. States which are permanently neutral in accordance with treaties have certain rights and obligations. They have to follow rules laid down in the treaties when conducting their security and foreign policy. Sometimes such treaty arrangements are paired with some kind of guarantees, by which the integrity of the neutral state is guaranteed by guarantor states. In return, the neutral state is obliged not to open hostilities against any state and not to enter into international agreements which could indirectly lead to such hostilities. The permanently neutral state of course has the right and obligation to defend its territory and its neutrality.

Austria has declared a self-chosen neutrality, and has applied some self-imposed restrictions to both its national and foreign policy. These restrictions are mentioned in the international documents by which Austria's sovereignty was restored in 1955.

Allow me in this context also to refer to the strict and permanent neutrality of Switzerland. Swiss neutrality is part of the constitutional system of that country. It is internationally recognized and was collectively guaranteed at the Vienna Congress in 1815 and in the Versailles peace treaty of 1919.

The picture would be incomplete if I did not mention Finland. The 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union is the foundation of Finland's policy of neutrality. This treaty notes "Finland's desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers."

International treaty and guarantee arrangements give the states party to them the right to expect that a certain policy will be adhered to by the neutral state. If these obligations are violated, it is possible to imagine signals of displeasure from the guarantor states most directly concerned. I hasten to add, however, that the more time that has elapsed since the treaty arrangement, the less the real possibility for the guarantor states to intervene directly in the affairs of the neutral state.

In the case of Sweden, my country becomes, *stricto senso*, neutral when there is war between powers in our vicinity. In peacetime, Sweden has no neutrality obligations. Sweden's neutrality is not laid down in its constitution or otherwise proclaimed as a permanent state doctrine. Our neutrality in the case of war is neither confirmed nor guaranteed by any international agreement. It is instead a policy the Swedish government and Parliament have chosen to pursue, a policy which it could, should it so wish, amend at any given moment.

Sweden has rejected the idea of incorporating its neutrality in any international agreement. In our view, guarantees furnished by the great powers would create some measure of dependence on these states. They might claim the right to keep an eye on Sweden's foreign policy and to raise objections should they consider that it conflicts with the terms of the international guarantees. In other words, the Swedish approach is not to give foreign powers any *droit de regard* toward Swedish affairs.

In peacetime, Sweden is therefore guided by what is appropriate in order to safeguard our neutrality in time of war. Because of this aim, our security policy must be conducted with precision, firmness and consistency. That is, however, different from legally binding obligations.

I now turn to the *policy* of neutrality, its scope, implications and opportunities.

Sweden's policy of neutrality can trace its roots to 1814, the year Sweden was last engaged in acts of war. Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, a former marshal in Napoleon's army, realized when he was King Karl XIV Johan of Sweden that the Napoleonic wars created a quagmire in which there were only losers. In order for his kingdom to prosper, he therefore moved to stay out of the vicissitudes of alliance-building on the European continent. What he started has little by little evolved into Sweden's policy of neutrality. That endeavor has obviously been highly successful, since we find ourselves in the unique position of not having been at war for the last 175 years.

Adhering to the policy of neutrality, Sweden has been saved from involvement in two world wars. Obviously it was not neutrality alone that saved us, but also strategic and political circumstances beyond our control. Certainly one component was luck. No one can deny, however, that a deliberate policy of neutrality was one factor enabling Sweden to avoid participation in these two major conflicts.

The evolution of the Swedish policy of neutrality over a long period of time has won the support of the Swedish people. The policy's credibility has been based on its consistency, a national consensus on its aims, broad political majorities supporting the means by which to achieve those aims, and a strong national defense. It is an exaggeration to say that Swedes regard the policy of neutrality as a flak jacket, but the vast majority would probably agree to liken it to a safety belt. Our policy of neutrality is deeply rooted in the minds of all citizens, and indeed, whoever electioneered from a political platform proposing a change of this basic policy would certainly lose in the elections.

As an interesting example of where another nation went, I would like to briefly sketch the path of the neutralistic tendencies in the United States. This nation was equally fed up with the European quarrels of the Napoleonic era. As a result, the United States turned its back on that continent in order to

expand within its own borders and within the Western hemisphere (in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine).

A century later, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, President Wilson proclaimed a policy of strict neutrality. In 1917 neutrality was abandoned, the main reason probably being the German strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.

When World War I ended, Congress again shunned away from involvement in European affairs and rejected the fourteen points suggested by President Wilson. This restrictive attitude in U.S. foreign policy, exemplified by the rejection of the League of Nations in 1920, continued through the period between the wars. The definitive breaking point for the policy of neutrality of the United States can be set at the Lend Lease Agreement with Great Britain on March 11, 1941, when Congress accepted the proposal of President Roosevelt to come to the aid of the United Kingdom and other threatened democracies.

From then on, it is proper to regard the United States' policy toward the rest of the world as one of the two superpowers, where involvement in the affairs of various regions has indeed been significant. However, it is interesting to note what happened when the United States actively engaged itself in the preservation of the freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. It was stated that the U.S. Navy would protect American shipping in the gulf—later including reflagged former Kuwaiti tankers—while at the same time the United States would be neutral toward the belligerents involved in that war.

At this juncture I would like to emphasize the difference between the evolution of the United States' and Swedish security policies respectively. While the United States' interest in staying away from European affairs contained a tint of isolationism, the Swedish policy of neutrality is paired with a deep commitment to full participation in the affairs of the world community. The basic aim of Sweden's policy of neutrality is to make credible our intention to be neutral in times of war, so that belligerents respect that neutrality and Sweden can be spared the scourge of war. It is not an effort to climb to high moral ground, but a means by which Sweden endeavors to safeguard its independence and national security. This policy of neutrality has three main components: nonparticipation in alliances; a strong defense; and a foreign policy that makes credible our intentions in case of war.

Nonparticipation in alliances is, of course, a *sine qua non* for the credibility abroad that Sweden will be neutral in the case of war. Sweden's security policy is a well-established fact in the Nordic region: Iceland, Norway and Denmark are members of Nato; and Sweden and Finland, each in its own way, conduct a policy of neutrality. The Nordic states interact on the basis of a common history and cultural, social, linguistic and religious affinities. Despite the different orientations in their security policies, each has

contributed to the relative calm in the Nordic subregion of Europe, and each bears a responsibility for that stability to continue. It is in this context that one can see the importance of Sweden continuing its policy of neutrality, because were it to be abandoned, it would in a stroke change the political map of Europe.

Recent developments in the European Community (EC) have influenced the debate on future Swedish options. Parliament has stressed that Sweden should work for a Western European common market encompassing all countries in the EC and the European Free Trade Association; that we should seek far-reaching, close and lasting relations with the EC; and that we should associate ourselves to the extent possible with the EC's work to develop a truly internal market. At the same time Parliament decided that Sweden should not consider membership in the Community, because the cooperation and coordination of foreign policy inside the Community is tantamount to that performed within an alliance.

Nonparticipation in alliances is so fundamental that the correct definition has been set in concrete in the following phrase: "nonparticipation in alliances in peacetime aiming at staying neutral in the event of war." It follows, therefore, that no commitment must be made in peacetime that prevents us from fulfilling the obligations of a neutral power when there is war between other states.

The strongest proof of our will to be neutral in the event of war is our refusal to join alliances in combination with a determination to make considerable sacrifices to maintain a strong defense. Sweden has based its defense on the theory of marginal defense, i.e., Sweden will mobilize sufficient strength to match whatever surplus resources an aggressor may be able to spare for use against it in the context of a general war in Europe.

Soviet military developments in the vicinity of Sweden are characterized by an increase in the operational ranges of tactical aircraft, the deployment of cruise missiles, an increase in strategic and operational mobility, and the development of new underwater technology (as evidenced by submarine intrusions). These have all influenced Swedish threat perceptions. The possibility for surprise attack, the shortening of military warning times, and the existence of special sabotage groups are relatively new phenomena and have been given added attention in Swedish defense planning.

As noted earlier, international law does not require a neutral state to be an impregnable fortress. It does, however, require the neutral state in time of war to use the military resources at its disposal to uphold its neutrality. Sweden's military capacity, with a mobilized total defense, has been and remains significant. The air force enjoys the reputation of being one of the strongest in Europe. Fully mobilized, the armed forces number more than 800,000, not including 300,000 persons engaged in civil defense. That, together with the determination of the Swedish people to defend themselves, even if

the outcome is in doubt, adds to the effect of the military hardware available. Furthermore, Sweden maintains an indigenous production capacity for most of its weapons in order to be independent in this field. In addition to airplanes, Sweden produces armored vehicles, missiles, submarines, and artillery.

The changing threat perceptions have increased demands on Swedish defense efforts. Broad political majorities support the steps taken during the 1980s. The Swedish antisubmarine warfare capacity has been enhanced and, on the operational level, instructions have been altered to make possible the use of force without prior warning against underwater vessels intruding in Swedish internal waters.

Despite economic constraints, it was decided in 1982 to develop a new generation of aircraft in order to ensure continued strength. The JAS/Gripen aircraft will use more indigenous than imported technology. Together with enhanced radar and base structures, the JAS system will improve our ability to counter aircraft and cruise missiles that might violate Swedish airspace. The system will thus serve as a platform for omnidirectional defense in the air and increase the capacity of the Swedish defense forces to deny Swedish territory to any side in the event of war.

The diversification of the threats has led to a series of other measures that will enhance our ability to deal with incidents in the grey zone between peace and war. New focus is being given to the need to protect the nation against surprise attacks. Particular attention has been devoted to counter-industrial espionage and international terrorism, and to the protection of communications and the whole civilian infrastructure of the state.

The underlying sentiment of these measures is clear. There is consensus in Sweden that the country is worth defending and that it is defensible by means at its own disposal. General conscription has created a sense not only of duty, but of privilege to prepare for the defense of the country. Defense spending is currently growing at a rate of 1.7 percent annually in real terms and is calculated to amount to 2.7 percent of the GNP. Under these circumstances, I know what the reaction would be on the part of the average Swedish taxpayer, or the conscript soldier in basic or refresher training, if someone told him that there are those who say that Sweden tries to have a free ride for its security. He would be disgusted.

So much for our *ability* to be neutral in time of war. Now to the foreign policy component of the policy of neutrality: our *will* to be neutral. If we have no military ability, the will is immaterial. On the other hand, if the capacity is available but there are doubts about our will, the situation would be equally bad, because then our intentions could be questioned. This is why we argue that our foreign policy is our first line of defense.

Sweden, with a large territory but only 8.6 million people, is a democratic country in northern Europe with strong economic ties to the Western world. Sweden is situated in the immediate vicinity of one of the superpowers. So

placed, Sweden had better avoid either coming under the influence of the nearby superpower or becoming the threatening outpost of the other. Our own interest is best served by basing our policy on a rational assessment of reality as we see it. After all, it is we who decide on a day to day basis the content of our policy, and the geographic realities are permanent.

In peacetime we must pursue a policy that inspires and sustains the confidence of the rest of the world in our determination and our ability to be neutral in wartime. This is no easy task in an era of increasing global interdependence in virtually all fields. Of prime importance in this regard is the confidence of the superpowers. If they believe that we are not really serious about our neutrality, or that only a little pressure is needed to get us to throw in our lot with either of them, then neutrality is worthless as an element of our security policy. That is why the Swedish government must remove groundless fears and hopes about our policy. And that is why Sweden must stand firm, even under strong external pressure.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress what the Swedish policy of neutrality is *not*. It is not aimed at neutrality *until* the time of war. It is not neutrality in ideological terms. Sweden is a Western, democratic country, and a member of the cultural community that traces its roots to the Judeo-Christian value system as developed under the influence of Greek philosophy. Therefore, Sweden has the right to express solidarity with this cultural community, to criticize phenomena that are contrary to our democratic principles and contrary to basic human rights. In particular, Sweden demands respect for international law and the interests of small countries, so that the law of the jungle will not be the norm. This is particularly important in the case of those nations situated in the vicinity of one or the other of the great powers.

It also gives us the right to actively engage in developing cooperation with nations in the Third World. We believe that such cooperation in the long run will foster stability in a volatile and increasingly important part of the world, thereby contributing to the enhancement of our own security. It is an enlightened self-interest.

And it gives us the right to actively engage in the endeavors to abolish the nuclear threat to this planet. We do so in the knowledge that the nuclear threat is not one that exclusively hangs over those who possess those weapons, but over life on this planet in its entirety.

Countries neutral by treaty, permanently neutral, or, like Sweden, conducting a policy of neutrality aimed at being neutral in war, have in common their desire to avoid being drawn into war. In today's world these countries come in handy for the world community. They are trusted, and they shoulder international responsibilities that contribute to the building of peace and understanding, sometimes at great cost. They do so, of course, in accordance with their respective history and traditions, geographical

locations, and individual political aims and aspirations, but in the common aim to benefit themselves from the lower tension that at least in part results from their contributions.

Permit me to mention a few examples:

- Switzerland, conveniently situated at the crossroads of Europe, has over the years played host to numerous international endeavors to solve disputes by peaceful means. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations and the International Red Cross (a genuinely Swiss organization), had or have impressive facilities in Geneva. The superpowers have used Switzerland as one of the main venues for serious deliberations, be they in their respective embassies and missions or during walks in the woods in the surrounding mountains. France and Algeria (just about to be born) met on the Swiss shores of Lake Geneva; and when the central banks meet on the highest level, they assemble in Basel.
- Who today is not familiar with the increasing role Austria and its capital Vienna are playing in international affairs? The UN's center for humanitarian affairs is based there; OPEC found neutral ground for their deliberations there; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe seems to have found a semipermanent home in the former capital of the Habsburg Empire. Here is where East and West meet in Europe today; here is where the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks started, failed and were buried; and here is the port of entry for those in distress who are permitted to leave the Soviet Union.
- When President Reagan wanted to reinvigorate himself for the challenges of the summit in Moscow, he stopped over in Helsinki in Finland. When the United Nations are in need of reliable, neutral and well-trained troops, the Secretary General rarely fails to call on the Finnish government to send a contingent. And when the time was ripe for Europe to leave the era of World War II behind in a concerted effort to increase the security of all, it started in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki. Who that is suffering from ill treatment, from torture or harassment, or from the despair of not being master of his own fate, does not see the word *Helsinki* as a beacon (as in the Helsinki accord or the Helsinki process)?
- In December 1988, 55,000 Swedes felt that they had received the Nobel Peace Prize when it was awarded to the United Nations peacekeeping forces. Swedish troops have participated in almost all of them since the first United Nations Emergency Forces in Sinai in 1956. When the superpowers want to receive data on nuclear experiments from independent, reliable and technically sophisticated sources, they have the Hagfors laboratory in Sweden at their disposal. And they use it.
- With no stake of their own, except the desire to create peaceful conditions worldwide as a contribution to their own security, Swedes have often been used to mediate, sometimes sacrificing their lives. I think of Dag

Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General of the United Nations (whom I had the honor to serve), and Raoul Wallenberg, who saved tens of thousands of lives in Budapest during the last months of World War II. I recall Folke Bernadotte, who shipped people out of the concentration camps in Germany in 1945, and who later fell from an assassin's bullet in Jerusalem while serving the United Nations. And I remember Olof Palme, who mediated on behalf of the Secretary General of the United Nations in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. There are many others.

It has sometimes been said that neutrality is immoral because if you are not one of us, you are my enemy. I believe that is wrong on two grounds:

First, I do not believe that the world's future is best served by seeing enemies around every corner. The need for cooperation in a world increasingly interdependent makes me believe, instead, that he who is not my enemy is my friend.

Second, the role played by neutral states during times of crisis, war, and peace has contributed in a positive way to the stability of the world.

What Sweden seeks to promote is respect for human rights and for international law; nuclear disarmament; democracy (as the slowest but best way of government); and stability and peace as a foundation for building a society for our children that is better than the one we inherited from our parents.

This article is adapted from a lecture delivered by Count Wachtmeister at the Naval War College on 21 March 1989 as part of the college's International Lecture Series. This series is sponsored by the Naval War College Foundation.

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Panic, unreasonable apprehension, when war begins, will be found in the same persons who in peace resist reasonable preparation.

Naval Strategy
A. T. Mahan (1911)
Little, Brown (1918), pp. 150-151

The Fate of a Good Doctor

Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Feuer, A.B., ed. *Bilibid Diary: The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes.* Hamden, Conn.: Archon Press, 1987. 288pp. $27.50

Thomas Hayes was born on 8 February 1898, became a physician, and was commissioned in the Medical Corps of the U.S. Navy in 1924. A reflective dreamer and thinker, he was later to write in these prison camp memoirs that he sensed his life taking an irreversible turn in the summer of 1940 when, as a senior lieutenant commander, he received orders to sea aboard the cruiser U.S.S. *Milwaukee.* "I had known happiness—real happiness. I had found the life I always wanted. But I knew when I left on this cruise that I was done, washed up as a happy wanderer." He was never again to see the wife and son he left in Tidewater Virginia.

After a year aboard ship (during which he "never did adjust," he later wrote), he made the promotion list for commander and was transferred to the staff of the Sixteenth Naval District, Philippine Islands. Pearl Harbor came four months later. Bombed out of Cavite on 10 December, he made his way to the Fourth Marine Regiment where he became its chief medical officer, and on New Year's day, 1942, his date of rank as a three-striper, his new command became a part of the American holdout garrison on Corregidor. Captured by the Japanese on 6 May 1942, he was put in the old Spanish "Bilibid" penitentiary in downtown Manila on 2 July. He remained there for nearly 2½ years, until, at the age of 46, he was swept up in the frantic Japanese effort to remove all their prisoners to the Home Islands for service in their factories and mines. But like 1,300 other American prisoners, he died a horrible death, under despicable conditions, en route in the hold of a northbound ship.

Hayes' extensive diaries were discovered hidden in Bilibid prison soon after World War II. There are gaps in his chronology (notably a nine-month one

President of the Naval War College from 1977 to 1979, Admiral Stockdale is now at the Hoover Institution. He knows a great deal about life as a prisoner of war in a communist country.

from 2 January 1943 to 1 October of that year), but he leaves us a vivid picture of POW life in Manila during the war. Thanks to his reflective nature and candidness, Hayes also tells us much about the captives' frame of mind during those years. More is different than the same in comparing POW concerns as prisoners of Japanese Imperialists and Vietnamese Communists. But contrary to popular lore about the difference between soldiers' attitudes in "popular" vs. "unpopular" wars, Hayes' reminiscences and skepticisms could just as well have come from a similarly cynical and strong-willed American POW in Vietnam.

For a veteran of Hanoi's central and "clearing house" prison (the French-built Hoa Lo) to review these precious, unspoiled first-person accounts of life in Manila's central and "clearing house" prison (the Spanish-built Bilibid), and not digress on the differences of captors' style and philosophy, would seem to me to be a waste of knowledge. In a nutshell, while to Japanese Imperialists a POW prison was a bother, to Vietnamese Communists it was a propaganda farm.

The purpose of a modern communist prison is the breaking of prisoners' wills in an effort to squeeze secrets and propaganda performances out of them. The purpose of a World War II Japanese prison seemed to be just keeping people locked up and feeding them as little as possible. Stories of these Japanese prisons are chronicles of dietary deprivation, dysentery, fever, recreational prisoner bashing, and high death rates. Communists aren't "good feeders," but their wear and tear is not so much on the prisoner's physical plant as on his nervous system. Every prisoner is considered to be in "workup" for propaganda exploitation; the commissar has deadlines to meet, and that means he must discipline his guards to *never* engage in personal conversations with prisoners, to demand strict obedience of a myriad of "trip wire" laws, and to engage in "prisoner bashing" only as scripted by the boss. His prisoners must be prevented from communicating with each other, and his political cadres are schooled to bear down on them with solitary confinement, one-on-one intimidation sessions, and repeated, emphatic, controlled, and purposeful physical torture sufficient to gain total submission. Prisoners are valuable assets, and their deaths are practically limited to natural causes and torture overshoots.

So it is with surprise, knowing in advance of the horrible death rates, that a prisoner from a communist "pressure cooker" reads of hundreds of American POWs almost totally without threat of solitary or torture and in direct contact with English-speaking Japanese and Filipino nationals (military and civilian) who had the run of the city. The result is a relatively disciplineless prison, open to smuggled notes from the outside, newspapers, espionage contacts, intrigue—a place where senior prisoners like Hayes (chief of surgery and later senior medical officer of the prison) are in semi-social contact with

their jailer counterparts, taking meals and drinks in their quarters on occasion and sometimes at Manila restaurants.

To be sure, these jailer (Japanese medical officer) counterparts were seldom the vicious caricatures we used to see in war films of the 1940s, but as the story unfolds it becomes clear that their second and third-level functionaries were capable of heinous terrors (like ordering the murder of the fifteen sickest Americans on their way to the hell ships bound for Japan). But to a person used to the total silence and solitude of a "clamp down" prison, day-to-day life as a captive of the Japanese in Manila reads more like being caught in a treacherous web of intrigue in a semi-civilian atmosphere.

This "civilian atmosphere" has roots. The Japanese professed great interest in the "Geneva Treaty" with regard to the treatment of prisoners. That, of course, was the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929—the last one of that series to have been ratified before World War II. Since their inception, Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners of war have been phrased in terms that takes the prisoner out of the military context to the maximum extent possible and puts him in a category of "benevolent quarantine," with minimal residual national ("home country") obligations, "answerable only to himself and humanity." They don't speak of the senior prisoner being commanding officer of his countrymen incarcerated with him. They refer to "prisoners' representatives," subject to a prisoners' vote where possible, and in the case of the 1929 Convention also "subject to the approval of the military authority"—which the Japanese obviously presumed to be Japanese military authority.

Accordingly, the Japanese selected the American prisoners' representative of their choice ("camp warden," they called him), who, so far as they were concerned, commanded the American contingent in prison. In the case of Bilibid, that designated commander was an alcoholic chief warrant officer (machinist) who had his own private liquor supply and mess, played favorites, worked deals, had a free gangway to and from town, ruled like a despotic potentate, buttered up the Japanese, and throughout his term of office told American commanders and colonels, such as Hayes, what to do. This camp warden (the "field marshal," as many Americans called him) was given real power by the Japanese. If an American prisoner wanted a few hours alone out in town, he, and only he, could set it up with the gate guards. Hayes would not trust the "field marshal" with sensitive material like escape plans and had reason to believe that to make his muster lists come out right, he had forged at least two American death certificates. "[He is] crooked, untrustworthy, characterless, and dumb," wrote Hayes. "The most disgusting and unforgettable fact [which has typified his regime] . . . is the toadying, backslapping, handshaking, and condoning of his acts which has marked the conduct of so many of our officers. They feared him and hoped to feather their nests by playing up to the bastard."

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It wasn't until after the Korean War that President Eisenhower issued the American military man's Code of Conduct, which clearly and specifically overrode all Geneva Convention biases against Americans' national obligations behind bars. His Code of Conduct established the position that the regular American chain of command holds in or out of captivity, and that for the American POW the war continues behind bars. Under this code and the instruction now attendant to it, American prisoners would have known in advance never to obey the orders of an American set up as a puppet governor by the captor power.

This bogus chain of command which the American prisoners let stand played no small part in generating the "me first" mood Hayes' commentaries repeatedly complain about. He describes a prison population who grew to let personal interests override the greater good of the community: "It is a constant fight against personal selfishness, a continual battle against individuals who would sacrifice their comrades for personal gain." Another catalyst for this self-centered attitude, also triggered by the Geneva Convention, were the provisions for a more or less independent economic life for each of these "obligation-free, citizens of the world" prisoners. Prisoners, said the Geneva rules, are supposed to be able to buy things in stores, and they are supposed to be paid by the captor power. The Japanese allowed a store to be run by a U.S. Army clerk, who bought items of food out in town, first with collections from prisoners who arrived with pocket money and eventually from the "pay" the Japanese started printing up for them. This led to endless squabbles which came to dominate much of prison life, and eventually put the American prisoners in the position of being partially responsible for their own starvation.

Neither the flavor of the times in Manila nor of the mind of Hayes can be had without a few last quotes from his diaries:

On the run-down physical condition of Americans. 9 June 1942 - "Conspiracies are at work" (under the food distribution system worked out by the "field marshal"). 22 July 1942 - "The Japanese couldn't understand why we were in such a state of starvation and malnutrition at the time of our surrender, and yet there were tons of food stored on Corregidor. That's something we would all like to have explained to us."

On the plight of prisoners taken at Corregidor. 30 July 1942 - "We have every reason to believe that our country has scratched us off their list as a lost cause. Certainly, if they made no attempt to help us while we were fighting, they surely won't consider it worthwhile now." 23 August 1942 - "It was one year ago that I arrived in the Philippines. . . . It was expected of me to come out here and be captured. . . . Great going, F.D.R."

Insights into Bilibid life. 10 August 1942 - "The observation of all who pass through this camp is that we are the poorest fed prisoners in the Philippines."

25 September 1942 - "The Japanese are now offering us two bottles of beer for every can of dead flies."

On home. 13 May 1944 - "It's a hot sultry night and walking back from the upper compound, I paused for a moment under the mango tree and looked up at the stars. My eyes fixed upon an old familiar constellation that always seemed to free the night over Williamsburg and Yorktown."

Hayes' body was incinerated on Formosa in January 1945.

The principle laid down by military writers, that an army advancing far from home should establish a second base near the scene of operations, on the same principles that determine the character of the first, and with sure communications knitting the two together, holds good here; only it must be remembered that secure communications at sea mean naval preponderance, especially if the distance between the home and the advanced bases be great.

Naval Strategy
A. T. Mahan (1911)
Little, Brown (1918), p. 200

Jon Oliver

IN MY VIEW . . .

Who Makes War?

Sir,

This is in reference to the article in the Summer 1989 issue of the *Naval War College Review* by David L. Hall, "The Constitution and Presidential War Making against Libya."

The author neglects some early occasions when Congress, while not "declaring war," did authorize the President to use armed force. He quotes Secretary of War McHenry advising President Adams to resort to "qualified hostility" with France (p. 35) and leaves the impression that the President did so on his own authority. Actually, Congress, by act of 28 May 1798, permitted the President to employ the navy to capture armed French vessels operating along the coast with designs on American shipping. Then, on 9 July, Congress approved the capture of French armed vessels anywhere, by warships or privateers, which the President was authorized to commission.

Another early occasion involved problems with the Barbary states. President Jefferson, in his annual message of 8 December 1801, emphasized trouble with Tripoli and the inability to exploit naval superiority. "The legislature," he said, "will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our forces on an equal footing with that of the adversaries." Six days later Representative Samuel Smith, brother of the Secretary of the Navy, offered a resolution to empower the President "by law, further and more effectually to protect the commerce of the United States against the Barbary Powers." Following considerable debate, the "Act for the protection of the commerce and seamen of the United States Against the Tripolitan Cruisers" became effective on 6 February 1802. The President now could use force to protect commerce, commission privateers, and allow the taking of prizes.

Raymond G. O'Connor
Aptos, California

Science: Antarctica's Most Visible Export

Sir,

With the probable review of the Antarctic Treaty a year away (1991), Professor Joyner's discussion (Autumn 1989 *Review*) of the potential for disruption of the nonmilitarization of the Antarctic is very timely. The outcome of this year's meetings on mineral resource issues indicates that there is a serious potential for economic resource matters in the Antarctic to become divisive in the next few years.

Professor Joyner's discussion of the nonmilitarization of the Antarctic might have been stronger had he taken greater note of the International Geophysical Year (1955-56) and the role of the Antarctic as a unique scientific laboratory. I think it may be argued that the international success of the IGY and the desire to continue an environment conducive to the valuable scientific research done in the Antarctic were important factors in the establishment of the treaty.

In any event, science is what the white continent has been about, and science continues to be its most visible export. Some might argue that scientific research is merely a public patina for geopolitics. However, if that were the case, the American research program there would be much smaller than it is.

One might also note that at the time the treaty was written, the Antarctic had not much strategic significance. Thus, it was not difficult for the treaty nations to forgo doing what they really had no immediate intention of doing—militarizing the continent. The needs of the scientific community for a condominium working environment were a natural basis for nonmilitarization.

In discussing the role of Article VII of the treaty, which provides for unannounced onsite inspections, Professor Joyner might have noted the half dozen or so times that such inspections have been done. The United States has conducted onsite inspections at research stations across and around the continent. (This writer was a member of three of those inspection teams.) The inspection clause is more than a good wish; it has been used to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to include verification in nonmilitarization agreements. The onsite inspections have shown that such activities can be conducted without undue interference with legitimate activities.

The significance of these onsite inspections lies in their impact on thinking and planning for more extensive arms limitation arrangements in Europe. In this sense, the thirty-year success of the Antarctic Treaty may extend well beyond its continental limits.

Frank C. Mahncke
Washington, D.C.

A Rich Literature for the Tapping

Sir,

Professor Brennan's article in the Autumn 1989 *Review* repeats many of the problems raised, and methodologies attempted, in teaching legal ethics (or Professional Responsibility, as it is now titled) in the law schools.

While once taught at Wake Forest as a one-semester-hour course in the first year of a three-year curriculum, Professional Responsibility was relegated to a third-year graduation requirement with precisely the same result Professor Brennan describes. Now it is available as a second or third-year course credited at two hours, with higher interest because of practical use in cliuic courses, i.e., those courses in which students are paired with practitioners in actual cases. Moreover, our students have become more interested in values and ethies because of media presenration such as *L.A. Law*, the Watergate scandals, and a grass-roots feeling, that I have perceived, that life is not value-free. Interest has also been heightened because of state and federal courts' and legislatures' adoption of rules punishing lawyers for filing frivolous claims or defenses to claims. While a single instance of deliberate or grossly negligent conduct usually does not trigger professional sanctions from a lawyer licensing agency, e.g., the State Bar, a pattern of such misbehavior will, and the offending counselor may have to pay stiff fines for each, not to mention the possibility of claims from clients. Finally, most states now impose the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination as part of the bar examination process before admission to practice. Other states integrate ethics issues into the basic bar examination.

The current trend is the pervasive approach, pioneered by Vanderbilt University in the 1960s, in which ethics problems are dropped into traditional courses, e.g., discussion of ethical aspects of frivolous filings in a litigation class, or conflicts of interest in property transactions or family law courses. Most law schools cap this off with a second or third-year Professional Responsibility course as Wake Forest does.

We have found that the subject is better taught through emphasis on practical settings for what may be viewed as "theoretical" problems, even if these are only mentioned in the freestanding professional responsibility course. In my Civil Procedure course, dealing with litigation problems, adding ethics components makes an interesting spectrum, running from what the court or client will do to a lawyer as sanctions in the case, or in a malpractice suit, to what will happen to the lawyer in terms of licensure.

Much of the above is reflective of the Wake Forest University Law School experience, and other law schools have employed different curriculum methods. The point is that a rich literature in eithics education for legal professionals exists and might be tapped, not so much for the rules but for tbe concepts and methodologies, for education in ethics for the military.

George K. Walker
Professor of Law
Wake Forest University

PROFESSIONAL READING



"The main strategic aim of the 'maritime alliance' must be to keep Russia in the landlocked position that has always handicapped her. This means commanding the sea-lanes of the world, notably the chokepoints through which not only Russian but most major shipping must pass."

John B. Hattendorf

Palmer, Michael A. *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade.* Contributions to Naval History . . . No. 1. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1988. 129pp. $7.50

Michael Palmer's short study is an important and welcome addition to the literature, not only for the subject it examines, but as the first work in what one hopes will be an important, continuing series of studies in naval history.

The title suggests the immediacy of current events in the 1987-88 period when Palmer wrote the study; as time passes on and those issues fade, the subtitle will provide the more valuable guide to his subject. It is an important and relevant point that there are similarities in thought between strategic thinking in the 1980s and in the 1946-54 period. It is important to understand that the ideas expressed in the 1980s reflected many earlier ideas about the importance of Nato Europe in American naval planning, the role of peacetime forward operations for protection of American national interests, and the need for a balanced fleet prepared for a full range of contingencies.

However, one could well argue that these ideas were not merely the extended origins of the Maritime Strategy announced by Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins, but ideas that reflected the thought of classical naval theorists and the earlier practice of Great Britain as a global naval power.

Dr. John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College.

Be that as it may, one can congratulate the Naval Historical Center for producing a work that is equally attractive to the academic scholar and to current policymakers and planners.

Palmer's study is an important authoritative, official history based on recently declassified documents. It is one of only a handful of serious scholarly contributions to understanding American naval issues in the postwar period.

Tracing the development of U.S. naval thinking in the late 1940s as it adapted to American involvement in Nato, Palmer demonstrates Admiral Forrest Sherman's key role from 1946-47 as DCNO for operations and as CNO from 1949-51. Sherman's strategic concept stressed the central role of the carrier task force as the key element for its missions in antisubmarine warfare, amphibious operations and air strikes ashore. It provided balance and direction to the various naval forces, missions and priorities. While not trying to seek wide public support, Sherman did try to formulate a strategic concept that was independent of the war plans. He saw, too, the need to improve strategic thought within the navy, and supported the role of the Naval War College for this purpose.

In particular, Sherman was instrumental in placing the Nato command structure in the Mediterranean on a firm footing and he emphasized the importance of that sea in naval strategic thinking. Upon Sherman's death in 1951, the navy had a coherent strategic concept and began to think seriously about operations on both flanks of Nato's central front. By 1953, using Sherman's theory as a basis, naval strategists moved on to consider seriously possible wartime operations in the Norwegian and Barents Sea areas.

By 1957, following changes of leadership and emphasis, Sherman's strategic plan had become so diffuse that it was no longer recognizable. Under Eisenhower, the navy was unable to continue to develop a concept separate from those created by the Joint Staff. The navy's separate concept was the victim of the 1953 DoD Reorganization Act which weakened the influence of the individual services. At the same time, new technological advances in Sosus, the development of the SSBN, and a changing strategic situation in Asia, as well as Eisenhower's emphasis on nuclear weapons as an economical alternative to conventional forces altered the basis for Sherman's concept.

Palmer's comparison of Sherman's strategy of 1946-54 with that developed in the 1970s is a very useful one. One cannot help but see the striking similarities and note both the strength of Sherman's concepts and the reasons for their disappearance. Palmer clearly makes his point in emphasizing Sherman's thoughts on forward peacetime operations: a balanced fleet prepared for global nuclear war during routine presence deployments, serving as both a visible deterrent to potential enemies and a clear commitment to allies. Pounding home his parallel to the 1980s, Palmer even goes on to stress Sherman's interest in the Norwegian Sea and to publish as an appendix Sherman's briefing of his ideas to President Truman.

The similarities are indeed striking, making it particularly worthwhile reading for modern naval strategists. Palmer ends his history on a note of sadness for "a strategy lost." Yet this is misleading. A strategy by definition is not something permanent. It should change as situations change and it should be lost when it no longer can achieve the desired goals with the means available. More interestingly, one might want to ask whether the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 will not be more important than the 1953 Act in its effect on separate service thinking about strategy. Its fundamental thrust seems to be to stop independent service thinking such as Sherman's and that done in the 1980s. If that is the case, it would be useful to examine positive historical examples of the navy's cooperative effort in joint planning, showing how each service's roles and missions can be effectively used jointly in a national strategy. It would be sad for the navy, if the situation has changed, merely to pine away in sorrow for a bye-gone method. There is more to be learned from a close examination of this example.

Captain Wayne Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

Keegan, John. *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare.* New York: Viking Penguin, 1989. 292pp. $21.95

The Price of Admiralty, John Keegan's latest endeavor, is a maritime companion to his best-selling, *The Face of Battle.* Paralleling his earlier book, *The Price of Admiralty* fulfills the promise of the subtitle, *The Evolution of Naval Warfare*, with a series of four, chapter-long vignettes that promise the essence of naval combat: the evolution of tactics and technology; the strategic setting; the personalities of the commanders; and the naval societies of the fighting men they lead. This talented author has vividly depicted the battle scenes and has included a few charts and illustrations.

Keegan chose for his subjects, Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway, and the Battle of the Atlantic. The periods of action are the age of fighting sail, the age of the big gun, and two manifestations of sea war at this century's midpassage, the carrier battles and a submarine campaign. His narrative on World War II leads to some prognostication in the concluding chapter.

How well does Keegan fulfill his self-appointed purpose? He does not paint war at sea with the bold strokes we saw in *The Face of Battle.* This is because

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Keegan is basically a landlubber and not always comfortable with the language of the sailor. For instance, in the narration of the storm after the Battle of Trafalgar, three times in one paragraph we find ships that, rather than having run aground, "went ashore"; Jellicoe's warships at Jutland in 1916 are called "ironclads."

Keegan's failing (I do not mean to say failure) is partly a lack of confidence, in contrast to his evident self-assurance when dealing with ground warfare. But the failing is almost a virtue. An insecure author is a cautious author. It is as if that trait of stolid conservatism for which navy men are universally condemned has infected Keegan. Doubtless because of his prestige this book will sell and be widely read. If so, we, the navy family, may rest easy. He finds a few black sheep (speaking both of men and of their ideas and ideals), but by and large we are a noble breed. When Keegan scratches beneath the veneer, which is his intent, he finds many heroes and few villains.

And there are nice touches. Keegan has an acute sense of the importance of search, sighting and signalling. He also understands the first responsibility of a commander as one of keeping control: elegant tactics are simple tactics. Like Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, he cites the similarity between a warship and a tank: "The British . . . perceived that the means of breaking the stalemate [in World War I] lay in the construction of a machine which would combine the qualities of manoeuvre and firepower within itself. They characterized this conception as a 'landship' and only later, when a prototype had actually been built, christened it a tank." And like Fiske, he contrasts the firepower of a fleet with that of an army in a neat paragraph that concludes, "in brief, six times as many guns, of much heavier calibre, could be transported daily by Nelson's fleet as by Napoleon's army, at one-fifth of the logistic cost and at five times the speed."

And this about Jutland: "The Grand Fleet may have appeared in the years between 1914 and 1916 to be the largest embodiment of naval strength, [but] it was a pyramid of naval power trembling on its apex." Or this about Midway: "At 1025 Nagumo stood poised on the brink of perhaps the greatest naval victory ever promised an admiral, certain to be spectacular in itself and destined to alter the balance of power between the Western and Asian world for decades to come. At 1030 he confronted not victory but disaster."

Keegan respects the great tactical skill of the Japanese Navy in World War II. He also helps along a reappraisal of the quality of Japanese warships and aircraft, to give them their due. Regarding the Atlantic convoy sea lanes, the ruthlessness of the German U-boat skippers, as opposed to their devotion to duty, is given more weight than seems fitting from an author who emphasizes the violence of war, but U-boat sailors justly receive his accolades for courage and endurance to the bitter end. Hatred and contempt for the enemy are not in Keegan's makeup.

This book is the result of cautious competence toward the great issues of naval history. *The Price of Admiralty* is conventional wisdom, well expressed. For my taste, Keegan's portraiture of battle, like Bruce Catton's, is rounded out with quotes from too many letters and diaries from just plain John Does. It smacks of TV interviews after the disaster. But his is the equal of the stuff I still enjoy in Fletcher Pratt's works, Ernest Hemingway's anthology, *Men At War*, and Hanson W. Baldwin's *Sea Fights and Shipwrecks*.

Former Secretary Lehman wrote a more laudatory review in the *Wall Street Journal* about a less well executed book, Barbara Tuchman's *The First Salute*. I think Mr. Lehman was kind because the thesis of Tuchman's book is that sea power matters and is too lightly regarded. Keegan has given lay readers a fair sense of sea war as at once majestic and miserable, and if I were reviewing for *The New York Times* instead of for the naval community my praise would be less stinting.

Here and there Keegan strays about twenty degrees off course, and I want to show why that is important. He closes the book with a forecast of the capital ship of the future. First he gives us a limited choice between carrier and submarine and then casts his lot with the submarine with the belief that nothing on the surface will survive missile and torpedo attacks in the future. Hence, the title of the last chapter, "The Empty Ocean." But the title identifies the flaw: an empty ocean is intolerable to the United States, Japan, Nato and to the oil rich states of Southwest Asia. Submarines can take away but cannot provide. Something must protect shipping and Marines. Keegan writes that submarines have communications problems, but he does not say that communications for mutual support and concerted action are woven into the very essence and character of both capital ships and the escorts of ships which must ply their trade. A naval policy that is only twenty degrees off course is dangerously off course. Sooner or later its ships will have "went ashore," like the *Exxon Valdez* did last year off Alaska, or the flush deckers that smashed into Point Arguello in 1923. Naval policy must be better than that.

Rabinovich, Abraham. *The Boats of Cherbourg*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 306pp. $18.95

The Boats of Cherbourg is so well written that the reader easily becomes witness to events of spell-binding international intrigue. Traveling from Cherbourg and Europe, via the Mediterranean Sea to Israel and the Middle East, one finds a route replete with captivating accounts of the activities surrounding the central issue of this book: The escape from France of the German-designed, French-built "Saar" missile boats that became capital ships of

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the Israeli Navy. The author explores the events of this operation with admirable detail. Moreover, he has made clear the impact of these boats upon present-day naval warfare.

Mr. Rabinovich is a senior feature writer for the *Jerusalem Post*. He claims access to hitherto highly classified information provided by the Israeli Navy and military industries, in addition to previously untapped sources in France.

On 21 October 1967, the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* was sunk by a salvo of missiles fired by Egyptian missile boats. For the first time in history, a naval vessel was destroyed by surface-to-surface missiles fired from a small, high-speed vessel by crewmen viewing their target solely on a radar screen. Three of the four missiles fired hit their target. The fourth missed only because there was not enough of the *Eilat* remaining above the surface.

The concept of missile boats was introduced by the Soviets in the 1950s. Their first missiles, the Scrubber and Styx, were carried on board Komar and Osa-class boats. These boats were to counter any possible approach to the Soviet Union by an American carrier task force, whose likely intent would be strikes on the Soviet homeland; they were to serve as an interim deterrent until a Soviet navy buildup occurred.

In 1962 Komars were exported to Cuba and Egypt, attracting the immediate attention of both the United States and Israel, respectively. At the same time, the Israeli Navy needed a multipurpose craft capable of taking on destroyers and subs, and for both extended operations at sea and close-in shore bombardment. The solution proved to be the French-built missile boats with homemade Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles. Israel gambled the future security of its sea frontier and maritime lifeline on twelve of these boats. By December 1968 the Amiot shipyard in Cherbourg had delivered five of the twelve ordered. Two additional boats were prematurely sailed from the shipyard by an anxious Israeli Navy to avoid an anticipated French embargo on further delivery of military equipment to Middle Eastern countries during a period of increasing tension.

However, the remaining five boats that were ordered ultimately became entangled in the embargo. It took a fascinating Israeli scheme of international hoodwinking to extricate these boats from Cherbourg and deliver them to Israel. The risks taken to remove the boats from France were far exceeded by their future value to the Israeli Navy. Even by itself, this element of the story more than justifies the reader's investment.

The reader is left to decide for himself whether or not to praise or condemn the "rescue" mission. However, each nation will do what it must to ensure its survival, and this was merely an example of Israel doing exactly that.

The last part of the book is the most interesting from the oper-

ational and tactical points of view. The author recounts the invaluable role these boats played in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Although the ground and air battles have been well publicized, very little was reported on the naval engagements. This book accomplishes that task.

The Israelis were able to score unparalleled victories against both the Egyptians and Syrians with the boats of Cherbourg, armed with Gabriel missiles, 76-mm guns and electronic umbrella chaff systems. The EW system on board the boats performed perfectly against fifty-four Soviet missile challenges.

Making the best of the most important principle of warfare, surprise, the Israelis were able to forestall any challenge to their maritime well-being.

Rabinovich also offers an interesting discussion of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and Sovmedron roles during the 1973 war.

I highly recommend *The Boats of Cherbourg*. International mystery and invaluable examples of creative strategies and tactics combine to make this book well worth the investment in time.

WILLIAM SHORT
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Hill, J. R., Rear Admiral, Royal Navy. *Arms Control at Sea*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 229pp. $27.95

Until recently, little had been written on the naval aspects of arms control. Now the subject seems to be all the rage. A growing collection of material gives testimony to the amount of attention being paid to a wide range of proposals to reduce the inventories, operations and weaponry of naval forces.

The Soviet Union, especially under Gorbachev, has dedicated a large public relations offensive to the goal of cutting naval arms. In over 20 major public policy addresses in the past two years alone, Soviet leaders have made specific proposals to cut naval forces. Their list is all-encompassing, aimed at specific limits, such as the number of ships in the Mediterranean, ceilings on ship construction and establishing "zones of peace" which would prohibit the presence of warships.

In *Arms Control at Sea*, Rear Admiral J. R. Hill (Royal Navy, retired) has produced a complete review of this important and timely topic. He presents not only a framework to understand the modalities of naval arms control, but a critical assessment of what may be at stake. Admiral Hill is now editor of *The Naval Review*, and recently wrote another Naval Institute book, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*. *Arms Control at Sea* deserves serious consideration, not just because of the author's naval credentials, but because it is the first volume dedicated to this subject.

Admiral Hill emphasizes the influence of international law. Multilateral agreements (such as the

1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga that established a South Pacific nuclear-free zone) can constrain the movement or construction of warships. Bilateral accords (such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea—commonly called INCSEA—between the United States and the U.S.S.R.) can result in establishing boundaries to avoid misunderstandings between vessels exercising their rights on the high seas. Admiral Hill's full coverage of related international accords is informative for those who desire a brief summary of key international treaties and their relation to naval matters.

The author's explanation of the types of limits gets to the crux of the issue. He presents basically three broad categories: structural limits (on construction of ships, aircraft, and weapon systems); operational limits (on how or where ships may sail); and confidence-building measures. Structural limits could take such forms as specifying the number of hulls to achieve the desired symmetrical or asymmetrical force levels, capping strategic nuclear weapons or the platforms that carry them (e.g., START), removing tactical nuclear weapons from ships, restricting the unrefueled radius of operations of ships to keep them within homewaters, and eliminating bases in foreign lands.

Operational limits could include agreements to establish sanctuaries for SSBN's, the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones or "zones of peace" restricting the presence in specified places of ships and aircraft, or cutting back the development of ASW techonology.

The third category, confidence-building measures, includes steps to reduce the outbreak of violence due to misunderstandings between opponents. An example of such a measure is the 1963 Hot Line agreement.

This groundwork is useful, but the main question needing an answer is: Will limiting naval arms contribute to security? Admiral Hill's answer is an elegant yet resounding "no." "Some of my more disarming colleagues," he says, "will no doubt say that this book ought to be called *No Arms Control at Sea.*"

But, he says, submarines are the most destabilizing of naval systems and should be prime candidates for confidence building. They are "weapons of stealth" that "pose a hidden or a half-hidden threat of escalation . . . to attack without warning or pity," and all parties might consider restraining their use in time of crisis.

Among structural limits, he offers tactical nuclear weapons at sea as prime candidates. In his judgment, their deterrent purpose and use in the U.S. and Soviet navies are ill-defined, and there is over-provision on both sides by "any reasonable standard." Clearly controversial, his thoughts on tactical nuclear weapons make a valuable contribution to policy discussions over the verification and limitation of sea-launched cruise missiles.

As specific confidence-building measures that may actually help reduce tension and suspicion, Admiral Hill offers advance notification of naval exercises, the delineation of exercise areas, and the presence of observers. He feels that an atmosphere of confidence would be helped by a more "measured" explanation of the U.S. Navy's 1986 Maritime Strategy and less emphasis on its "gung-ho" offensive nature.

Admiral Hill concludes, however, that the control or limitation of naval armaments is not the main issue, but really a diversion. First of all, the arbitrary removal or limitation on numbers of naval forces would be highly difficult to put into effect. Secondly, and most importantly, such limits would not contribute to security. If naval forces did not exist, Hill states, "some other means would have to be found to settle disputes." In fact, history suggests that the presence of maritime forces has actually contributed to the containable and nonescalatory resolution of crises.

Some criticisms are in order. This book is not very readable. The indirect style makes it difficult to grasp the message the first time around.

Secondly, an American audience will not find in Hill's analysis the most important current issue, namely, the impact and meaning of Gorbachev's "smile diplomacy" and the superpower debate over naval forces in arms negotiations.

Thirdly, while the book's consideration of all naval powers, especially France and Britain, provides a broad perspective, it makes Hill's text sound a little like *Arms Control for Medium Powers*. The focus of attention in arms control must always be on the biggest guys on the block and what their decisions imply for the global military balance.

Nonetheless, *Arms Control at Sea* provides an excellent gauge with which to measure the progress of this debate. As Gorbachev pursues his agenda and offers more and more tempting proposals—and as START and other arms negotiations gain momentum—an understanding of the pros and cons of naval arms limitations will be of increasing importance to all of us.

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Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. *Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. 203pp. $32

Van Cleave, William R. and Cohen, S.T. *Nuclear Weapons, Policies and the Test Ban Issue*. New York: Praeger, 1987. 104pp. $35

It is often recalled that the celebration of apparent triumph should be tempered with caution. In the triumphs of the ancient Roman conquerors, a dwarf was specifically assigned to ride beside the great hero, whispering of his mortality. In this way, the exultant leader would not be swept by the euphoria of the

moment into believing that he was immortal, or his great deed irreversible. Considering the apparent success of the INF Treaty and the stated willingness of the current Soviet regime to consider meaningful arms control, it is important that potential national security decision makers receive similar periodic warnings concerning the permanence or effectiveness of arms control agreements. Following SALT I we learned it is easy to be led by the euphoria of the moment into believing that there has been a profound change in the effectiveness of agreements.

Although written prior to the INF agreement and the gathering momentum of *glasnost*, these two books play the important role of skeptical counsel. Each explores a particular aspect of the dilemma inherent in American-Soviet negotiations: how to get a totalitarian state with an expansionist ideology to respect treaty restraints on its military development. The effects of the political asymmetries are compounded by ideological and technical factors often overlooked by optimistic advocates of arms control. While the ideological factor is the focus of Dr. Douglass's study of Soviet arms control strategy, the team of Van Cleave and Cohen explicates and simplifies the technical aspects of the most persistent arms control proposal. Both volumes are well researched, logically argued and persuasive.

Since Leninist ideology has always condoned cheating the bourgeoisie, the answer to Joseph Douglass's title is obvious. The Soviets "cheat" because they consider such action as a significant element of their diplomacy. It is not only condoned, it is required. Under Leninist ethics, any act that undermines the capitalists and advances Soviet control is necessarily moral. Mix this code of un-ethics with the passion for deception and intrigue that pervades the Russian tradition, and the greater question becomes: Why does the Soviet government cheat *in*consistently? According to Douglass's research, which relies on interviews with Soviet emigrés, Soviet restraint is due to a combination of caution and calculation. The Soviets plan to take advantage of Western faith in the sanctity of treaties. However, having learned from experience, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the Communist Party knows exactly how far to push.

Douglass's emigrés know the Communist Party, since they are former members of high standing, and willing participants in deceptive actions. Universally they agree that the Soviet regime has developed an active plan to distort, defy, or simply disregard arms control treaties to which the West will continue to adhere. What surprises these witnesses is not that the Soviets place so little faith in treaties, but that the Western alliance refuses to countenance the possibility that it is being misled.

Exploring the clues and impressions of the former cadres, Douglass finds that *all* the paths of Soviet logic

return to ideology and that the ideology simply cannot withstand equitable, lasting agreements with democratic states. In response to calls to reduce defense expenditures due to the utter improbability of an American attack, a Soviet General responded "If we accept your theory, where is the basis of our ideology and propoganda?" Douglass concludes that the Soviets must cheat to demonstrate support for the Leninist ideology of continuous conflict with the capitalists. And without that ideological base, there is no legitimacy for the one-party state.

Under such logic, Douglass can provide few recommendations for Western diplomats except to expect the Soviet regime to violate any agreement that cannot be enforced by strenuous sanctions. Douglass's call is for "safe" arms control—agreements whose violation would not place Western defenses in jeopardy. However, the book is more basic research than policy pronouncement. Based on a study originally compiled for the U.S. government, the work allows decision makers—and readers—to draw their own conclusions. Retaining a portion of its governmental study format, the book concludes with a risk assessment for future policy decisions and five supporting appendices from corroborating experts.

William Van Cleave was the only expert to testify against the SALT I Treaty during the euphoric days of its ratification hearings, so it is not surprising that his study finds considerable flaws with the ongoing proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. His collaborator, physicist Samuel Cohen, is frequently referred to as the "father of the neutron bomb," having played a major role in designing the weapon President Carter was pressured into discarding. Despite holding what might be considered "hawkish credentials," the authors have produced a balanced study that carefully outlines the advantages of continuing a modest test program for nuclear weapons. Even a committed advocate of arms control (as opposed to disarmament—a much different objective) would find portions of their argument persuasive. The guiding assumption is that despite the rhetoric of conventional modernization, Nato will continue to rely on theater nuclear forces to deter war. It would be irresponsible, the authors argue, to rely on an aging, untested deterrent. With a total ban on nuclear testing, the deterrent effect of Nato's nuclear weapons will eventually erode as probable opponents find the threat of using untested, possibly unreactive weapons less than convincing.

Supporters of the concept of mutual assured destruction might argue that any nuke—whether aged or untested—would prove a sufficient disincentive towards war. However, as Van Cleave and Cohen point out, the technical challenges of detecting very low-order nuclear detonations—tests sufficient for modernization, but difficult to distinguish from seismic

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phenomena such as earthquakes—are such to tempt determined violations. Since the Soviet Union remains a closed society, especially in the realm of weapon development, the possibility of "cheating" is largely one-sided. If one party continues to modernize its arsenal while the other eschews testing, the eventual outcome is a destabilizing advantage that would make aggressive action more likely. Van Cleave and Cohen cite reports indicating that the Soviets may have already violated the 150-kiloton limit of the current Threshold Test Ban Treaty, an unratified yet presumably mutually observed agreement. Even an organized on-site inspection program would have difficulty detecting a well-planned series of tests.

While Van Cleave and Cohen conclude with the same pessimism of the Douglass study, they recognize the power of arms control euphoria to ignore the likelihood of violation. They also recognize the role of skeptical counsel as a lonely one.

Summing the ideological objectives identified by Douglass with the technical objections elucidated by Van Cleave and Cohen, the open-minded reader may be converted to caution. Converted or not, readers of both books will come away with a greater understanding of the complexity of arms control: a complexity that dispels the euphoria of a momentary success.

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Nelson, Ronald R., and Schweizer, Peter. *The Soviet Concepts of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence and Detente.* Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1988. 193pp. $14.50

What do Soviet leaders *really* want? Beneath the protective veneer of censorship and propaganda, what long-term goals explain Soviet behavior in world affairs?

Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer answer such questions by letting the Soviets speak for themselves through representative quotations from over 350 articles and books by Soviet spokesmen, from 1972 to early 1987. They reject the view that the Soviets are mere cynics, proceeding instead on the assumption that some hard, ideological core of shared beliefs must give shape and substance to Muscovite public statements.

Again and again, Nelson and Schweizer document the Soviet assertion that the expansion of socialism brings peace, while the defense of capitalism causes war. Thus, "peace requires the extinction of capitalism and the class system on which it is based." Soviet authorities attribute détente between these two rival systems to the rising might of the Soviet bloc—rather than to Western goodwill or a mutual desire for peace—and they proclaim that a major goal of "peaceful coexistence" is to assist the national liberation movement and all other forms of the world revolutionary process.

Nelson and Schweizer do cite a few cases in which especially anti-

Western themes have disappeared or diminished since Gorbachev's rise to power. They see such changes as more stylistic than substantive, however. They assert that there is no reason for the Soviets to modify or scrap their concept of peaceful coexistence, since it "has, after all, served them very well."

Some Soviet citizens would disagree. They would cite the sorry state of the Soviet economy and the heavy burden of Soviet-funded wars in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Kampuchea, let alone the protracted combat in Afghanistan. Indeed, strikers and demonstrators from the Baltic to the Caucasus are making demands and dredging up painful memories that discredit Soviet policy all the way back to Stalin and Lenin. Very strange things are being said in the Soviet Union these days, thanks to Gorbachev's relaxation of censorship. The impact of such grumblings on Soviet foreign policy is far from clear, of course, and Gorbachev's "reforms" are subject to all sorts of limitations, revisions, and reversals. Even so, this reviewer suspects that the unanimity of opinion documented by this study may deteriorate over the next few years.

Nelson and Schweizer address the right subjects at the right time. They examine foreign policy during an era when Western public attention is riveted on Soviet domestic policy. They stress issues on which they find broad, long-term agreement among Soviet elite groups, while our media focus on narrow, short-term disagreements. Perhaps most importantly, they find evidence of bitter hostility toward the West, which contrasts sharply with current Soviet smiles and assurances of good will.

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Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Fate of Nations*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988. 415pp. Hardcover $39.50; softcover, $13.95

The Fate of Nations is an analytical study based on six cases and designed to present the basic varieties of security policies that are possible in the state system. Mandelbaum analyzes first what he calls the "managed" balance of power system of the nineteenth century (starring Great Britain), proceeds to France (1919-40), then to the United States after World War II, and to China, Israel, and Japan for roughly the same period.

The author explains that he has chosen these six states to illustrate the different degrees of national power and the different problems in national security. For example, he argues that Britain benefited without undue effort from the collective security system then in effect, much the same as Japan benefits from today's international economic system. For China, he examines the "strategies of weakness" and for Israel the "hard choices of the security dilemma." French policy is

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characterized as "the failure of security policy."

Mandelbaum ranges widely, including much on international economic theory as well as game theory. His basic proposition is that state behavior can be understood better by observing the international situation than by any "inside-out" explanations. Nevertheless, he devotes a good deal of time to internal phenomena before he is finished.

The author's previous books have concentrated on the nuclear field. This is his first venture into a general treatise on international relations. There is much in it which is stimulating, and the book rarely drags. It is much more useful on the post-World War II era than on the earlier periods because the author is more familiar with the later period. In the first hundred pages there are some minor factual errors. For example, the author states that the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Pact "left open the question of whether Poland would remain independent." But paragraph two of the secret protocol specifically says, "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the sphere of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San." As the author states, he relies on secondary sources, but he also uses more recent ones, not listing some of the old classics like Langer. That may account for his conviction that Germany was *most* responsible for World War I (which seriously understates or ignores Austria-Hungary's increasingly untenable position).

The chapter on Israel is a very strong analysis, excellently done. It covers from 1948 to 1979 and is focused on Israel's "security dilemma." Mandelbaum relates very well the painful series of choices Israel faced as it traded land for promises. It is to be regretted that Mandelbaum did not cover Israel to the present, since its dilemma has surely become more acute as the influence of the PLO and West Bank unrest has increased.

The treatment of Japan is also first-rate. All of the chapters covering the post-World War II period are very good. However, the book as a whole is considerably repetitious due to its structure—its mixture of facts and analyses for roughly contemporary foreign policies. It might have helped to put a succinct history of the postwar period up front. The book would have also benefited from a concluding chapter, to sum up.

Despite its minor flaws, the book displays a powerful analytic ability and is well worth reading.

This reviewer's copy was bound without pages 179 to 210 (but with two copies of pages 211 to 242). Buyers will want to check this out.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
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Lord, Carnes. *The Presidency and the Management of National Security.* New York: The Free Press, 1988. 207pp. $22.50

Encouraged by the double whammy of Irangate and the presidential transition, an unprecedented flood of publications about the National Security Council has arrived. Many do not go beyond rehashing the problems of Iran-Contra and fail to create a context worthy of serious study. Some have titles suggesting serious treatment but turn out to be kiss-and-tell pieces with a singularly myopic vision of the NSC. (*Inside the NSC* by Constantine Menges is one of these.) Carnes Lord, on the other hand, has set his sights much higher—a serious study of the NSC in the largest possible political and policy context. In this short book (175 pages plus 22 pages of notes), he addresses almost every issue that could be raised and provides recommended solutions for most. This is an important and possibly landmark work.

As a former NSC staffer in the early Reagan years, Lord is not without a point of view. While talking the scholarly high road, he makes clear that he is highly skeptical of the capabilities, and hence proper role, of military and foreign service officers. Although his call for equal attention to civilian control of the foreign service will be applauded by many professional military officers, the recurring allusions to "politicals" battling "careerists" reflect a distinctly Reagan-era ideological bias. In my experience, that was simply not a useful distinction in predicting staff competence. That said, Lord is on solid ground in titling his first chapter "The Presidency and the Problem of Bureaucracy." To fail to understand and deal with the institutional dimension of power in Washington is to miss the point, and Lord's emphasis on the pervasive importance of bureaucratic culture is a major strength of this work.

Lord's strength is the richness of his thinking on the nature of policy development. Using an elegant turn of phrase, he breaks this process into strategic planning, the catalyzing of decision, and the management of decision, and deals at length with each. His major thesis, with which I completely agree, is that the primary focus of the President should be to give strategic direction to the bureaucracy. Lord notes that "Policy devolves to the operational level only through a failure to capture it at the level of strategy," and he argues that the NSC staff should assert dominance over strategic planning. With better strategic planning, there is less need for the NSC staff to dabble in "tactics," and the tensions between the NSC staff and the implementing agencies can be reduced. Thus his "single most important innovation" would be to create a separate planning element within the NSC staff, with responsibility for strategic intelligence, net assessment, long-range planning, short-range and crisis planning, economic and resource planning and writing (!) In his view, this NSC

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element would cut across all areas, including planning for general war and the military and economic aspects of crisis and contingency planning. The speech-writing function is interesting and recognizes the reality that a presidential speech is a strategic document and frequently is the most effective vehicle for integrating differing institutional and policy perspectives into a larger whole.

One of Lord's most interesting (and controversial) ideas is that of restructuring the relationship between the field elements of the military and the State Department. As he correctly points out, there is no diplomatic counterpart to the military CINC, regional coordination being accomplished in the State Department in Washington. Lord would fix this by double-hatting selected ambassadors and giving them a more direct role in coordinating political-military matters on a regional basis, in concert with a restructured NSC staff. He has equally grand ideas to fix the over-concentration of power in the State regional bureaus and the weakness of the planning function in DoD—ideas which cannot be readily summarized but which raise fundamental issues. His suggestions of roles for the Vice President, particularly a strengthened role in reaching out to Congress and as a special troubleshooter in managing cabinet-level tensions, are highly innovative.

Although Lord recognizes the executive-congressional relationship as in need of repair, his heart does not appear to be in addressing this issue, and he touches too lightly on the problem of congressional committee fragmentation that works against the integrating power of the President. He alludes to the (Tower board) recommendation to create a joint intelligence committee as a way of reducing leaks, but he ignores the fundamental recommendation (made elsewhere) that Congress be selectively invited into the NSC process. Congress could create a joint national security committee consisting of the majority and minority leadership of both House and Senate and their key committees. Such a group could be invited to meet with the President and NSC principals, with a view toward sharing the most sensitive issues and understanding the likely reaction of the Congress before final presidential decisions are made. No matter how good the planning, national security policy cannot be implemented if it is not sustained by the Congress, and fixing this has to be NSC agenda item one.

Carnes Lord has done a major piece of scholarly work that deserves more attention than it has received to date. He covers a great range of topics, but this must be done if the full scope of NSC responsibility is to be understood. His solutions need to be tailored to the specific personalities of a new administration, but the concepts he outlines ought to be taken into account. In particular, Lord's concept of the supremacy of strategic planning needs to be seriously considered, even if the

bureaucratic device of a separate planning staff is not adopted. This is a book full of ideas and will be of interest to anyone interested in the realities of the national security decision-making process.

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Holland, Harrison M. *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma.* Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1988. 154pp. $26

This is a valuable but highly specialized book. Unlike most books or articles on Japanese security, it is much less concerned with grand strategy and broad policy options than it is with the bureaucratic nuts and bolts. Its chapter headings reflect this focus: defense organization, defense operations, the defense program outline (*taiko*) and planning estimate (*chugyo*), the budget process, and a case study of the FY 1985 defense budget. These, plus equally useful appendices that provide a small cross-section of basic documents, make the book worth reading.

The problem is that its audience is probably quite limited. Those scholars and officials who specialize in Japanese defense affairs should be familiar with its fundamental information and positions. Those who are anxious for a primer on Japanese security will almost certainly find this book too advanced and specialized. That audience might wish the book had a subtitle warning them: "More than you ever wanted to know about the inner workings, procedures, and regulations of the Japanese defense community." Perhaps the most appropriate readers are non-Japan specialist defense-oriented scholars, officials and military officers who want to broaden their horizons and develop a "Japan expert's" expertise. It is recommended for that audience as background reading.

It could be recommended less equivocally, were it more timely. Based on research, interviews, and a conference conducted in 1984-85, it was not published until 1988. Although there is a two-page "epilogue" bringing it up-to-date through mid-1987, the book is somewhat dated.

This type of study should be done on a regular basis so that experts on U.S., Soviet, and European security can familiarize themselves with how the Japanese bureaucracy responds to the changing security situation in and around Japan. Perhaps the most valuable contribution this book makes is to break new ground which others can follow.

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Perry, Mark. *Four Stars: The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989. 402pp. $24.95

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Four Stars has much to commend it. It is an interesting and exciting book. Once you pick it up, it is hard to put it down. I never thought that a book on the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would fit that description. Perry has written about the JCS in the same way that David Halberstam wrote about Vietnam in the *Best and Brightest*.

Four Stars breathes life into the members of the JCS, particularly the eleven officers who have served as Chairman. Perry's analyses of the characters and the roles played by Earl Wheeler, Thomas Moorer, John Vessey, and William Crowe in shaping the JCS are illuminating. The reader actually feels that he or she knows what makes these chairmen "tick."

Perry forcefully and cogently argues his thesis, namely, that over the past 40 years the JCS have battled to gain a larger role in the making of American foreign policy. More importantly, Perry shows how and why the JCS have succeeded in that struggle, moving from a committee of military advisers to the most powerful group of military officers in America.

Described in rich detail are meetings among the chiefs and between the chiefs and the secretary of defense, providing us with rare glimpses of the inner workings of the JCS. The most dramatic meeting described in *Four Stars* occurred on 25 August 1967, when the JCS decided to resign *en masse* over President Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War. Fortunately, they changed their minds the next day and decided to work for change within the system.

The book offers an excellent analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between the JCS and the first fifteen secretaries of defense. It shows how the chiefs primarily valued respect, even deference, for their experience from their civilian leaders. Secretaries like Robert McNamara and Caspar Weinberger were despised by the JCS for the way in which those former businessmen treated them, even though McNamara and Weinberger showered the military with money. The JCS "loved" secretaries like Melvin Laird and Clark Clifford—even though they cut their budgets—because they gave the JCS that deference and respect.

However, for all its virtues, *Four Stars* has three major flaws. First, it has too many editorial errors: Admiral John Poindexter becomes William Poindexter; Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard becomes an assistant secretary of defense; the July 1965 decision to fight a large-scale war in Vietnam without calling up the reserves takes place in July 1964; and the fiscal year 1978 defense budget, which was reduced in real terms by President Jimmy Carter, is portrayed as having been increased by President Gerald Ford.

Second, Perry leaves out some episodes that are of critical importance to his thesis and to understanding the JCS. He omits an analysis of the role of Thomas Gates,

secretary of defense from 1959-61, in laying the foundation for the McNamara revolution as well as getting the JCS to come to an agreement on such critical issues as Joint Strategic Target Planning. Nor does he discuss the legendary blowup between CNO George Anderson and Secretary McNamara over the conduct of the naval blockade during the Cuban missile crisis—an incident which had more impact on Anderson's tenure on the JCS than his opposition to the TFX. Finally, the author ignores the outcry that followed the firing of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger by President Gerald Ford in 1975—an outcry that forced Ford to attempt to increase defense spending and to reverse his position on SALT II.

Third, on several critical occasions, the author's hybrid methodology, which he calls investigative history (a combination of investigative journalism and historiography), lets him down. Some of these occasions are particularly disturbing to me because I am cited as the source. For example, Perry describes the initial meeting between Weinberger and the JCS on 15 January 1981. According to him, there were more than 40 people at the meeting, including several new civilian appointees. (I was not one of them.) Perry alleges that in the course of this meeting Weinberger attempted to resolve the MX deployment mode controversy by proposing to deploy the missiles on surface ships. Perry then has me describing the reaction of the participants in the meeting in language that I never use. When the author interviewed me, I discussed a meeting that occurred in Weinberger's office toward the end of January 1981. This session was held to prepare Weinberger for his first congressional appearance. The MX basing mode did indeed come up, and I did discuss the reaction of the participants to Weinberger's MX proposal. Perry could have avoided this problem by allowing his interviewees to check what he attributed to them—a practice followed by Hedrick Smith in *Power Game*.

Despite these flaws, Perry does succeed in capturing the essence and evolution of the JCS. It is unfortunate that his mistakes will be cited by those who disagree with his thesis, which is essentially correct.

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Stoler, Mark A. *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989. 252pp. $10.95

Professor Stoler has taken on a formidable task—summarizing the life and times of George Marshall in less than 200 pages. There is, to be sure, the monumental four-volume work of Forrest Pogue for those interested in pursuing the subject in depth; but for most students and general readers, a briefer treatment is in order.

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The first third of the book covers Marshall from his birth in 1880 until he became chief of staff on 1 September 1939. Included is the usual biographical development: junior officer in the Philippines; service with Pershing in World War I; and the frustrations, as well as the opportunities for professional development, characteristic of the interwar American army. All of this is presented from the perspective of the man who, at age 59, took over as military head of the American army on the eve of its greatest expansion.

Stoler is an expert on the European phase of World War II, and it shows. (His *Politics of the Second Front* deserves much more attention than it has received.) He is able to present the issues faced by the new chief of staff lucidly and with great insight. A particularly interesting aspect of his analysis is his portrayal of the evolution of the Roosevelt-Marshall relationship. In the end, the do-it-yourself mode of operation of the commander in chief shifted to one of depending on Marshall as the first among equals of his strategic advisers.

The Eisenhower-Marshall wartime relationship—which was a good one—is not developed in any detail. There is the usual discussion of Marshall being so valuable in Washington that Roosevelt was unwilling to appoint him as Supreme Allied Commander (which turned out to be the greatest military command ever held by an American). The truth is that based on personality alone, Marshall, who was ten years older than Eisenhower, was far less suited to the job than the latter. It would have been most difficult for Marshall, as Supreme Commander, to have borne the cross of Churchill, let alone that of Montgomery.

After the war Truman sent Marshall to China on that ill-fated monument to American arrogance: resolving the Chinese civil war (an episode which the author treats with sensitivity). The main postwar role for Marshall came immediately after China, when Truman appointed him to succeed Byrnes as secretary of state for what turned out to be a tumultuous two years for makers of American foreign policy. Here the brief space allowed the author shows. Imagine trying to include in 22 pages of biography of a secretary of state the following: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Containment Policy and the Czechoslovakian coup of February 1948.

The kinds of important issues that cannot be treated in a book of this length include the tight U.S. defense budget of those times and the resulting deterioration of American military forces. When the Korean War came along in 1950, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson was forced to walk the plank for those inadequacies. The truth is that one of Truman's allies in preventing Johnson's predecessor, James Forrestal, from building up the American defense establishment was George Marshall. For example, Forrestal's last attempt to improve U.S. defense

posture came in the fall of 1948 with the preparation of the Fiscal 1950 budget. He took his case personally to Secretary of State Marshall. Marshall listened, but he was not about to support Forrestal with the president lest it interfere with outlays for the Marshall Plan. Hence, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, whom the author credits for his great efforts in the 1950-51 defense buildup, was in fact correcting his own earlier misjudgments.

With regard to George Marshall's role as defense secretary (from September 1950 to September 1951), the author correctly emphasizes that Marshall reestablished the prestige of that office following Johnson's tenure. The secretary was past his peak at this point and knew it, and let Robert Lovett, his deputy, run the department. This being a war period, defense budgets were no longer the central problem in the Pentagon. Hence, interservice tensions (then as now budgetary, not doctrinal in origin, whatever the rhetoric employed) were no longer a problem.

There was one problem that developed in Marshall's tenure as defense secretary that Lovett could not handle for him: the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Professor Stoler handles the issue and Marshall's role in a balanced and interesting manner. There were personality issues of course (feisty Harris versus insubordinate MacArthur is the usual portrayal), but the real issues and the resultant lessons are political-strategic—lessons which, by the way, were largely forgotten during the next decade as the Vietnam tragedy unfolded.

In sum, Professor Stoler, with style and verve, has produced an excellent summary volume on George C. Marshall and his times. As supplemental reading for courses in American foreign policy and military history, the book should prove insightful, readable, provocative, and manageable. I highly recommend it for such courses and for the general reader.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
Naval War College

Shortal, John F. *Forged by Fire: Robert L. Eichelberger and the Pacific War.* Columbia Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987. 154pp. $24.95

Forged by Fire is an admiring account of the accomplishments of Lieutenant General Eichelberger in the Pacific during World War II. The author, John Shortal, is a serving army officer and a former member of the department of history at the United States Military Academy. Shortal quickly sets the scene in his introduction. On 30 November 1942, at his forward headquarters in Port Moresby, Guinea, General MacArthur decided that the poor performance by American troops in their first offensive of the war at Buna required a change of leadership at the front (as much to protect MacArthur's personal reputation as for any other reason). Eichelberger, who

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had last heard guns fired in anger in Siberia shortly after World War I, was summoned to the presence of the great man: "MacArthur's greeting was terse and to the point. He briefly described the tactical situation at Buna and then, looking Eichelberger in the eye, gave the following order: 'Take Buna or don't come back alive!' "

The book is organized into four chapters of approximately thirty pages each. The first takes Eichelberger from his admission to West Point in 1905 to the order he received to take Buna, and the next three describe the campaigns at Buna (December 1942), Biak (June 1944) and Manila (January 1945).

The author's views are clear. Eichelberger comes across as a rather rumpled uncle, the kind of senior officer who generally wins respect and affection rather than instilling fear. However, this is not to suggest that a comfortable old shoe cannot kick. Shortal's Eichelberger drives hard, shares the soldier's danger and discomfort, relieves old schoolmates when necessary, smarts when snubbed, and delights in promotions and awards. He is also a canny tactician, a superb trainer of troops, a believer in physical conditioning, and a fine developer of leaders. In brief, when MacArthur ran into hot situations, he called on Fireman Eichelberger to save the day.

MacArthur and his entourage are roughly treated. The aloofness that has been called arrogance, the posing as the Wizard of the Orient, the unwillingness to share the limelight and the glory, the ego—these unkind characterizations of MacArthur have been heard before, but they do ring true. The people surrounding MacArthur are depicted as sycophants so dedicated to their chief that they competed to protect him and bask in the warmth of his smile. General Charles Willoughby, an easy target, is particularly savaged by Shortal for his absolutely consistent intelligence estimates—it seems he was always wrong—and for failing to recognize the massing for the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950. Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff and another of the "Bataan Gang," is called ruthless and described as a hatchet man always prepared to lop off another head to save the reputation of his boss.

Shortal is relentless in his opinions, and therein lies a major fault of the book. The author has fallen in love with his subject. One smiles knowingly when lovers repeat words of endearment; one frowns when historians are repetitious, particularly in a short book.

We are told that at Buna, Eichelberger "learned three important lessons that would give him an edge in the future": realistic training, avoidance of frontal attacks, and command from the front where the action is. Fair enough, but our author underestimates his faithful reader's memory by repeating these three points far too often, almost as an incantation that explains the very meaning of life.

At every turn we find Good (guess who) thwarted by the emperor or his nefarious court. Eichelberger should have gotten more stars, more medals, more fame, and the bigger army with the bigger missions. We are asked to believe that the Bataan Gang spent more time polishing the MacArthur legend and spiting Eichelberger than thinking about how to defeat Japan. It is unfortunate that the author treats professional reputation as a zero-sum game requiring the diminution of other reputations to enlarge that of his subject. He overlooks in Eichelberger the very faults he condemns in MacArthur and his staff. In his first chapter Shortal tells us that Eichelberger transferred from the infantry to the adjutant general corps in his bid for promotion and to court his patron; later he transferred back to the infantry for the same reason: to get ahead. It is permissible even for the most ardent admirer to note that one's hero has feet of clay. Our concern is history, not canonization. Courting favor was not unusual behavior in the army of the period between the two great wars of this century. See George Patton's letters and diaries to learn the art of unabashed apple polishing.

It seems to this reviewer that Eichelberger is yet another fine product of the tiny U.S. Army of the 1920s and 1930s that somehow prepared middle grade officers—most of them quite ordinary men—for impressive performances of duty at the highest levels in a great crusade. Those concerned with national security into the 21st century might ponder how it was done and ask if we are getting it right in our day. Because Shortal evokes reflections like these, *Forged by Fire* can be read profitably by both the general reader who cares about his nation's well-being and the specialist in security issues.

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Leary, William M., ed. *We Shall Return! MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan.* Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988. 305pp. $25

Douglas MacArthur did not reconquer the Philippines alone! That does not qualify as man-bites-dog news, but if there is a theme in *We Shall Return*, it is that many of MacArthur's subordinate commanders were competent men and he had the capability to listen to them and take their advice.

Dr. William M. Leary edited this anthology of biographical essays, written by an impressive array of authors, on the principal leaders who helped in the Southwest Pacific campaign to defend Australia and then recover the Philippines.

Probably the best chapter in the book is the well-documented scene-setter by Stanley Falk on Douglas MacArthur himself. Falk clearly calls the "Dugout Doug" appelation a slander. Equally clearly he assesses MacArthur's claim to having the

shortest casualty lists as a myth. Most serious are Falk's charges that MacArthur's self-interested attitude inhibited the development of unity of command and a unified, better strategy against Japan.

Unlike Falk's, most of the other chapters are infected with hero worship. Donald Goldstein of the Air Force Academy calls USAAF General Ennis Whitehead a "genius," which is rather extravagent given that he was working for General George Kenney, whom Herman Wolk identifies as the "first among equals"—and this in the theater that distinctly did not have first call on either materiel or men. The authors of chapters on ground generals (Walter Kreuger, Thomas Blamey of Australia, Robert Eichelberger) also admire their subjects. So do those dealing with the admirals (Thomas Kinkaid and Daniel Barbey). For the most part, the sketches deal with events that long ago were competently covered in official publications. Little is told about what made these leaders the men that they were, nor about how they managed their relationships with MacArthur. Except for the chapter on Whitehead, which contains many mistakes, all are well edited and all are supported by good documentation and bibliographical essays.

If one desires a comprehensive understanding of the Southwest Pacific campaigns, the official histories and many others are better sources than this book. For a comprehensive understanding of what made MacArthur and the men around him tick, then some of the MacArthur biographies, particularly that by D. Clayton James, are to be preferred—even if they take more time to read.

DAVID R. METS
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Dunn, William J. *Pacific Microphone.* College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1988. 399pp. $19.95

The wartime memoirs of military and naval commanders, alas, too often are defensive in tone, dreary in style, and wanting in human-interest stories. On the other hand, the reminiscences of many war correspondents are rewarding as vivid, anecdotal, you-are-there reading. It would be difficult to find a finer example of the latter genre than *Pacific Microphone.* William J. Dunn was the first editor of CBS News and represented that network as its senior radio news correspondent in the Pacific War. In his book, which is based on his personal papers and diaries as well as on his broadcast scripts of the era, Dunn graphically describes his wide-ranging itinerary of 1941-1945, principally in General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific theater (and, in a brief epilogue, during the first six months of the Korean War).

Dunn's assignments during the Second World War took him from Chungking to Melbourne and from Rangoon to Guadalcanal and

included all the major operations of MacArthur's American and Australian forces from the conquest of Papua to the liberation of Luzon. Probably no person, civilian or military, was personally present at more of the epochal happenings in the war against Japan than Dunn, who reported by radio on events from the China and Burma fronts as well as from the operations on Southwest and South Pacific islands. His experiences were rich in the drama, glory, and horror of war, and he tells of his odyssey with an eye for detail and humane perceptiveness that marks the writing of a master war correspondent at his best.

Dunn left the United States in January 1941 on a supposed ninety-day tour of radio facilities in the Far East for future CBS needs in covering the expected expansion of hostilities in that area. He would not return to America, as it turned out, until after witnessing the Japanese surrender ceremony on the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay in September 1945. In the meantime he had gotten to know a number of American and Allied senior officers, notably MacArthur, who early took a liking to the amiable, portly correspondent. Their friendship grew, and MacArthur invited Dunn along for many of the historic occasions of the war in the Southwest Pacific, such as the general's return to Leyte. Dunn would be at the general's side again in late 1950 during MacArthur's reconnaissance flight above the Yula River. It is not surprising that Dunn ends his work with a blast at Truman for relieving MacArthur in 1951. Dunn also has high praise for General Robert Eichelberger, head of the Eighth Army, though sometimes at the expense of his able counterpart, General Walter Krueger of the Sixth Army. He strongly defends Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's leadership of the Seventh Fleet, especially in the Leyte Gulf actions, but, oddly, throughout the books he spells his name "Kincaid."

Though a minor error in itself, such mispelling unfortunately reflects a general carelessness in proofreading throughout, thus allowing historical errors as well as typographical ones. General Yamashita, for example, is mistakenly placed in command of Japanese operations on Bataan in 1942 as well as in charge of the Japanese defenders on Leyte in 1944. Regrettably, too, Dunn's likes and dislikes among American and Allied officers frequently seem to be linked to the kind of cooperation received from them or their headquarters staffs in setting up field interviews or in working out the many and varied problems of the relatively primitive broadcast facilities of that time.

The book is excellent for its type, but Dunn could have made it better in two rather simple ways. First, he should have focused on his personal experiences, particularly in radio broadcasting, instead of covering a multitude of topics wherein his knowledge was sometimes indirect. Second, there is little indication that after World War II he kept abreast

of the ever-growing literature and revelations about the leaders and events of the Southwest Pacific world in which he had been enmeshed in 1941-1945. He apologizes in his preface for occasionally using the term "Jap," but in a sad way that usage typifies much of his knowledge and interpretations that need updating.

Dunn's book cannot be considered a contribution of great relevance to the national security community of today, but *Pacific Microphone* provides fascinating, on-the-spot observations by a veteran correspondent widely esteemed by his peers. And the reader of this book is likely to agree with Dunn's bottom-line conclusion: it was "an unhappy era" and a "cruel and bitter war."

D. CLAYTON JAMES
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Day, David. *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939-1942.* New York: Norton, 1989. 388pp. $19.95

In this thoroughly researched study of Britain, the Dominion, and the onset of the Pacific war 1939-42, Australian scholar David Day examines the period in which his country's colonial mentality and Britain's misleading assurances led to the "Battle for Australia," when that country lay almost unprotected before the conquering Japanese.

Day, author of the earlier *Menzies and Churchill at War*, bolsters his research at Churchill and Clare Colleges with published and unpublished official documents, private papers, memoirs, contemporary letters, and secondary works. But this is a work of revisionist Australian war history that makes little allowance for the mindset of Prime Minister Robert Menzies' generation of Australian leaders. Day depicts the prejudice in London against Australian origins, accents, and manners. The various causes of bitterness between London and Canberra are carefully researched, but the nobler side of the wartime prime minister, whose broadcasts revived the failing courage of millions of Europeans, gets short shrift. There is little indication of the indomitable courage and the prophetic insights of Churchill as he stood against Hitler. A few maps of the shifting European and North African fronts during the period encompassed would have helped the reader to better understand the balance between the war theaters.

Fourteen chapters trace the progression from Australia's insouciant attitude to its realization, before the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway relieved the pressure, of its dire vulnerability. The 1930s, a time when the concept of the "mother" country led naturally to the expectation of protection, gave way to the Australian discovery that, for Britons, imperial interests and the protection of India—the "jewel in the crown"—were to take precedence over the protection of Australia. Britain was not only unprepared for war but misjudged the coming

struggle, grossly underestimating the Japanese capabilities. Britain placed excessive reliance on the French and Dutch presence in the Pacific and failed to assess Singapore's suitability as a major base, believing it would never be tested.

Australia, too, was unprepared for war; during the Depression that country's government had not wanted to burden the taxpayers and, at the outbreak of war, it disregarded arguments for a strong air force. It barred U.S. products from Australia and rejected U.S. proposals for a direct air link. When its government declared war in 1939, Australia had no aircraft fit for combat, its army and part-time militia lacked arms and though the Royal Australian Navy had six cruisers, it had little else. Even much of the high command were not Australian. Both the navy and the air force were headed by British officers.

Day portrays the years through which Churchill, dominating his cabinet and service chiefs, focused on the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the U.S.S.R. to the neglect of the Far East. He turned a deaf ear to Australia's pleas for aircraft. Churchill, who commented at the time of Pearl Harbor, "greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British Empire," did not intend U.S. attention to be diverted from Europe. The "Germany first" strategy meant that inevitable losses to the Japanese would have to be recouped later. Churchill exploited Australia's loyalty, causing General MacArthur to condemn Britain's failure to provide for Australia's security and to return in kind Australia's generous assistance.

Menzies' shaky political position underlay the argument for the relief of Tobruk in North Africa, which damaged the prestige of the Australian troops. Visiting London, Menzies, drawn into political intrigues against Churchill, achieved little for Australian national interests. Later on, Dr. H.V. Evatt was no more successful. S.M. Bruce, the High Commissioner in London (the Commonwealth equivalent of an ambassador), and Sir Earle Page, Australian Envoy to London, were children of their time. Like Richard Casey, Australian representative in Washington and London, they did not appreciate the wide divergence of Imperial and Australian interests. Ultimately, Churchill's estimation that the Japanese would not invade Australia proved correct. Distance saved the Dominion as earlier it had muted her clamor to be heard. But before the Japanese Navy was decisively defeated at Midway, Australia suffered the traumatic fall of Singapore, with the incarceration of her troops, and the shattering bombing raid on isolated Darwin on 19 February 1942. Many, in government and out, feared Australia would be overrun.

This book presents the American reader with a little-known aspect of the Pacific war. In demonstrating the dangers of trusting implicitly the pledges of a distant ally, neglecting strategic and logistic intelligence, and underestimating the strengths of

a potential enemy, *The Great Betrayal* offers the national security community valuable lessons.

DORA ALVES
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Ball, Desmond; Langtry, J.O.; and Stevenson, J.D. *Defend the North: The Case for the Alice Springs—Darwin Railway*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985. 104pp. $9.95

In 1942 the United States perceived a threat from the northwest. The Japanese had landed in Kiska and Attu, and it appeared that they would soon reach Seattle. The outposts in Alaska seemed to be in danger and an overland route to the north, safe from submarines, was needed. Construction of the Alcan Highway was the solution, giving the allies the capability to move men and materials north to meet the threat without having to divert naval forces from other critical theaters of operations.

Australia also faced a problem in 1942 in that country's northwest. The port of Darwin had been almost obliterated by Admiral Nagumo's carrier-based aviators. Just about everything needed to defend that part of the country had to be sent by ship. If the Canadian and American overland route north to Alaska was rugged, the Australian route north from the center of the continent at Alice Springs to the "Top End" also tested man's ability to suffer, his ingenuity, and his drive. A road, really only a track, was put in. It wasn't much, but it was better than nothing.

The situation has changed greatly in the "Top End." Today there are several adequate roads to the Northern Territory from east, south and west. The days of the coastal steamer are now the business of museums. Vast "road trains" (tractors with three to four trailers) rapidly bring fresh vegetables and merchandise north. While this works well for the civilian population, it is inadequate for emergency military needs.

The authors are fully engrossed in their study of military issues in Australia. Among other topics, Desmond Ball has previously written on intelligence (with the American, Jeffrey Richelson), examining the U.S. Signals Intelligence facilities down under. The key authors of this book, Langtry and Stevenson, are retired officers and have experience in the area of logistics. *Defend the North* is about logistics.

The book begins with the political issue of a rail link north. Major public investments for this project, however, are restricted by the still small population. The authors argue that the railroad needs to ride the defense issue if it is ever to be built.

No doubt there have been threats from the north, real and imagined. The Australian military is increasing its presence there; the Royal Australian Air Force is establishing a new base at Katherine. Our B-52s are seen from time to time at Darwin, and even our ships have been to its enormous harbor. Still, a rail link, if you accept the authors' premises, is

needed. Sustained activity of any military nature in Australia will eventually require the logistical link that only rail can provide, given that country's seaborne limitations.

While this book can be viewed as part of a local debate over a defense-related and practical political issue, it has utility for Americans, for Darwin provides a position from which to reach Southeast Asia. At one time, Manus in the Admiralties attracted U.S. attention. We would do well to examine our alternate systems of supply delivery to the Western Pacific and Indian oceans. Do we have flexibility? Do we have the capacity to support large-scale operations? One can ask other questions of the type raised by these Australians viewing their strategic and geographical position. If nothing else, the authors' arguments will inform the reader of one issue that not only confronted the Australians yesterday, but still does today.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER
San Jose State University

Hannah, Norman B. *The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War.* Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1987. 335pp. $19.95

This book is yet another in a long series of efforts that attempts to discover the underlying causes of our defeat in Vietnam. The author is a retired foreign service officer with extensive experience in Asia (but not in Vietuam), whose appointments included that of political adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet during a crucial early stage in the escalation of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Hannah's book portrays the origin and evolution of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in a series of chapters variously evoking images of the bullring, the theater, and knitting. The author asserts that the failure of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos and the subsequent U.S. failure to isolate the battlefield in South Vietnam led to our defeat in the Vietnam War. He states that, throughout the war, the principal American decision makers failed to appreciate this fact. As a consequence, although there was "a real [North Vietnamese] aggression through Laos," the United States "won the wrong war by expending its effort against . . . a largely simulated insurgency in South Vietnam." The result was a misguided "strategy of mirrors" compounded by a "dismally repetitive," incremental decision-making approach that continually missed coming to terms with the main chance in Laos.

Hannah argues that we could have done better and produces excerpts from his own memoranda of the time to show how the establishment of a flexible, mobile barrier south of the so-called Demilitarized Zone and across the Laotian panhandle would have isolated the battlefield in South Vietnam, "using our ground positions as the anvil and our aerial attacks as the hammer." Success was possible later in the war, despite the misguided beginning, in his opinion: 1969 was still a good time to

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intervene in Laos, but even that opportunity was missed; Cambodia in 1970 was the wrong place; and by 1971 the Laotian operation was simply too late to be effective. At the end, frustrated though unbeaten in the field, "Like a dispirited bull, the United States left the ring."

There are some interesting particulars in this book that deserve favorable attention. Hannah's account of the negotiations over Laos are instructive. His commentaries on the self-deception that prevailed in the U.S. government during this war, the flaws inherent in an incrementalist approach to war, and the inability of the United States to define an appropriate strategy linking means and ends, ring true. And at the end of the last chapter he offers, almost as an afterthought, some "lessons" that merit careful reflection.

What makes *The Key to Failure* so disappointing is that these and other useful particulars are largely lost in a book whose basic organizational concept is simply off the mark, and whose prose is replete with rhetorical questions and metaphors that are just a bit too cute. Anyone who spent any time on the ground in South Vietnam, or who knew anything about the conduct of revolutionary war, would realize that the "insurgency" in South Vietnam was by no means "simulated," despite the overall direction received from Hanoi and the subsequent introduction of regular North Vietnamese formations. Even if one accepts Hannah's assertion that the problem was North Vietnamese aggression, his focus on Laos overlooks the fact that Laos was only a conduit (albeit an important one) for North Vietnam; the crux of the strategic problem was the source—North Vietnam itself—not the battlefield (South Vietnam) or the line of communication (Laos) to it. Without the neutralization of that source, the flow of men and materiel southwards would continue, especially given what is now known about the single-minded determination of the communist leadership in Hanoi.

That same determination makes it even less likely that Hannah's preferred "containment by negotiation (based on the neutralization of Laos)" would have succeeded. His belief that "We could have established a line and stood pat until negotiations produced a definitive cease fire" reflects a misunderstanding of the tactical permeability of any barrier defense; a disregard for the feasibility of establishing an effective barrier—mobile or not—in that particular terrain, to which those of us who walked over it can attest; and the fact that when one has an American government, with the characteristics Hannah describes, engaged in a war of attrition against an opponent like that in Hanoi, time assuredly *does* favor the other side.

Working one's way through *The Key to Failure* is akin to prospecting for gold in a long-abandoned mine. Some real nuggets, or at least flakes of gold, can be found if one makes the effort, but pyrite abounds and one has to work through a good deal

of filler to strike paydirt. Hannah obviously sees himself as a classic "prophet without honor" in his own time and place. His book has the tone of barely subdued sarcasm—that of a person who believes his earlier contributions were unappreciated and who feels compelled to reproduce large portions of his own memoranda to support his case—something which he has the grace to acknowledge may appear "self-serving." (It does.) There are some good points in the book to be sure, especially with regard to the Laotian negotiations. But the conceptual misapprehension permeating it simply lends credence to the belief that the State Department is the last place to look for sound guidance in matters of strategy.

Somewhere there may be good answers to the debate over "Who lost Vietnam?" but *The Key to Failure* is not the place to find them.

ALAN NED SABROSKY
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Middlebrook, Martin. *The Fight for the Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1989. 321pp. $24.95

Martin Middlebrook, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, has gained international recognition for his nine books on the two world wars.

The absence of the Argentine perspective in his previous book on the Malvinas, *Operation Corporate*, led Middlebrook to negotiate with the Argentine authorities for interviews with participants in the Malvinas/Falklands war. He was particularly successful with the navy.

The Fight for the Malvinas, which contains sixty-two interviews with members of varying ranks in the Argentine army and navy, is a history of the operations during the war as seen through Argentine eyes.

Middlebrook makes it clear that the Argentine political decision to reoccupy the island was based on the premise that the British would not retaliate militarily. The unreadiness of Argentina's forces illustrates this misperception: Bombs failed to explode, thus betraying the brave pilots of the *Fuerza Aerea*; torpedo failures did the same to submariners; support to the land forces failed to materialize. All these shortcomings stemmed from that one political error.

Quoting from the interviews, the author describes specific operations in detail: The South Georgia crisis (which Middlebrook believes the British mishandled), the seizure of the islands without shedding British blood, the naval battle that never was, the sinking of the cruiser *General Belgrano*, the sinking of the destroyer H.M.S. *Sheffield*, the air battle, the effects of the British task force on Argentine actions, the unopposed British landing on San Carlos, the battle of Goose Green, the "*Invincible* attack," the bombing of the *Sir Galahad*, the battle of Stanley, and

finally the surrender of "Puerto Argentino."

It is difficult to establish the absolute truth, but Middlebrook made an effort to maintain his objectivity. Though this work is better balanced than his last, throughout the well-written pages the author's opinions can still be detected, and his objectivity falters.

The word "ignominious" is used several times to characterize the restriction of the Argentine fleet to coastal waters after the *General Belgrano* was sunk. It is used when describing the transport of thousands of surrendered troops by British ships, and the final military defeat.

Reality would be better served if some adjectives were spared. Middlebrook contradicts himself in the introduction when he states that very few Argentine soldiers had any regrets about the war; most were proud to have fought in 1982, and the impression was that many would be willing to fight again. A soldier who feels shame does not make these statements.

Unfortunately, Middlebrook fails to mention the significant logistic help provided the British by the United States. Hence, the effectiveness of the Sea Harriers is attributed mainly to the excellence of the airplanes and their skilled pilots; there is no evaluation of their weapon system, but without the Sidewinder AIM-9L air-to-air missile, quickly provided by the United States, the outcome of the battle probably would have been different and consequently the course of the war. Without that help the end probably would have been the same, but less "ignominious."

The book is a product of unedited information from the Argentine side. Middlebrook does help the reader to understand both the Argentine defeat and the difficulties that the British had to overcome during the war. He points out the brave actions of the men on both sides, on land, at sea and in the air. The pain of both is demonstrated and so is their civilized behavior. Above all, he reveals the deep belief of Argentines, at all levels, that the Malvinas belong to them.

As you read this review you may recognize the Argentine hand in it that may have had difficulty being totally objective.

JULIO GROSSO
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Naval War College

Thompson, Julian. *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982.* New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985. 201pp. $25.95

A look at most military bookshelves would indicate that field marshals and squad leaders have an abundance of literature from which to study their respective arts. Field grade officers, on the other hand, must search much harder to find books that describe warfare from the perspective of the commander of a battalion, regiment, or brigade. Fortunately, *No Picnic* by Brigadier Julian Thompson, Royal Marines,

fits very nicely into this large gap in military literature.

In *No Picnic*, the author recounts his participation in the Falklands campaign as commander of 3 Commando Brigade. Although he does not draw such a distinction in the book, his account can be viewed as a description of two separate, but related, operations. The first was the amphibious operation for which Brigadier Thompson was the commander of the landing force. The second operation was the land campaign to seize Stanley. During this phase the author was one of two brigade commanders in a division that had been formed upon the arrival of an army brigade in the Falklands.

Brigadier Thompson's account of the amphibious operation starts with the receipt of a warning order and ends with the Brigade firmly established ashore at San Carlos. The many intervening steps between these two events, such as embarkation, rehearsal (or lack of same), movement to the objective, and the actual landing, are all covered with an attention to professional detail not found in more general accounts of the war. One example that I found particularly interesting was a description of the process by which San Carlos was chosen as the site for the landing. *No Picnic* also forces the reader to think about what assets are required to conduct an amphibious operation. On one hand, the case can be made that the British were lucky to have succeeded in conducting the operation on such a shoestring. On the other hand, the application of any U.S. standards of required amphibious lift and other support would have dictated that the operation never be attempted.

In his account of the land campaign, Brigadier Thompson continues to describe events with an eye to details that are invaluable to readers with a professional interest in the campaign. The margins of my copy of *No Picnic* are filled with notes pointing out the author's views on such subjects as the amount of artillery preparation required for an attack, the location of control measures, such as lines of departure and assembly areas, and the employment of night patrolling.

Throughout the book, by means of many examples, Brigadier Thompson hammers home his view that the deciding factor in the campaign was the superiority of the individual British fighting man and his training. The professional manner in which the author delivers this message makes *No Picnic* particularly instructive for field and company grade officers. On second thought, I would guess that field marshals and squad leaders would find this book equally interesting.

T.L. GATCHEL
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Naval War College

Larzelere, Alex. *The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988. 543pp. $16

Do not let the size of this book deter you from reading it. The author, Captain Alex Larzelere, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), has written a highly readable chronicle of the 1980 Cuban exodus, and his analyses and interpretations of events bring the narrative to life. Skillfully he takes us from the death of a Cuban guard at the Peruvian Embassy in Cuba to the chess game between Jimmy Carter and Fidel Castro over whether the humanitarian acceptance of political refugees also prescribes the acceptance of refugee criminals and mental patients.

Questions of refugee acceptance that surfaced within the time frame of this brief event—roughly from April to November 1980—are now being played out in Hong Kong with the Southeast Asian refugee problem. How does a government limit the influx of people fleeing an oppressive regime? President Carter made a decision to accept a manageable 3,500 refugees, but this escalated to over 100,000 who safely made the journey across the Straits of Florida. Most refugees have exceptional needs and limited resources. Thus, a humanitarian opportunity is often followed by long-term economic and social costs. Compounding the boatlift problem was Castro's requirement that the boatloads include prisoners and the mentally ill along with the voluntary expatriates. Today, nine years later, the United States is still faced with huge prison and mental hospital costs to retain and rehabilitate these people.

Captain Larzelere traces the circumstances that led to the 1980 Cuban exodus. There were internal economic pressures of insufficient housing, unemployment, an aging population, and reduced infant mortality. There was dissatisfaction with the communist form of government and collective economic rewards. Finally there was the consciousness that friends and relatives (800,000 had left since 1959), living just ninety miles away, were enjoying a prosperity that could not be realized in Cuba.

The tales of some refugees, especially those who sought safety on the Peruvian Embassy grounds, are vividly recounted. Their courage is documented in words and pictures. Some of them made perilous voyages in boats too small for the sea conditions, and all left most of their possessions behind.

Captain Larzelere served in key positions both afloat and ashore in the boatlift operation area. From those vantage points, he describes the stream of empty boats headed from Florida to Mariel Harbor, and the boats' return trip loaded with refugees. From the Coast Guard's perspective, this was first and foremost a massive search and rescue operation. All available air and sea resources were deployed from as far away as New England to render assistance to boats in trouble. Fortunately, the U.S. Navy was able to augment Coast Guard forces and share some of the overwhelming rescue task. The operations will be immediately familiar to those who

served in this or similar large-scale rescues, especially the author's vivid accounts of the chaos that occurred during the Sunday storm of 27 April or the tragedy of the *Olo Yumi* on 17 May.

Whether Castro lost prestige in the eyes of the world when so many Cuban citizens were willing to forsake their country, or did himself a favor by getting rid of malcontents and criminals who were a drain on the economy will be determined later. The question remains, if pressure should again build in Cuba, would he seek relief through another boatlift to the United States? The author urges comprehensive reviews of policies, strategies, and executive decision-making processes to avoid being surprised by another exodus of this magnitude. This book will serve as a valuable primer for those tasked with those reviews.

JOHN C. TRAINOR
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Fernández, Damián J. *Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 160pp. $19.95

Premier Fidel Castro long ago expanded his original notions of sponsoring liberationist guerrilla wars into a full spectrum of politico-military services. Where once his peripatetic revolutionists schemed romantically—and unsuccessfully—at implanting Maoist *focos*, later he led a diplomatic and military array of overt and clandestine forces aimed at creating a Marxist-Leninist world.

Professor Damián J. Fernández, political science professor at Colorado College, traces Castro's efforts to become a significant player in the world's hottest region, the Middle East. His study was performed in the archives of the Cuban Information System at the University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies and in the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress. The book is written primarily for Latin Americanists, and most of the Middle Eastern scholarly source materials appear to be secondary.

The first chapter is a summary of Cuban foreign policy from 1960-1985. It is easily the best of its kind in print.

Next is a survey chapter on Cuban policies in the Middle East, as a region, followed by a chapter containing a country-by-country implementation of those policies. These two chapters form the centerpiece of the book. A special case study on Cuban-Libyan relations follows, and it contains some surprises. Where the casual observer might expect Muammar el-Qaddafi and Fidel Castro to find common ground as leading scourges of the industrial West, Qaddafi, while sharing Castro's anti-Zionist and anti-U.S. enthusiasm, in fact, finds Castro to be too faithful a Soviet ally.

The summary chapter develops some interesting conjectures on how

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and why Cuba is even a player in the Middle Eastern cauldron. After all, Cuba needs Middle Eastern petroleum but is financially bankrupt, totally beholden to Soviet largesse for significant purchases. The Middle East hardly lacks for glinty-eyed revolutionists who know the fine points of the AK-47 or the radio-detonated car bomb. Yet Fidel Castro has indeed multi-regionalized Middle Eastern turbulence with his presence, despite an overwhelming lack of assets and logical reasons.

Professor Fernández relies strongly on Foreign Broadcast Information Service bulletins for Cuban actions; more credibility would be attained through analysis of what Middle Eastern leaders think of Cuba. Michael Stührenberg wrote recently in the liberal weekly *Die Zeit* of Hamburg that "Cuba is considered by many of the poorest nations to be an international superpower. . . . They view Castro not as Moscow's representative but as its successor." Professor Fernández does not go quite so far.

Pointing to the glittering opportunities which first attracted Castro to interpose his country in Middle Eastern affairs, Fernández concludes that the region is tough for any outsider to manipulate and that, even if he is not simply a stooge of the Kremlin, Castro still has to accept Soviet guidelines.

"The Middle East might well be Fidel Castro's, and revolutionary Cuba's last international frontier," he says. Yet the chart on page 56 shows an impressive array of regional penetrations by a regime ruling a small country that U.S. patriots used to tell me, in 1960, could be "cleaned out by a squad of well-trained Marines with baseball bats."

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY
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Maxwell Air Force Base

Moral Obligation and the Military: Collected Essays. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988. 245pp. $7

The good news about this volume is its publication. The bad news is its brevity.

Publication of a biennial report of successive conferences of the Joint Services Conference on Professional Responsibility (1985 and 1986), held at the National Defense University, records the admirable effort of the military services to encourage reflection among their personnel on the ethical standards of their profession.

This volume presents the most significant papers presented at these conferences. Oddly, though, it is silent, or nearly so, on the two political-military topics most salient in public and professional discussions of foreign policy during those years (1985 and 1986): the U.S. intervention in the Nicaraguan civil war and the sudden reassessment of the moral legitimacy of nuclear deterrence.

Likewise, the book omits the newsworthy statements by leading former defense officials, such as

Robert McNamara, who recently revealed his own long-standing moral ambivalence about deterrent strategies. Equally striking is the omission of the uproar provoked by the U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter (condemning on traditional moral grounds the present U.S. strategy for deterrence), which has been widely and closely studied at several of the senior war colleges.

For all the volume's shortcomings, however, several essays, make it useful. For example, John Yoder, a pacifist theologian, points incisively to the universality of often unacknowledged moral commitments in all major political-military choices. Yoder pleads for more candid admission of the ethical premises of policy decisions than is normally recognized by popular theories of "Realism" in foreign policy. Another piece seems to suggest that the application of Clausewitz' theory to present doctrines of nuclear war would reveal that the latter are open to serious questioning.

FRANCIS X. WINTERS
Georgetown University

Mearsheimer, John J. *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ., 1988. 234pp. $24.95

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart was a prolific military writer until his death in 1970. He also, supposedly, significantly influenced the German generals in World War II and, later, the Israeli military leaders. One writes "supposedly" since this book, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, by Professor John J. Mearsheimer challenges these views.

Mearsheimer disputes the conventional idea that the Germans obtained the blitzkrieg concept from Liddell Hart's works: "I find no basis for the widespread claim that Liddell Hart had marked influence on the development of the thinking about the blitzkrieg in Germany during the interwar years and that the German offensive of May 1940 was essentially a case of his disciples putting his theories into practice."

Mearsheimer makes much of a short passage of praise to Liddell Hart in General Heinz Guderian's *Panzer Leader* and produces evidence that Liddell Hart wrote the paragraph with the approval of Guderian for the English edition. It was undoubtedly wrong for Liddell Hart to have done so, but this in itself does not blemish the idea that Liddell Hart actually *did* influence Guderian. Mearsheimer unconvincingly suggests that each had much to gain by praising the other.

There is one important point overlooked by Mearsheimer. Guderian, dismissed in the winter of 1941 and later reinstated as Inspector-General of Armored Troops, flew to Hitler's headquarters for a conference on 9 March 1943. In *Panzer Leader*, under the heading "Conference Notes," is the sentence, "Read out article by Liddell Hart—on organization of armored forces, past and present."

Why, at his first important conference with Hitler after being reinstated, would Guderian read a paper by a man who had no influence on him? What does Mearsheimer have to say about this famous sentence? Nothing—not one word! One suspects that this omission would leave readers with uneasy feelings about this book.

The most serious of Mearsheimer's errors lies in his confusion of policy and strategy. Liddell Hart had long been an advocate of a British sea power strategy rather than a Continental commitment. Mearsheimer finds this hard to understand. He believes that British strategy, which he often calls policy, was correct in both world wars in striving for a decisive victory over Germany. Apparently he does not accept Clausewitz' idea that war should be an instrument of policy.

British policy vis-à-vis Europe had been to maintain a balance of power which entailed, as in World War I, a grand strategy of preventing the defeat of France and Russia. The ideal instrument for this role was not a large British army, but the Royal Navy. The pursuit of a decisive victory over the Central Powers would undermine British political aims. When in fact Britain did place a large army on the Western Front, she trapped herself into supporting Franco-Russian ambitions—which was not a balance of power. True, Britain "won" the war, as Mearsheimer states, but a military victory is only the means to an end, a political aim. It is like the old medical joke: the operation was a success, but the patient died. If we accept Clausewitz, that the political aspect is the most important point, then, in this sense, Britain lost World War I.

ROBERT E. WALTERS
Winter Park, Florida

It is entirely plausible that the Nobel Peace Prize should have been awarded to the designers of the first SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) systems, for in being so well hidden under the seas, this kind of weapon has made war much less likely during these years and, further, let each side relax somewhat more in the knowledge that such war was unlikely.

George H. Quester
Armed Forces & Society
Winter 1987, p. 199

Recent Books

Alden, John D. *U.S. Submarine Attacks During World War II.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 285pp. $24.95

The compiler of this work states that his primary objective "is to provide a side-by-side listing of data on U.S. submarine attacks and Japanese ship losses during World War II." The information reported by submarine commanders when they attacked ships (most ships could not be precisely identified) is compared with information from Japanese sources on ships that were sunk or damaged by known or suspected enemy submarines. The work includes "the few attacks made by U.S. submarines in the Atlantic, those made by British and Dutch submarines operating in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and casualties caused by mines laid in those areas by U.S. and Allied submarines." This book is similar to Jürgen Rohwer's *Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945*, produced by the same publisher in 1983.

Bellany, Ian and Huxley, Tim, eds. *New Conventional Weapons and Western Defense.* New York: Frank Cass & Co., 1987. 198pp. $29

This book should prove useful for a number of people in the American defense establishment in light of increasingly restricted defense budgets. Since the examples are primarily English and European, they may allow some of the ideas about these issues to be examined with less emotion than would be attached directly to American manufacturers and defense policies. This may help to clarify what theories are supported by fact or are merely doctrinaire. The difficult decisions that will have to be made about future weapon development and acquisition need to be based upon reality and not myth.

Brassford, Christopher. *The Spit-Shine Syndrome.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 192pp. $37.95

"Sir, he has the best-looking boots in the Army," was the answer given to Brassford when he asked if a soldier was a good trooper. For Brassford, this response came to symbolize what is wrong with today's Army: the substitution of appearance for competence, thus "the spit-shine syndrome." He recommends that promotions and assignments be based on unit effectiveness. His proposal for reform would replace the Army's current system for officer evaluation—a fragmented hodge-podge of single focus inspections and reports—with a single, realistic combat simulation and trial exercise wherein the unit's combat performance would be the only measure. Combat performance is that for which an army is maintained. It may thus be too radical.

Breuer, William B. *Geronimo!* New York: St. Martins, 1989. 621pp. $29.95
In February 1945, 412 American paratroopers rescued 2,147 civilian prisoners from the Japanese camp Los Baños in the Philippines, with loss of life to neither jumpers nor prisoners. While not the most remembered parachute assault of the Second World War, it is memorable for its absolute success and for the routine audacity of the troopers. This is but one of the anecdotes about American paratroopers, including jumping Marines, in Breuer's exhaustive history of these soldiers who earned every bit of their memorable swagger. Breuer has recovered the stories in tactical detail of what may well be every combat operation of the war that involved paratroopers. This is a splendid book for those who have worn jump wings.

Elsam, M. B. *Air Defense: Volume VII, Brassey's Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1989. 92pp. $15.95
This book is a nontechnical tutorial on the subject of air defense. It presents an overview of the air defense battle that examines early warning systems, air defense aircraft, surface-to-air missile defenses, and command and control. It is intended for the cadet, junior officer, or interested amateur. It might also be useful for beginning policy specialists who lack technical training.

Flanagan, E.M., Jr. *Corregidor: The Rock Force Assault, 1945*. Novato, Calif: Presidio, 1988. 331pp. $18.95
This account of the recapture of Corregidor includes background on the early acquisition and development of the island, the fall of Bataan, the island's own fall to the Japanese in May 1942, the U.S. invasion of the Philippines in 1944 and the recapture of Manila in 1945. Led by the 503 Parachute Regimental Combat Team (two-thirds of which jumped onto the island under the most hazardous of conditions) and reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment, the recapture of Corregidor was a joint operation. This is the story of daring, expertly planned and well-executed ground operations against a fanatical enemy in strong defensive positions.

Haffa, Robert P. *Planning U. S. Forces*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1988. 164pp. $5
Because of the changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the impending crisis in the U. S. defense budget, Colonel Haffa's book is very timely. His thesis calls for the return to first principles for force planning with a focus on what we want our armed forces to do: the strategic policy, military missions to be accomplished, and the alternatives. For readers of the *Review*, his most interesting section deals with planning naval forces. The author demonstrates the principles of rational force planning by comparing the requirements for a power projection versus a sea-control navy. A 600-

ship navy appears to be the answer to neither. Due to the projected major reduction in U. S. forces deployed overseas, Colonel Haffa's section on planning rapidly deployable forces, including their organization and support, takes on an especially current significance.

Keegan, John, ed. *The Times Atlas of the Second World War.* New York: Harper & Row, 1989. 254pp. $50.

Many publishers of war histories fail their readers by providing their books with inadequate maps. Now for those interested in World War II, *The Times* of London, Harper & Row, and John Keegan have provided at least a partial remedy. There are about 180 pages of four-color maps, plus a chronology, index, and other paraphernalia suitable for helping the reader get the best use out of his maps. There are also tables, such as that on page 193, showing Japanese war production year by year of such items as warships (by type), aircraft (also by type), and military vehicles (likewise). For those who come to own it, this promises to be a useful possession for a long time.

O'Kane, Richard H. *Wahoo.* New York: Bantam Books, 1989. 337pp. $4.50

Dick O'Kane was the first executive officer of the newly commissioned *Wahoo* when she went to war in the Pacific in 1942, with the aggressive "Mush" Morton as her skipper. *Wahoo*'s career was short but violent. She destroyed 31,980 tons of Japanese shipping until she was lost in the Sea of Japan on her seventh patrol. O'Kane gives a wonderfully detailed account of those patrols and of the men who served her. His book, first published in 1987, will be warm reading for all those who served in *Wahoo*'s sisters.

Parrish, Michael. *Battle for Moscow: The 1942 Soviet General Staff Study.* McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989. 210pp. $40

Rotundo, Louis. *Battle for Stalingrad: The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study.* McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989. 340pp. $40

Pergamon-Brassey has added two new titles to their "The USSR at War Series." Both works are translations of Soviet general staff studies written during the war to teach Red Army commanders and their staff the lessons of recent combat experience. Though both volumes were intended as training tools and not for mass consumption, the material is largely free from propaganda and distortion. Its focus is on how the battles were fought and why the results were not always satisfactory. Grand strategy is not discussed, instead the emphasis is tactical. The range of topics extend from the employment of forces at the army and corps level, to the techniques for fighting in trenches and in cold weather. While the writing is rough in parts, both works provide a wealth of detailed information for the student interested in these campaigns.

Polmar, Norman and Mersky, Peter B. *Amphibious Warfare, An Illustrated History*. New York: Sterling, 1988. 192pp. $34.95

This is a quick tour of amphibious warfare during and after World War II, well supported by photographs, though not quite so well with maps. The emphasis is on the American experience. The book will be convenient as an introduction for those who know little about the subject and as a quick reference for those who know more.

Suvorov, Viktor. *Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1988. 213pp. $3.95

Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, a.k.a Viktor Suvorov, who first introduced the West to the Soviet Special Forces or Spetsnaz, has now written a book on this subject. While his earlier works created a sensation by revealing the existence of this elite and deadly force, they contained only one or two chapters that specifically discussed Spetsnaz. This volume contains greater detail on this mysterious, but interesting component of the Soviet military with descriptions of the Spetsnaz' history, training, and equipment. Particularly noteworthy is a chapter that explains the close relationship existing between the Soviet Union's top athletes and the Spetsnaz: many athletes are also trained Spetsnaz agents. The book concludes with several chapters on typical tactics and a fictitious scenario for Spetsnaz employment, in a Warsaw Pact/Nato war. Although no major surprises are contained in this work, it is highly readable and does serve to provide additional information on a subject about which little published material exists.

Taylor, H.A. *Fairey Aircraft Since 1915*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 450pp. $29.95

This is another in a long series of aviation catalogs, published first in England and then in this country, detailing the products of various aircraft manufacturing companies from beginning to end, or, as in a few cases, to the present. As did the others in the series, this book contains extensive information about each aircraft and many interesting photographs. One, for example, shows a Flycatcher fighter "emerging from the upper hangar deck . . . starting to fly-off from the 60-foot lower deck of HMS *Glorious*." It has been a long time since anyone in any navy has seen an event such as that.

Ψ